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Int r o d u c t i o n
There is a disagreement among anthropologists and the sociologists, re­
garding the meanings of the word caste. For example, Dumont and Pecock 
argue that a caste system is distinguished from other sorts of social 
stratification because it is connected with particular religious beliefs. 
Where these beliefs are held, then caste exists: where they are not,
social stratification may exist, but it is not a caste system. They 
write:
The caste system can only be understood when we re­
alize that it is permeated by essentially religious 
conceptions and further that these religious concept­
ions are based upon a social apprehension of the pure 
and the impure (contributions to Ind. Soc., II, 1958: 47).
Contrasted to their view is a view shared by Barth, Berreman and Bailey.
Barth writes:
If the concept of caste is to be useful in sociological 
analysis its definition must be based on structural 
criteria and not on particular features of the Hindu 
philosophical scheme.
(ed. Leach 1962: 145)
Like Barth, Berreman holds that caste is a form of rigid social stratifica­
tion and may occur in any society.
Adherence to a religious principle may not significantly 
affect the attitudes and behavior to which logic would 
seem, or to which dogmas attempts, to tie it. A com­
parison of the realities of caste attitudes and inter­
action in India and the United States suggests that no 
group of people is content to be low in a caste hierarchy 
to live a life of inherited deprivations and subjection - 
regardless of the rationalizations offered them by their 
superiors or constructed by themselves. This is one of 
many points in which further cross cultural comparison, 
and only cross cultural comparison of caste behaviour 
might be conclusive.
(Am. Jr. of Soc. 1960: 12'7)
Berreman’s conclusions are that caste is a hierarchy of endogamous divi­
sions in which membership is hereditary and permanent (1960: 127) .
Bailey writes:
The rigidity characteristic of caste can, however, be 
criticized on the grounds that it is not so much an 
ultimate criterion, but rather a suggestion inviting 
further analysis. This analysis can proceed in two 
ways: a) either one can say that status ascription
at birth and status immutability is underwritten by 
a set of beliefs about pollution; or b) one can say 
that status ascription at birth and status immutability 
are entailed by other structural characteristics, 
whether these are analytic (i.e. entailed in a strict 
sense, meaning included in the definition of birth 
ascription and status immutability) or they are 
synthetic (i.e. empirically the case - for example 
that caste is always associated with a particular kind 
of economy, or never found in societies above a certain 
population level. One does not have to choose between 
these definitions, in the sense that if one is right the 
other is wrong: (a) concerns culture, (b) concerns 
structure. To follow one rather than the other reflects 
one’s interest or one’s training, nothing more. To set 
them up as alternatives makes for disputation but not 
for understanding.
(Archiv. Europ. Soc. IV. 1963: 113-4)
It will be agreed that such ambiguity in the meaning of the word caste
is confusing. In the words of Leach:
Such double usage is unfortunate; the tendency to stress 
the status-group components of caste prejudges the whole 
question as to what is the essential sociological nature 
of the Indian phenomenon. Conversely the merging of class 
and caste concepts is liable to lead to a highly distorted 
image of the nature of '’colour barTJ and other manifesta­
tions of rigid social differentiation.
( 1962: 1)
It seems that the disagreement regarding the meaning of the word caste
emanates from a lack of agreement concerning the role of religion in
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systems of action. Following Firth, here religion is being defined 'as 
a concern of man in society with basic human ends and standards of 
values, seen in relation to non-human entities or powers', (1964: 229).
The confusion arises because Dumont and Pocock find the manifestation 
of this concern in purity and pollution and therefore consider caste as 
a uniquely Indian phenomenon. Barth and Berreman who do not regard the 
role of religion as significant, define caste in structural terms only.
This research attempts to answer the question; does religion have a 
significant role in systems of action? The hypothesis is that religion 
does have a significant role in systems of action and therefore the 
word caste can justifiably be used in the Indian context. It is in 
this sense that the word caste has been used in this thesis.
I have tested the hypothesis in communities in Indo-Paz'kistan subcontinent. 
The religion of the majority in India is Hinduism and that of the major­
ity in Pakistan is Islam. Until recently India and Pakistan made up a 
single country. They have a long common history and have shared ethnic 
groups, migrations, invasions, conquerors, and empire builders as well 
as law, technology, administration and economic institutions. Rural 
communities in the two countries exhibit a very similar social structure. 
Every village contains a number of endogamous groups each called caste 
in India and koam in Pakistan. These groups have precedence over one 
another thereby forming a hierarchy.
I have compared social hierarchies in India with those in Pakistan to 
test the hypothesis. I regard social hierarchies as forms in which social
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roles are ranked in a society. These forms are products of both 
structural and cultural factors. Following Mill’s method of difference 
in ’experimental inquiry’, I have attempted to bring out the role of 
cultural factors (religion in this study) through-a comparison between 
social hierarchies in the two countries. Instead of comparing different 
instances of a phenomenon, to discover in what they agree, this method 
compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non­
occurrence to discover in what they differ (1906: 257). In the present 
study the ’instance of occurrence’ consists of common formative factors 
and the instance of ’nonoccurrence' consists of Hinduism.
This method appears to be free from some drawbacks which characterize 
the comparative method adopted by many scholars in this field. Usually 
comparisons are made between caste in India with structures outside the 
Indian scene. Some examples are Chappie and Coon (1942: 437), Nadel 
(1954: 9-22), Donoghue (LIX, 1957: 1000-17). These scholars find ’caste' 
in Arabia, Polynesia, Africa, Guatemala, and Japan. Others such as 
Allison Davis, B. Gardner, M. Gardner (1969: 1-15)^ , Dollard (1957: 61-3), 
Gallagher (1938:109), Myrdal (1944: 668-75), Warner (1936: 234-7), and 
Berreman (1960: 121-7), refer to Negro-white relations in the United 
States, and particularly in the South as being those of caste. Yalman 
(ed. Leach 1962: 78-111), and Barth (ed. Leach 1962: 113-46) find 
similarities between the Indian caste and systems of social strati­
fication in Ceylon and Swat respectively.
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Tambiah has pointed out the^drawbacks of the above method in these 
words:
If we start with the assumption that there is something 
common between them, then we shall concentrate on patterns 
that appear similar and measure the degree of their simi­
larity on some kind of quantitative scale. The danger in 
this approach is that we may artifically separate and lose 
signt of the total phenomonen. A similar objection applies 
to the method which selects elements of expressive symbolism 
such as pollution from the total context of social relations 
and attempt to explain them in terms of general human psy­
chological propensities. Psychological universals do not 
explain differences in social types.
(ed. Reuck 1967: 328)
I find from my own research in Swatt that one is likely to misread facts 
as Barth appears to have done, while attempting to find similarities 
between Indian caste and other systems of social stratifications. He 
writes:
...Saints cannot compete with Pakhtuns in wealth even 
though they claim the highest ritual status.
( ed. Leach 1960: 141)
This is a questionable generalization. There are many instances of 
'saints’ competing for wealth and power. One such notable instance is 
that of Miangual Abdul Wadud, otherwise known as Badshah Sahib, a 
'Saint by caste' by Barth's definition. He gradually became the 
wealthiest and most powerful man in Swat. Leach is correct when he 
writes:
I believe that social anthropologists are like the medieval 
Ptolemaic astronomers; we spend our time trying to fit the 
facts of the objective world into the framework of a set of 
concepts which have been developed a priori instead of from 
observation.
(1961: 26). 5
I have limited the comparison to the political and economic hierarchies 
only. By political hierarchy I mean ranking according to power, author­
ity and influence. When analyzing a political hierarchy I ask: a.) who 
occupies which position in the scale of power, authority and influence?
b.) why does a group occupy the position which it does?, c.) how far is 
the element of religion a determinant in the political hierarchy?, d.) 
is the position ascribed or achieved?
By economic hierarchy I mean ranking according to command over resources. 
When analyzing economic hierarchy I ask: a.) who occupies which position 
in the scale of command over resources?, b.) why does a group occupy the 
position which it does?, c.) how far is religion a determinant of 
economic hierarchy?, d.) is the position ascribed or achieved? I justify 
the limitation of the comparison to political and economic hierarchies 
only, on the following grounds: a.) as has been shown by Bales, ranking
according to power and authority as well as access to resources is a 
structural feature of all group life including even small groups tested 
in the laboratory (1950: 73). Thus such a ranking can serve as a common 
denominator in comparison between different groups, b.) the role of 
cultural factors like religion and kinship can be discovered through 
questions such as 'who occupies which position in the hierarchies and 
why1 and therefore both culture and kinship are variables.
Let me briefly restate my position: my first assertion is that role
differentiation is a structural concomitant of all human collective 
living and that roles tend to be evaluated forming hierarchies. My 
second assertion is that societies differ in regard to the evaluation
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of the attributes of the incumbents of these hierarchies. Williams
writes:
The accepted scales of valuation of different societies, 
or even of subgroup in the same society, often have 
little in common. How for instance does one judge accu­
rately the relative standing of a Spanish bishop of the 
Roman Catholic Church, a Brahman, a French general, an 
American millionaire, a Russian commissar, a Swedish 
scientist, a member of the English nobility? Individuals 
occupying these positions have high ranks in their respect­
ive social systems.
( 1970: 102)
Simmel expresses this as follows:
All leaders are also led, in innumerable cases the master 
is the slave of his slaves...In the grossest fashion, 
this is shown by the journalists who give content and 
direction to the opinion of a mute multitude. But he is 
nevertheless forced to listen and guess what the tendencies 
of this multitude.are, what is desired to hear, and to have 
confirmed and whither it wants to be led.
(ed. Wolff ( 1950: 181-6)
Udy’s empirical researches in 150 non-industrial societies also express 
the same view:
...it was found that much of the technologically unexplained 
variation could be accounted for by the political structure 
of the society concerned; predominantly political influences 
under certain conditions tend to override the technological 
considerations in determining organizational structure.
( 1959: 126)
My third assertion is that because, excepting religion, formative fact­
ors in communities in India and Pakistan are common, a comparison be­
tween social hierarchies in the two countries brings out the role of 
religion in systems of action. This was true of the days when the 
communities were not beset by modern influences and this is true also
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today. It is on this account that this is a diachronic study.
It is necessary to explain here what I mean by concepts 'powerf,’author­
ity1, 'influence'. By power I mean latent force or the ability to use 
force. Force means the reduction or limitation or closure or even total 
elimination of alternatives to the social actions of one person or group 
by another person or group.
( Bierstedt 1950: 730-8)
Authority is delegated or institutionalized power. A body is said to be 
having influence over those who make a choice in conformity with the 
body's wishes without any apparent coercion. Influence is persuasive.
It is voluntary to a much greater degree than is power. Though power 
and influence have some common characteristics, one may be distinguished 
from the other. They are independent variables. Karl Marx was not a 
man of power but his influence has certainly been great. A common char­
acteristic of power and influence is legitimization or 'ground' in the 
terminology employed by Gerth and Mills:
An adequate understanding of power relations thus involves 
a knowledge of the grounds on which a power holder claims 
obedience, and the terms in which the body feels an 
obligation to obey.
Further:
Power is simply the probability that man will act as 
another man wishes. This action may rest upon fear, rational 
calculation of advantages, lack of energy to do otherwise, 
loyal devotion, indifference or a dozen other individual 
motives...penalty alone does not bring obediance.
( 1953: 193, 195)
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Finally I give below the arrangement of the presentation. It has three 
parts. The first is devoted to five communities in India and second to 
one community in West Pakistan. The third part contains conclusions.
The five communities in India are Gaon in Western India, Ramkheri in 
Central India, Bisipara in Eastern India, Sripuram in Southern India, and 
Rampur in Northern India. The community in West Pakistan is Malakpur. 
Published research reports are the only sources of information about the 
Indian communities. In the case of Pakistan the sources of information 
include research publication by Eglar, District Gazetteers, and my own 
field work in the winter of 1969. The names of the village in Pakistan 
are fictitious.
The discussion of each community is divided into three parts viz., a 
brief discussion of the village population, political hierarchy and 
finally economic hierarchy. Each hierarchy has been presented in two 
parts. The first part comprises description and identification of the 
hierarchy in question and the second part contains discussion concern­
ing questions such as "why do the groups occupy the position in the 
hierarchy which they do?"
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GAON 
HENRY ORENSTEIN
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
PRINCETON/NEW JERSEY, 1965
GAON
Gaon is situated near Poona, Maharashtra. It has a total population of 
1421 persons comprising both old and new residents. Old residents number 
1081 and new residents 340. Recently there has been a substantial influx 
of immigrants into the village. This is why there are over 300 newcomers 
in Gaon. The caste composition of the village is given in the following 
$able. As each caste has a main occupation, the Table also gives names of 
castes along with the main occupation of each. Forty persons are non-Hindus. 
They are not a Hindue caste and therefore have not been shown in the Table.
TABLE I - Population and Occupation of Long Standing Castes
Old and New Residents
Caste Main Occupation Old Resident Population New-Resident Population
Households Persons Households Persons
Brahman Family priest 5 27 1 4
Gurav Temple priest 4 22 - -
Maratha Agr ic ultur is t 48 312 26 176
Sonar Goldsmith 1 5 _ -
ICumbhar Potter 9 67 - -
Sagar Rajput Agriculturalist 46 291 11 59
Keli Water carrier 2 7 - -
Nhavi Barber 1 4 1 7
Lohar Blacksmith 2 10 - -
Parit Washerman 1 6 - -
Ramosi Watchman 2 10 1 3
Kaikadi Basketmaker 3 12 1 5
Cambhar Leather Worker 13 73 - -
Mahar Scavanger 24 117 2 9
Mang Rope Maker 22 112 5 43
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Castes which have settled in Gaon only recently.
TABLE 2 - Population and Occupation of New-Resident Castes
Caste Main Occupation  Population___
Households Persons
Mali Gardener 7 38
Dhangar Shepherd 1 5
Bhoi Fisherman 2 5
Vadari Earth Worker 1 7
Ghadsi Musician 2 1
Holar Musician 2 12
Mang Gardui Cattle Breeder 2 7
Administratively Gaon is a part of Vadi, a settlement about two 1
away. The above Tables show only those castes which live in Gaon. The 
entire population of Gaon itself does not live in a single settlement. 
Many landowning families have shifted to houses built on their farms. 
Thus, a number of hamlets, the most important of which are the Rajput 
hamlet and the Maratha hamlet, constitute a part of Gaon.
12
THE POLITICAL HIERARCHY
Traditionally Rajputs are at the head of the political hierarchy. Both 
headmen, the police patil and the revenus patil, are Rajputs. A very 
high majority of leaders namely, ten out of thirteen are Rajputs. It 
is they who run the village. They organize community affairs and lead 
in the collection of funds for village projects. They are sought to 
settle disputes. Even the patils consult them before making any im­
portant decision concerning the village. Their importance may be judged 
from the fact that the decisions made by panchayat, (village council), 
representing Gaon and Vadi regarding the removal of the dilapidated 
houses in the main settlement remained a dead issue. Evidently it was 
because these leaders were not involved in that decision.
Yet all Rajput leaders are not equally influential. The Bal Rajputs com­
prising eight households were clearly higher in this respect than the 
Annas who comprised nine households. This was evident from a number of 
incidents. Oneone occasion a Rajput made sexual advances toward a Rope- 
maker girl who was working in a field. Later her sister reprimanded the 
offender and slapped him. As a measure of retaliation, the young man 
manhandled her husband with the help of some other people. The Bals * 
demonstrated their influence as well as their support to the Rope-makers 
by not only beating up the young man but also getting him fined.
Another instance is a dispute between a farmer of high caste and a group 
of Harijans. The farmer accused the Harijans of stealing jagari, (a kind
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of raw sugar) and threatened to get them "externed" from the village.
The Harijans insisted that the Ja/gari in question was a baluta (tradi­
tional patron-client economic relations) payment and approached the Bals 
for help. Thereupon the Bals testified to the magistrate in Poona that 
the Harijans were men of good character and saved them from being externed 
(p. 191).
A third instance is the occasion when Bal invited the Harijans to enter 
the compound of a Brahman household and to take out water from the 
Brahman's well. This happened on an Independence Day. This was an un­
precedented act and neither the Brahman nor anyone in the village could 
protest.
Finally, perhaps the clearer demonstration of the political primacy of the 
Bals was evident in an incident which took place at Hanuman Jayanti in 1956. 
It was customary to erect a pole, (malkhamba)yhich the young men of the 
village used for calisthenics. The Annas (Rajput) decided to erect a 
separate pole and asked two men of the Leather-worker caste to proceed with 
the work. Many villagers, especially the Bals objected to this. The two 
Leather-worleers were beaten and the Annas project was halted. The matter 
did not end here and the next day many Annas were caught and were beaten 
by the Bals.
The second in political hierarchy were the Marathas. Among the village 
leaders two were Marathas. One of them lived outside the village but
* Required by court order to stay out of the district.
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exerted considerable influence, the other, who lives in the village, is 
very assertive and aggressive. Such a paucity of leadership has placed 
the Marathas in a somewhat less important position in the village political 
life.
The Brahmans are third in the hierarchy. Two village leaders are Brahmans. 
The fact that the Brahman leaders are not aggressive makes the caste less 
politically significant.
Other castes in the village did not have any notable leadership and play 
only subordinate roles. Generally speaking the ’clean castes’ support 
the Anna Rajputs and the Harijans support the Bal Rajputs. Such a 
cleavage in the village however, is of a kind different that what have 
been called "horizontal and vertical cleavages." Here though the Rajputs 
are divided into two factions, (dividing the caste into two groups), their 
supporters maintain cohesion of their respective castes. Orenstien ex­
plains it as follows:
As a result, some people conceived the village as divided 
into two "parties," the "main settlement party" and the 
"Anna party". In fact the split was not so sharp or all- 
embracing as they seem to think. Many important villagers 
lived outside the settlement, nowhere near the Anna hamlet, 
and though these sympathized with the Annas, they did not 
openly side with them, but remained neutral. Most of those 
who lived in or near the main settlement also sympathized 
with the Annas but continued to maintain a facade of friend­
liness with the Bals. Thus the feuding groups did not have 
a clearcut boundaries of all inclusiveness of the "factions" 
reported from other parts of India. (P. 88)
Nor perhaps can the two factions be ranked in a definite political hierarchy.
It appears to be as follows:
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1. Rajput (a) Bal
(b) Anna
2 Mar tha
3 Brahmans
4 Others
Recent constitutional changes have provided the Harijans to improve their 
political status. Seats have been reserved for them in village panchayat 
and other elected assemblies. There is one such seat in the joint 
panchayat of Gaon and Vadi. However, the Harijan member is a man of no 
consequence and the political status of the Harijans is almost unchanged.
Not long ago there was a dispute between Rajput landowners and the 
Scavengers regarding bluta payments. The Scavengers refused to work but 
later begged for forgiveness. It was only after they had apologized that 
they were allowed to live and work in the village. (p. 157).
Contrasted to the village scene a different political hierarchy appears 
to be shaping up in the larger political arena of the taluka,(subdistrict), 
the district and the state as a whole. Many caste organizations encompassing 
large number of villages have come into existence. They are of two types.
In one of the types the organization is theoreatically open to all castes.
In actual practice, however, the members belong to one or a group of con­
gruous castes. The professed aims of these organizations are to bring 
about changes on the state and national level. The Schedule Caste Federa­
tion and the Styasodhak Smaj are examples of this type. Both cater to 
Harijans and are anti-Brahman. In the second type of caste organization
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membership is restricted both in theory and in practice to a single 
caste. These organizations aim at uplifting their own castes. An 
example of this type os Dhanger Association. It is doubtful if political 
change in the larger arena have brought about any significant changes in 
the political hierarchy in the village, excepting perhaps that hostility 
on caste lines is increasing.
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BOrenstein explains political hierarchy in the following words:
Membership in appropriate traditional bhauki was an 
important determinant of leadership. The most sign­
ificant bhauki was, of course, that of the Kokes; all 
of the Rajputs listed were of this group. All kokes 
in Gaon were thought of as the Patils of the the village, 
and they thought of themselves in this way. As a re­
sult they had a "natural" right to lead others. More 
than any others, therefore, they were prone to seek 
power, either by direct assertion of themselves or by 
subtly placing themselves in position of influence.
Others accepted their leadership more readily precisely 
because their bhauki held'legitimate rights to power"
(P. 178)
Srinivas comments on the emergence of "legitimate rights to power" as 
follows:
Opportunities for seizing political power were more likely 
to be available to the leaders of the dominant castes, and 
even tribes, than to others. This is why in South India 
dominant peasant castes such as the Marathas, Reddis,
Vellalas, Nayars, and Coorgs have been able to claim 
Kshatriya status. Numerical strength and the prestige and 
power coming from ownership of land put them in a strategic 
position for capturing political power in periods of un­
certainty, which were only too frequent.
Quoting Pannikar and Shah, Srinivas holds that this situation was not con­
fined to South India. The Pala dynasty of Bengal in the medieval period 
was "Shudra" in origin, and the Patidars of Gujrat was a caste of local 
peasants. He elaborates the process of social mobility in the following 
words.
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When a leader of a dominant caste or small chieftain 
graduated to the position of a raja or king,acquiring, 
in the process, the symbolic and other oppurtenances of 
Kshatriyahood, he in turn became a source of mobility for 
individuals and groups living in his domain. A necessary 
concomitant, if not precondition, of such graduation was 
Sanskritization, that is the acceptance of the rites, be­
liefs, ideas and values of the great tradition of Hinduism 
as embodied in the sacred books. For instance a king who 
did not have the requisite number of Brahmans for perform­
ing an important ceremony did not hesitate to raise members 
of a lower ranking group to the status of Brahmans.
(ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968: 190)
The case of Gaon Rajputs has been less dramatic. Once Dhanger (shepherd) 
they decided in a caste council to up-grade their caste and call them­
selves as Sagar Rajputs, apparently after they had acquired landed 
property in Gaon as well as in the adjacent areas (P. 145). It might be 
maintained therefore that factors which go to "legitimize right of a caste" 
to political power include, organization and leadership, wealth and ritual 
purity (ascribed or achieved). The significant questions are: Was a caste 
pure enough to have unhampered social interaction with high castes? Has the 
caste been wealthy enough to attract followers? Was the nature of its 
occupation such that it could interest itself in political activities?
The present political primacy of the Gaon Rajputs has such a history.
The Marathas rank numerically highest in the village (Table 1), but are 
second in the political hierarchy. This is not because they are ritually 
handicapped. They associate themselves with Sivaji’s conquest and the 
Kshatriya varna. They wear the "sacred thread" and rank fourth in wealth 
in Gaon. Though recorded as "pure Soodras of the Books" the villager
19
never thought of them as in the Sudra varna (P. 45). Their secondary 
political position is apparently due to a lack of leadership and active 
interest in the village affairs. Another explanation appears to be that 
"the Marathas did not consider themselves dominant in the village and so 
did not compete so much with one another in order to exercise domination"
(P. 90). Contrasted to them are the Rajputs. "All Kokes (Rajput) were 
patils" (P. 89).
The Brahmans have only two households and are the wealthiest caste in the 
village. Until recently their occupation was Kulkarni (village accountant). 
They were village servants and received baluta payments. Their duties in­
cluded collecting taxes, maintaining records of land and land rights, as 
well as checking crops. This gave them considerable power and influence. 
After the appointment of talathi (accountant appointed by government) they 
have lost much of their earlier importance, though still regarded by some 
as important men. (PP. 173,267). Their third position in the political 
hierarchy may be ascribed to mainly to their passive role and to their small 
numbers.
In the case of Harijans "low-caste membership was probably an obstacle to 
the assumption of power" (P. 179). A wealthy Leather-worker who was well 
qualified and was of proper age to act as a leader was not regarded as a 
leader by anyone in the village.
Orenstein concludes that the primary determinants of village leadership are 
wealth and membership in the proper traditional bhauki (local subcaste). 
Probably these conclusions do not explain many things. The association of
id
leadership with, any particular group in a community is not an unusual 
phenomenon* it may take place in any feudal society or in the Negro- 
White southern United States. Again, even in the case of the high 
castes in India which are associated with leadership today, it would be 
difficult to say with any certainty if they had enjoyed such a status 
all through history. As has been pointed out earlier, kings are known 
to have raised many castes to higher ranks and the possibility that caste 
mobility has been taking place through migration cannot be ruled out.
But probably what is significant is the fact that an individual is in­
extricably linked with his bhauki in many ways. His full membership of 
a bhauki is dependent upon the origin of his parents. He is denied full 
membership, should any one of his parents belong to any unacceptable 
bhauki♦ He shares deity with his bhauki. In case of a death of a member 
in the bhauki he is automatically polluted and has to be in a state of 
sutuk (defilement of kinsmen resulting from death of a married person). 
along with other members. In case of his own death his mortuary rites 
have to be performed by the members of his own bhauki to which he belongs. 
The spouses for his children may only be sought in bhauki/of a definite 
ritual specification. He is identified with his bhauki in social inter­
course. The rules regarding commensality or acceptance of water, smoking 
and shaking hands, forms of address and seating arrangements are all 
identical for everyone in the bhauki.
The significance of inextricable links of the individual with his bhauki 
is evident in two ways. First, is the direction of the cleavage. For 
instance let us compare the cleavages in Gaon with those in Tararwala.
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The existence of hostility within the bhauki was overtly 
recognized and attested to by the villagers. Inquiry 
about the matters or even about matters not directly on 
the subject, often elicited statements such as, in the 
words of one man, "brothers always fight ... there is 
always fighting among bhauki members"... Open conflict 
resulting in a sharp division within a kheri bhauki ex­
isted in the Koke group, the main bhauki of Rajputs.
The feud included many but not all Kokes. Seventeen 
households were involved. Conflict between the two groups 
was intense. Physical violence occurred at times, and on 
some occasions, especially ceremonials, even pitched 
battles (P. 86-7).
Presumably, Bals and Annas cames together on ceremonials. This is because
In the kheri bhauki as a whole, two of the most import­
ant areas of obligation and cooperation were in marriage 
and death. It was considered absolutely necessary at the 
time of death to have kheri bhauki members assist in re­
moving the dead body from the house. They were required 
to be among the "Pall bearers" who carried the deceased 
to the place of cremation or burial. In deciding on a 
spouse for one's child, it was thought highly desirable 
to have some mature member of the kheri bhauki,partici- 
pate, at least nominally, in the decision..."Tf someone goes 
to the other village to choose a girl without people of 
his kheri bhauki, no one will give him respect or value.
They will think there is something wrong with him5 (P. 85).
The situation in Tararwals is different. Inayat IJllah writes:
The faction in its climax becomes a strongly totalitarian 
group. Efforts are made to harmonize the economic in­
terests and social activities/pf every member family to 
that of the group through social control till no aspect 
of the individual life remains uncontrolled.
Within the faction, each member family is assigned a de­
finite role. Some guide and lead the faction. Some 
finance it in times of trouble. Others provide the hands 
to fight. Social inequality which is quite sharp otherwise, 
is reduced within the faction, as it is less determined by 
birth or caste privileges and more by devotion to the cause 
of the group. Desertion of one's faction lowers the moral 
credit of the family. It is usually regarded as unpardon­
able offence.
Inayat Ullah shows the composition of factions in the village as in the 
following Table.
TABLE 3 - "Caste” Composition of Patti-based Faction in Tararwala*
In 1957
Name of caste
Tarrar - Land owners
Warraich
Mangat
Cheema
Gondal
Gakkhar
Faqir
Hajra
Sangranna
Bawra
Joya
Lilia
Awan
Rajput
Bhatti
Teli- Oil-presser
Nai-Barber
Machhi-Baker'
Kumhar - Pqtter 
Mochi - Cobbler 
Lahar - Blacksmith 
Tarkhan - Carpenter 
Julaha - Weaver 
Arain 
Mirasi
Mussali-Farm labourer
Sayyed
Dindar
Unknown (refugee)
Total families
Faction
m -N
1
1
15
3
1
Families connected with 
Two factions/All factions
1
55 12 17 12
Each faction is denoted with the initial letter of the name of the respective 
leaders of the 3 factions.
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He continues:
From this table it can be seen that factions extended 
their hold over 71 per cent of the families of the 
village. These families are exclusively attached to 
one of the three factions. All families belonging to 
M and G have a hostile attitude toward one another.
But this hostility is most intense among the families 
which are the nucleus of the factions and decreases 
among the outer, "parasitic" families. In faction M 
the nucleus families are of the Tarar caste, while on 
Faction G Mangat, Warraich and Tarar together constitute 
the base of the faction.
The nucleus family of each faction would not have any 
social or economic relations with one another; no member 
of these families would speak to his counterpart. They 
would not sit, play or smoke huqqa together; wherever 
any member of one of the nucleus families of one faction 
is sitting, members of nucleus families of the other 
faction would not sit. They would not exchange greetings. 
Everybody would try never to let his cattle nor himself 
go to the fields belonging to the other faction. They 
would not sell; or buy things from one another. They 
would not rent or borrow land. They would not participate 
in any social ceremony with them. They would not even 
perform the "id" and the usual prayers together. Even 
on sad occasions like a funeral the hostility would persist. 
Attempts would be made to cause harm to the other faction 
whenever possible, openly or secretly; false rumours, 
damaging the honour of the other group would be spread; 
stories of sexual infidelity coined and circulated.
Efforts would be made whenever possible to turn any 
benefit of the others into a loss. False evidence and 
sometimes fictitious suits would be lodged to harm the 
others.
(Sociologus Vol. 8; 1958; 176-8)
A second way in which the significance of links between an individual and 
his bhauki is evident, is, in what might be called "caste psychology".
By this I mean that members of a bhauki and subcaste cultivate a thought 
pattern which classifies the word into "one’s own caste" and those "not 
in one’s own caste', the "we group" and "they group". This thinking has 
been extended to regions and states and what Srinivas calls "caste fusion"
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as communications improve (ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968; 199). The caste 
associations reported in Maharashtra and elsewhere in India are probably 
the embodiments of this psychology.
It is necessary here to take note of "Structures of Politics in the Villages
of Southern Asia", a recent paper by Nicholas. He begins by locating the
social cleavages which organize political conflict. He identifies two
ideal types of cleavages, vertical and horizontal. Vertical cleavages
divide structurally equivalent political groups, and horizontal cleavages
divide super and subordinate groups from one another. He shows the
relationship between some crucial features of village social structure
and the direction of political cleavage. His conclusions which he draws
from data from nineteen villages in India are as follows:
There are two factors, found repeatedly in Indian villages, 
which are conducive to the development of vertical political 
cleavages: a.) considerable dispersal of agricultural lands 
among cultivating families as is found, ideally, under 
ryotwari land tenure, and b.) a dominant caste group that 
is a majority of the village population. A combination of 
these two factors is ordinarily associated with political 
conflict between factions.
A second set of factors, often closely associated with one 
another also frequently leads to vertical political 
cleavages; these are joint, or mahalwari land tenure, by 
a dominant caste group organized on segmentary lineage 
principles. Each of the vertically divided political 
groups in this case is generally composed of a patrilineal 
segment of the dominant caste group, often localized in a 
"quarter" of the village, and its servants and dependents 
among the subordinate castes...
Political conflict between stratified groups, horizontally 
divided from one another, is the least frequent form in contem­
porary South Asian villages. Such conflict is most often 
associated with concentration of agricultural land in the 
hands ofnone or a few individuals as is found, ideally, 
under zamindari land tenure, and/or dominance of a village 
by a minority caste.
(ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968: 279-80)..
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Nicholas also discusses Tararwala, a village in Penjab West Pakistan.
The village has a mahalwari system of land tenure. He writes:
Exclusively on the basis of present caste composition, one 
might expect most political conflict in the West Panjab 
village of. Tararwala to occur between the dominant Tarar 
zamindari caste (8 per cent) and the low ranking but 
numerous Masalli 0-9 per cent) .
He goes on to say that conflict in this village occurs between patti (re­
latively self sufficient section of a village ) based factions rather than
between the super and the subordinate "castes". He gives three reasons 
for this apparently anamalous situation.
1. Land is actually held by members of several different 
zamindari castes collectively termed Jat (probably).
Jat - comprising 38 per cent of the village population
and occasionally intermarrying with one another.
2. Most families of subordinate kamin castes are in­
dividually tied to households of zamindari castes and 
thereby to pattis rather than to their village caste 
group.
3. Before 1947 the village was 30 per cent Hindu. The 
Hindus inhabited a major patti of the village; their 
departure must have worked a great change in village 
political alignments (1968: 278).
These conclusions clearly show the importance of the size of a caste and 
the form of a land tenure in political cleavages. However, as I have 
discussed in the final section, kinship and religion are also very signi­
ficant in political activity and it is in these respects that social 
hierarchies in India differ from those in Pakistan. Here it is sufficient 
to quote Nicholas once again:
Gareful study of a few cases of Indian village politics 
has recently led Bailey to conclude that all political 
conflict groups in these villages are factions; that is, 
in no case can all leader-follower ties be accounted for 
on the basis of a single structural principle or a single 
kind of recruitment, (ed. Singer and Cohen, 1968: 278).
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Before concluding the present section let me briefly answer the questions 
posed in regard to the analysis of a political hierarchy.
The Rajputs occupy the highest position because they are the wealthiest.
The fact that they spend more than other castes and are less exclusive make 
their style of life suited to political primacy. Further, their ritual 
rank and their traditional callings as rulers, warriors and landowners
legitimize their political primacy in the eyes of the people. Again, they
are better organized and have better leadership and experience in political 
affairs than any other caste in the village.
The high rank of the Rajputs in the political hierarchy is achieved in so
far as they become the largest landowners and thereby excercised political 
power. The position of those low in the political hierarchy, particularly 
the Harijans, is ascribed in so far as their ritual roles are imcompatable 
with roles of political leaders,
Hinduism is a significant element of the political hierarchy. This is 
manifested as follows:
a.) The ritual roles of unclean castes strongly militate against 
free social interaction with clean castes.
b.) An individual is ritually bound up with his agnates and this 
makes it extremely difficult for him to move up in the political hierarchy. 
He is identified with his sub-caste and therefore mobility has to be a 
group phenomenon.
c.) Intra-caste ritual ties and intercaste rules governing 
commensality and social interaction determine very largly the composition
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of group organized for political action. This explains why political 
groups tend to follow caste lines.
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Ec o n o m i c H ierarchy
In all probability each caste in Gaon followed the occupation with which 
it is traditionally associated at one point in historyt. The landowning 
castes were economically higher than craftsmen or specialists in that period. 
This is because the landowners had direct access to resources and the 
Others were dependent upon them. Thus the Rajputs and Marathas being 
landowners were higher than all other castes in the village. Their 
economic position was higher because i.e. Brahman, Temple-priest, Gold­
smith, Potters, Water-carrier, Barber, Blacksmith, Washerman, Basket- 
malcer, Leather-worker, Scavengar, Watchman and Rope-maker received baluta 
from them. This payment was made in the form of fixed share in the 
harvest. It seems that with the passage of time this economic setup under­
went many changes. In the first place, many of the hitherto dependents 
castes also acquired some land. These days almost each caste belongs to 
this land-owning category. The case of the Brahmans is particularly 
notable because they are one of the three wealthiest castes in the village 
(the others being Rajputs and Marathas) and yet they still receive baluta.
Another change in the economic set-up during the past years has been a 
gradual disassociation between a caste and its traditional occupation 
mostly in favor of agriculture. For exampe, five households of the Potter 
caste in a total of nine, have totally abandoned their traditional calling. 
One of the two Watchmen households has also abandoned its caste occupa­
tion. Again, in a total of thirteen households of Leather-workers only 
three are carrying on with the calling of their caste. Further, twelve
of twenty-four Scavenger households work as agricultural labourers and
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four in a total of twenty-two households of Rope-makers have taken to 
agriculture as a fulltime occupation. One of the Rope-makers is working 
as a Barber in Mot.
These changes have upset the old economic hierarchy. The hitherto de­
pendent castes are becoming increasingly independent. This is evident 
from a rapid decline of baluta. Orienstein reported in 1961 that "the 
baluta system was nearly entirely destroyed". (P. 293).
The old economic hierarchy is being threatened from another direction also. 
There is an increasing tendency on the part of the hitherto economically 
dependent castes to form cooperative societies and thus to raise their 
caste in the economic hierarchy. The Rope-makers are an example of this 
kind. They are planning to purchase on cooperative basis a rope-making 
machine. The Bagdis of Gaon are another example. In 1961, their plans 
to form a cooperative society were under way.
An approximate economic hierarchy in Gaon is as follows:
TABLE 4 - Caste Wealth in 1,000's of rupees
Caste Average Wealth by
Household
Brahman 
Rajput 
Watchman 
Maratha 
Potter
Temple Priest 
Leather Worker 
Blacksmith 
Scavenger 
Washerman 
Water Garrier 
Barber 
Goldsmith 
Rope Maker
26.72
20.80
12.25
10.11
4.92
4.48
3.88
3.43
2.82
0.80
0.78
0.53
0.30
0.13
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Is the. economic hierarchy in Gaon a product of rational economic motiva­
tion? Many writers would answer this in the negative. For example, 
commenting on jajmani (baluta) relations Naktipur and Sherupur Gould 
writes that there is no rational motivation in the traditional jajmani 
relations. He concludes:
Jajmani system persists because it maintains the status 
of social interaction that are essential for rural 
Hinduism...The jajmani system persisted in British times 
in spite of vicissitudes, because it did not depend upon 
the political superstructure, but upon the survival of 
Hinduism. Being a jajman meant being an orthodex Hindu 
whose value system made necessary the engagement of 
certain specialists. It continues because of the 
motivation of the peasantry to practice orthedox Hinduism 
quite apart from the wealth that can be gained in it.
The jajmani system is not the exploitation of feudalism, 
but the mutual wish to practice certain rituals and a way 
of life necessitating the avoidance of impurity. (1964,
38-9).
Mathur supports Gould’s views to a certain degree. He outlines a hierarchy 
of occupations and suggests that at the top of the hierarchy are those 
occupations prescribed for the Brahman, namely, temple and domestic priest­
hood, astrology and scholarship. These callings are very pure and do not 
involve occupational pollution. The second category of occupations in­
cludes soldiering, administration and land ownership. These occupations 
are not as pure as those of the Brahmans, because they involve killing, 
injuring, or harming living beings.
Trade and shop keeping comes next on the hierarchy of occupation, both 
these involve impure activities, such as dealing with oils, jagari, and
spices.
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The third category of occupations in the hierarchy consists of cultivating, 
tailoring, blacksmithing, carpentry and pottery-making. These occupations 
are ritually pure but somewhat "lowly". Cultivation involves injuring the 
earth, a Blacksmith has to use bellows made of hide and the Carpenter and
Potter kill the insects in the wood and clay.
Barbering is ranked next in the hierarchy of occupation. A Barber cuts 
the hair and massages the limbs of his clients. This involvement with 
human body makes a Barber’s occupation lower than the craftsmen.
Begging as an occupation is next in the hierarchy provided a person begs 
from the clean castes only. This is important because begging from un­
clean castes as does the ascetic Nath Jogi makes the status of the .begger 
unclean.
The Drummer’s occupation is impure because he comes into contact with 
animal skin and works even for untouchables.
The Oil-presser who ranks next in the hierarchy is also regarded impure 
because his occupation involves intentional killing of life in the seeds.
Cloth-weaving is regarded impure because the Weaver has to use a bow made
of animal tissues.
Washerman’s occupation ranks next because he washes soiled garments in­
cluding those worn by people during ritual pollution.
Basket-weaving and matmaking are impure because they involve handling of 
palm leaves and stalks which are intrinsically impure.
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Working with., leather is impure but skinning and tanning have a higher 
degree of impurity because these occupations require handling of dead 
animals.
Scavenging is regarded as a very highly impure occupation because 
Scavenger has to remove night soil, and to castrate calves, thus killing 
life germs of the extremely sacred cow, (1964: 153-6).
Elsewhere Mathur summarises his views as follows:
Restated so as to appear as a ritual prohibition, this 
rule would mean that "ritually clean" castes are pro­
hibited from taking to "impure or very impure" callings, 
ritually unclean castes are forbidden to follow both 
the pure and the very impure callings; the castes that 
are considered to be ritually untouchable must not 
pursue callings or trades which are "pure" or "impure".
(1958: 57)
He further adds that agriculture as a calling is an exception and is 
open to all castes. Thus, he recognizes a limited role of rational 
economic motivation.
Hocart, Thurston, and Leach also recognize ritual factors in economic 
hierarchy though in a somewhat different way. Theoretically the kamins 
(i.e. the craftsmen) have a monopoly over functions (Hocart: 1950: 48-9) 
The purifying functions of the Washerman give him some power (Thurston: 
1909:269). In the case of a class society, the majority competes for 
the favors of a wealthy minority, whereas inthe case of caste the minority 
competes for the services of the majority (Leach: 1960: 10) .
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I shall now consider how far does the evidence from Gaon support the 
views mentioned above* It indicates that a need for self sufficiency 
arose due to ecological factors. Relatively isolated as were the 
villages it was important for the farmers to have craftsmen at hand. 
Payments were made in kind at the time of harvest because it was con­
venient for the farmers. It also suited the craftsmen because baluta 
give them economic security. Probably that is why with the advent of 
improved communications and cash crops, as in the case in Gaon, baluta 
has almost disappeared (P. 293). It persists in those villages where 
there are no cash crops.
Again, there is nothing to prove that each caste has followed an occupa­
tion according to its "innate purity" without any change. There have 
been many upheavals and migrations in the past and it is hard to maintain 
that the occupation with which a caste is associated today has remained 
unchanged in the long course of history. Exigencies of circumstances, 
economic opportunities, political dominance or subordination are important 
factors and may not be ruled out. The examples of Leather-workers, Potters 
and the Rope-maker, who has become a Barber, show that rational economic 
motivation is significant in the choice of occupations and consequently 
in the economic hierarchy. Thus Gould’s views cannot be substantiated in 
the case of Gaon.
The assertions of Hocart, Thurston, and Leach also do not find support 
from Gaon. The cases of Scavengers and Rope-makers are two examples 
which show that the craftsmen do not have much power. As has been
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mentioned earlier the original Scavenger bhauki refused to work. The 
landowners imported another Scavenger bhauki in the community. Official 
records pertaining to traditional rights confirm this. There is but one 
bhauki listed for 1874 , two for 1884. (P. 65). Similarly the Rope- 
makers decided to purchase a rope-making machine in 1954. They needed 
the signatures of the patil in order to get a loan from the government 
for this purpose. The patil refused to acede to their request and they 
were not able to buy the rope making machine at that time. (P. 263).
Unlike the views of the above writers, those of Mathur do explain economic 
mobility in Gaon, though only partially. Almost all the castes have in­
creasingly taken to agriculture. Particularly notable are the Brahmans 
who once were dependent and are now one of the wealthiest in the village. 
Notable too is the Scavenger caste. In Table 4 their position is ninth 
in the village and rank higher than five castes, four of them being 
ritually higher than the Scavengers. Agriculture has played a major role 
in their economic mobility. Thus far, Mathur’s views are supported, but 
the position is different if one argues that this does not prove conclus­
ively his contention that ritual factors limit choice of occupations.
Can it not be justifiably maintained that agriculture was the principal 
road to economic mobility open to any caste irrespective of its ritual 
status? And further that economic mobility would not be through 
agriculture, were the modern economic opportunities, political security, 
and improved communications made available to Gaon a hundred years earlier. 
Judging from the cases of Leather-workers who opened a shop in Bombay
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and the Porter who became an employee in a cloth shop in Hot and the 
Hratha who became a tailor and the Rope-maker who became a Barber, it 
may be concluded that economic mobility does not seem to follow any 
rigid rules and further that most certainly rational economic motiva­
tion is one of the elements of economic hierarchy.
Another element in the economic hierarchy is the identification of 
individuals. Who eats with whom, who is willing to give spouses to 
one’s children and what is one’s occupation? An individual may change 
his occupation because he happens to be a man of initiative and enter­
prise and becomes wealthy, but it is not possible for him, all by himself, 
to choose groups for commensal and affinal relations. His acceptance 
in any group for these purposes depends upon how he is identified. This 
is why he sets about raising ritual and economic standards of his bhauki 
members along with his own. All economic upward mobility is a group 
affair and not an individual affair. This explains why the newly 
acquired wealth of the Leather-worker of Gaon brought about a general 
rise in the economic level of the caste of Leather-worker as a whole. This 
also explains why Gagdis and the Rope-makers are also forming cooperative 
societies on caste lines. It would be incorrect to equate caste associa­
tions with welfare societies because of the reasons for the formation of 
the two types are different.
To conclude: the various positions in the economic hierarchy are achieved
in so far as there is an evidence of rational economic motivation. The 
positions are also ascribed.
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ft seems, like that./the secular aspect of rank was 
primary in mobility and often of much, significance . 
in rank, tke yery basis of rank was vital,(pollution)..
High status, even if achieved largely by secular 
means, was always asserted through exclusiveness in 
the matter of vital. (P. 148).
The importance of religion as a factor in the economic hierarchy is 
evident from the fact that it necessitates a collective action on the part 
of a bhauki in situations involving social mobility.
In recent years many new castes have come to live in the village. These 
are Mali, Dhanger, Bhoi, Badari, Ghadsi, Holar, Mang Garudi (Table 2).
The occupations which these castes pursue were hitherto not followed by 
anyone in the village. Surely these occupations were not unknown to the 
villagers nor would it be correct to say that the occupations are economi­
cally worthless, the recent immigrants would not have followed them.
The only plausible explanation of the question, why did anyone from the 
old residents not change over to one of these new occupations, appears 
to be that the nesessary action in this direction was not taken by any 
bahulci in Gaon.
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Ramkheri
Ramkheri is situated seven miles from Dewas Town, the capital of Dewas 
Senior State, before its merger into the Indian Union. In 1955 the 
population of the village was 912 persons. The caste composition of the
village is given below:
TABLE 5 »
CASTE NAME POPULATION
Khati Farmer 181
Rajputs Landowners, Warriors 118
Balai Weaver 85
Chamar Tanner 69
Bhilala 64
Gosain 45
Teli Oil-presser 29
Brahman 28
Ahir Dairyman 26
Sutar Carpenter 25
Nai Barber 14
Nath 14
Kumawat Tobacco-curer 14
Mali Gardner 13
Gari Goatherd 10
Darzi Tailor 9
Balai Babaj i 9
Kumhar Potter 9
Bhangi Sweeper 8
Mina 8
Lohar Blacksmith 8
Doli Drummer 8
Bairagi 5
Bargunda Basket-maker 5
Bharbunjya Grain-parcher 2
806
Non-Hindus 106
Total 912
Ramkheri, has a nucleated form of settlement. Is is roughly divided into 
about twelve wards. There are two main areas of Rajput habitation, in 
the places where the headmen first settled. Around the Rajput houses are 
dwellings of allied castes. There is a strong tendency on the part of 
castes of roughly equal ritual purity to live in the same locality, and, 
it is clear which caste provides the nucleus in any ward. But in the 
Harijan wards there is clear separation, both from other castes and be­
tween the Harijan castes themselves.
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EQLIXICAL HIERARCHY, IJUW I KHERI.
Before 1946 during the days of the Maharaja's rule political leadership 
in Ramkheri clearly rested with the Rajputs. The village had four 
headmen, all Rajputs. The headman wielded great authority and enjoyed 
a considerable measure of independence in those times. In relation to 
the Maharaja he was a kind of viceroy and was permitted to administer 
the village without interference so long as he continued to pay an 
annual nazrana and taxes to the darbar (royal court) and kept the village 
at peace. That he might have a high status outside the village too, can 
been seen from the fact that the headman of village Hung in Malwa was a 
general of the Maratha armies who was granted land in recognition of his 
military services (S. W. Gazetteer, Vo. V: 1908). The headman was usually 
a powerful landowner and within the village besides being the representative 
of the Maharaja, acted as the principal link between the village and the 
court. It was customary for the influential men of the village to sit in 
a council under his chairmanship to discuss ways and means for the 
implementation of the Maharaja’s orders. One of his acknowledged functions 
was arbitration in intercaste disputes. Sometimes through his personal 
influence he brought about settlements. His other functions included the 
supervision of the village festivals and worship in forty-two shrines on 
behalf of the village whenever there was a cattle epidemic. These 
official and unofficial duties brought him into contact with almost every­
body in the village thereby giving him a thorough knowledge of its people.
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In performing his duties he was assisted by the village servants, 
theoretically twelve in number, the barabalauti CCensus of India, 1931 
Pt. 1:10). The patwari (village accountant) assisted the headman in the 
maintenance of records related to ownership of land and taxes. The 
village servants were paid in kind and some were remunerated by watan 
holdings (rent-free land).
The fact that the headman was a Rajput, raised the political rank of the 
Rajput caste as a whole. Mayer states that the influence of these Rajput 
leaders spread to the rest of the caste group. This was partly because 
the group was to some extent seen as undifferentiated by the rest of the 
village, and partly it was due to conscious efforts by all caste members 
to share in the prestige of their ruling caste mates. This tendency 
existed whether the caste members were wealthy and well regarded in the 
Rajput caste group or not. In Ramkheri even the poor relations of the 
headmen tended to act as leaders. For the Rajputs, village leadership 
was a caste thing, for the other castes it seems to have been the role 
of one or two big men of the caste, (P. 113). For instance some years ago 
there was an influential Cotton-carder whose advise was taken, and also 
some Oil-pressers and Farmers acted as arbitrators in disputes.
Constitutional changes introduced from time to time after 1946 have tended 
to upset the old political hierarchy. In the first place the headman has 
lost much of his authority and is now a salaried official with little more 
than ordinary routine duties. In the second place, adult franchise and 
creation of rural local bodies have opened channels to positions of power
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and influence, to all castes. Jfor example during the first elections to 
the Village Committee (Ganv Panchayat) held in 1946, only three Rajputs 
were elected in a total of eight. The remaining five comprised, one 
Brahman, one Farmer, one Trader, a Cotton-carder and an Oil-presser.
The Oil-presser was elected chairman of the committee. During the 1951 
elections one in a total of four members was a Balai Babaji, one a 
Brahman and the remaining two were Rajputs. During 1956 elections one in 
a total of five members was a Bhilala, one a Cotton-carder, one a Brahman, 
and the remaining two were Rajputs.
These developments indicate that the Rajputs are no longer regarded as 
the sole legitimate political leaders. That such a change in political 
hierarchy is taking roots is evident from the ineffective boycott of an 
Oil-presser on the part of the Rajput-dominated Comprehensive Committee.* 
This Oil-presser was boycotted soon after the installation of first 
elected Village Committee in 1946. In earlier times a boycotted man had 
no alternative but to leave the village. In this case, however, the 
boycott has been weathered successfully and the boycotted man is not only 
living in the village, but has also a group of supporters numbering about 
a dozen.
Yet the Rajputs still have primacy in Ramkheri as well as in the sub­
district. In both the most recent Village Committees the same Rajput 
has been the chairman and most powerful member. Again there was a high
* The Comprehensive Committee also called Sarvjanik Samiti was formed by 
the villagers six months after the first elections. It has 43 members 
representing all wards in the village.
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percentage of Rajput chairmen in 53 Village Committees in the subdistrict. 
TABLE 6
Caste
Number of V C Chairmen 
<1956) %■ ■
Rajput 20 38
Khati 12 23
Kalota 4 7
Brahman 8 15
Naita - -
Dakar 2 4
Other 7 13
Total 53 100
Still again, the Rajputs 
Central Committee.
TABLE 7
Caste
was disproportionately better represented in the 
Number of C C Members
%
1956
Raj puts 20 38
Khati 5 9
Kalota 3 6
Brahman 8 15
Naita, Dakkar & Others 17 32
Total 53; 100
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To sum up; The Rajputs are at the head of the political hierarchy. 
Next to them are the ’’clean castes" and lowest in the hierarchy are 
the "unclean castes". Recently the authority of the Rajputs was 
challenged by an Oil-presser with a group of supporters, but so far 
there is no serious threat to the primacy of the Rajputs.
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BIn this section I offer an explanation of the political hierarchy in 
Ramkheri. Wealth is an element of major importance in political 
hierarchy. The Rajputs are biggest landholders in Ramkheri and this one 
fact contributes very largely to their political power. Srinivas observes 
that landownership is a crucial factor in establishing dominance (1966: 12). 
Wiser remarks about the landowners are that they are so sure of their 
power they make no effort to display it. Yet, if one of them appears 
among men of working castes the latter express respect and fear in every 
guarded word and gesture (1951: 18-19).
A number of practices on the part of the Rajputs contribute toward their 
dominant political position. They tended to spend lavishly on marriage 
ceremonies and on funerary feasts and purificatory rites. Contrasted to 
the almost equally wealthy Farmers, who combined both rites as a money 
saving device, the Rajput performed these rites separately and invited 
more guests. Again, they did not engage in money lending possibly be­
cause it was considered mean. Their payments to the jajmans were pro­
portionately larger than those of others, demonstrating thereby their 
ability and willingness to spend more than other castes. Still again 
they were least exclusive. They had liberal commensal habits and per­
mitted the allied castes to eat in the same pangat, (line of persons at 
a meal). This practice held out the promise of equality to lower caste.
It seems that political hierarchy is disturbed if the roles are no longer 
clustered and the system is not involute on account of influences from
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outside the village. The political primacy of the Rajputs has been 
successfully challenged by an Oil-presser. This has been possible be­
cause he had relevant political relations with authorities in Dewas 
Town and also because he did not demand on the village for his living.
Religion is another element of major importance in the political 
hierarchy. This is evident in the following ways:
1.) Hinduism makes a distinction between "clean" and "unclean" 
castes and lays down dharma or rules of conduct for each. The role 
of the "unclean castes" involves relatively unclean occupations, 
restrictions on access to village temples, as well as restrictions 
upon free commensal relations and interactions with "clean castes". 
This makes the role of the "unclean castes" incompatable with roles 
of political dominance over "clean castes". Empirical evidence from 
the caste composition of 246 headmen in 233 villages during the days 
of the Maharajafs rule supports this conclusion. All but 1.6 percent 
were "clean caste". Presumably, the Bhilala headmen represented these 
villages in which the population was made up of "unclean castes" only.
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TABLE 8
Caste Number of Headmen Percentage
Rajput 102 41.5
Khati 29 11.8
Kalota 222 9.0
Brahman 19 7.7
Naita 17 6.9
Dakkar 13 5.3
Muslim 8 3.2
Kumawat 6 2.4
Deshwali 4 1.6
Bhilala 4 1.6
Other (less than 4) 22 9.0
246 100.0
13 villages have more than one headman, each of different caste. This 
explains why there are 246 headmen in 233 villages (Mayer, 1963: 92).
The political implication of the ritual disabilities of the "unclean castes" 
left them with two courses of actions. They could either continue to re­
main in their politically subordinate position. Alternatively it was 
necessary for them to improve their ritual status before they could per­
form any role of political dominance. This probably explains why the 
opportunities offered by universal enfrenchisement these days are
accomplanied by efforts on the part of the "unclean castes" to upgrade
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themselves in the ritual hierarchy, through what has been called 
sanskritization. An example of such efforts in the Bhilala caste 
in Ramkheri. They claim a Rajput descent and have abandoned many of 
their ritually unclean habits. However, even before the universal 
enfrenchisement it would be incorrect to state that in the field of 
religion and polities, we cannot say that cooperation entails the 
summation of roles and therefore caste refers to ritual status alone 
and so ignore its organizating role for political groups.
2.) Pharma lays down rules for the individual as well as for the
caste. Membership to a caste may be obtained by birth alone. Marriage 
may be contracted with a person of one's own subcaste and from a 
different gotra than ones own. Marriage of the children may not take 
place without ensuring that the ascendants of their spouses were of 
one’s own subcaste and of correct gotra. One is linked with one’s 
own agnates in more than one way. He worships a common Clan Goddess and 
a common Bheru. In case of the death of anyone of the agnates, he is 
polluted for a specific period and has to undergo purificatory and 
funerary rites. It is the duty of the caste members to see that no infringe'- 
ment of these rules takes place, and no member is accepted until he has 
fulfilled the prescribed conditions. The castes have therefore set up 
caste councils both in the village as well as in groups of village 
(pankhera). Cases of infringement of caste rules and intera-caste 
disputes are placed before these councils, thereby enforcing agnatic 
ties. The political implications of these rules have resulted in an in­
ability on the part of individuals to attain vertical mobility. All
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political vertical mobility must take place in groups. There is not a 
single instance of vertical mobility on the part of an individual in 
all the history of Ramkheiri. The Oil-pressers as a group however, have 
moved up in ritual, economic and political hierarchies.
3.) Dharma is a major determinant of the composition of what might 
constitute a group organized for political action. Ritual duties and 
obligations toward agnate militate against segmentation in the subcastes 
on the village level and even beyond. For example the Rajput were made 
up of two clans Ghauhan and Solanki, each with branches A and B. In 
the past Chauhan A has sometimes been alone, opposed by Chauhan B 
together with Solanki A and B; and there has also been times when 
Chauhan A and B stood united against Solanki A and B. That factions 
tend to follow agnatic links wherever these are available to followers 
within the village context of kinship is also examplified by the factions 
headed by Ambaram and Ramnath in the Farmer caste. Again, quarrels 
among Bhilala tend to divide the subcaste into the clan groups, each 
with its linked households. Yet it is noteworthy that outsiders have 
always regarded these castes as homogeneous units. This is presumably 
because of close interaction within the group for ritual purposes in 
spite of their factions. The Rajputs are an example. The emergence of 
jati sangh (caste associations) appear also to be founded upon the ritual 
ties. Again, the disproportionately high representation of Rajputs in 
the local bodies as well as the apparent partiality manifested by the 
Rajput dominated Central Committee toward Rajput villages in the alloca­
tion of funds (Tables 9 and 10), indicate that groups organized for
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political activities follow caste lines. The political implications of 
this form of political organization are that the village is horizontally 
divided into a number of social strata competing against each other.
TABLE 9 
Headman1s
Caste Per capita allocation standardized in Rs
Plan I Plan II
Percentage
Increase
Raj put 4.29 6.91 61.1
Khati 2.12 4.12 94.3
Kalota 3.40 4.94 45.3
Brahman 6,35 4.79 -24.6
Naita 3.09 2.36 -23.6
Dakkar 4.57 3.22 -20.5
Other 2.39 3.99 66.9
TABLE 10
Average per capita allocation 
(Standardized) in Rs
Caste of V C 
Chairman Plan I Plan II
Percentage 
Increaser
Rajput 4.30 5.68 32.1
Kalota 5.33 5.35 168.8
Brahman 3.84 4.44 15.6
Naita 2.87 ---- ---
Other 3.14 4.48 43.7
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ECONOMIC HIERARCHY
Like most of the villages in India, Ramkheri is an agricultural village. 
The overwhelming influence of agriculture is shown by the fact that the 
total number of men traditionally of agricultural castes (Farmers, 
Gardener, etc.) is only 69 whereas there are 162 men who are primarily 
or secondarily farmers. Moreover, of the 40 men who may be classified as 
non-agriculturist some have interest in land which they lease to others. 
Therefore one’s position in the economic hierarchy may be measured 
according to his relationship with land. (P. 78).
Generally speaking relationship of caste to land is either direct or in­
direct. Those in the former category are landowners, tenants and farm 
labourers. Those in the later category are craftsmen. In recent years 
a third category largely dependent upon the income not derived from the 
village has come to exist. Details regarding these categories are 
given in Table 11.
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TABLE 11 - Landowners
The following Table shows the average land held by each caste.
Area Held Area Held
Caste_____________    Per Head Caste Per Head
Rajput 21.76 Weaver 3.05
Gosain 14.06 Tailor 2.98
Parmer 10.07 Mina 2.76
Fakir 9.99 Bairagi 2.69
Brahman 9.51 Potter 2.67
Gardener 7.50 Balai Babaj i 1.68
Oil-presser 7.30 Drummer 1.12
Goatherder 5.87 Carpenter 1.11
Tobacco-curer 5.39 Nath 0.83
Co tton-carder 4.55 Sweeper 0.82
Dairyman 4.11 Blacksmith 0.73
Barber 3.58 Tanner 0.20
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TABLE 12 - Tenant and Farm Labourers
As small landowners find it uneconomical to maintain draught animals 
and equipment, they give their fields on lease to landowners with larger 
areas. Consequently, tenants and landowners happen to be the same 
individuals and therefore the case of the tenant need not be considered 
here. The caste of the farm labourers employed in 1956 - 7 is given 
below:
Brahman 1
Rajput 2
Khati 3
Dairyman 1
Kumawat 1
Cotton-carder 4
Bhilala 1
Nath 1
Drummer 1
Weaver 6
Tanner 3
Total 24
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Craftsmen
Those included in this category are the Blacksmith, the Carpenter, the 
Barber, the Potter, the Drummer, the Tanner and the Sweeper. They are 
indirectly dependent upon land because payment to them are made partly 
in cash by the farmers. Payment in kind are made annually per plough 
for services agreed upon between the farmers and the craftsmen; cash 
payments are made for extra work. All craftsmen do not receive equal pay­
ment in kind. (Table 13). Presumably the Blacksmith and the Carpenter 
who receive more than others are regarded most useful in this category.
The Tailor who is also a craftsman is usually paid in cash on piece 
work basis.
TABLE 13 Blacksmith Potter
Item Carpenter Barber Tanner Drummer
(Approximate Weight)
Sorghum(harvest)-sheaves 2 2 2 2
Sorghum(threshing)-sheaves 4 4 4 2
Sorghum(clean) grain-lb. 50 20 20 10
Unrefined sugar - lb. 10 10 3 3
Peanut (unshelled)-lb. 20 20* 20 10
Maize-cobs 50 30 30 20
Wheat(clean-grain)-lb. 10 5 5 5
(at sowing time)
Wheat(threshing)-lb. 5 5 5 5
Pulse harvest - lb. 10 5 5 5
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The manga t Cl iter ally meaning alms-takers) is a group of priests who
make their living partly through farming land attached with the
shrines which they serve and partly by receiving uncooked and cooked
food from the farmers, In the later capacity they may be placed in the
category of craftsmen. This group includes the Gosain, the village
priest, the Bairaigi, the Nath, and the Balai Babaji. These days the 
0
G^sains have become landowners (Table 11) and though theoretically in 
the mangat category they are not so in practice. The village priest 
performs important rituals for the whole village and is therefore paid 
more than other priests. "Without him life could not be conducted 
properly, and he is as necessary as the carpenter, etc." (P. 71).
Others
This category consists of members of different castes. Strictly speaking 
they have become and are in the process of becoming independent of the 
village economy.
They include 4 Oil-pressers, 2 Gardeners, 4 Farmers, 2 Dairymen, and one 
each of Mina, Cotton-carder, Brahman, Gosain and Barber. These comprise 
2 Schoolmasters, 6 Village accountants, 3 High school or college students, 
2 Traders, 1 Army, 1 Police, 2 Factory workers.
Keeping the above facts in view the economic hierarchy appears to be as 
follows;
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The Rajputs are the wealthiest and at the head of the economic hierarchy. 
This is because their average landownership exceeds that of all other 
castes. This is also manifested by the number of animals they owned in 
1955-6. Twenty-four Rajputs had 83 head of cattle, as compared to forty- 
two Farmers who had only 103 animals and sixteen Balais who had 21 animals.
Next to the Rajputs may be ranked the Gosains, the Farmers and the Oil- 
pressers. This is because the Gosains and the Farmers rank second and 
third in landownership, while the Oil-pressers derive their income from 
land as well as from white collar jobs.
Next to the Oil-presser may be ranked craftsmen and other clean castes.
The Harijans are lowest in the economic hierarchy, their average land­
ownership being 1.62 acres.
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BIn this se.cti.Qn the first question to be answered is nwhy do the groups 
occupy the position which they do in the economic hierarchy? In other 
words the fact that "clean castes" particularly Rajputs are higher in the 
hierarchy and that the "unclean castes" are at the foot of the hierarchy 
must be explained. An explanation appears to lie in the political con­
ditions in Central India during the last century. The region in which 
Ramkheri is situated was in a state of disorder and anarchy. Writing 
about the prevailing conditions in Dewas Malcolm remarks:
The Puars of Dewas have suffered throughout the last thirty 
years of extreme misery. They have been, in fact, the sport 
of every change. With territories situated in the most dis­
tracted part of Central India, and unable to maintain any 
force, they have alternately been plundered and oppressed, not 
only by the governments of Sindia and Holker but....every 
freebooter of the day. A detail of their history during the 
last twenty-five years leaves an impression of wonder at their 
being in existence, or having an inhabited village in their 
country. (1824, Vol. 1: 113).
Under these circumstances only a well organized and numerically strong 
group could own land and make a living through agriculture. It seems that 
one of the reasons why Ramkheri Rajputs were successfully able to hold out 
under such adverse conditions was the fact that they had the support of 
their caste fellows in the seven neighboring villages. Probably there was 
also a mutual support between the Rajputs and the allied caste dominated 
villages around Ramkheri.
The Farmers started moving in the village soon after the turn of the 
century. They moved in only gradually probhbly because they were un-
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certain of the outcome. Had they been more confident, agriculture being 
their traditional calling, they would have acquired more land which was 
relatively easily available in these days. However with increasing 
political stability and better prices they grew in numbers and though 
they are numerically the largest caste in the village their earlier lack 
of confidence and interest in acquisition of larger acreage has given 
them only a secondary position in the economic hierarchy.
The indirect dependence upon land on the part of craftsmen and the ritually 
"unclean castes" is due to many factors. The Rajput landowners disliked 
the ritually inferior castes to acquire land and to post a threat to them 
and therefore forced them out of their holdings. Again, these castes has 
neither the skill nor the experience necessary to make agriculture a 
profitable project. They found it economically better to exchange their 
services with sure income in forms of grains at the time of harvest.
A second explanation to the question why do the caste occupy the position
which they do in the economic hierarchy lies in the role of caste. In
Hutton’s words:
From the point of view of the individual member of a caste 
the system provides him from birth with a fixed social 
milljQi^  from which neither wealth nor poverty, success nor 
disaster can remove him, unless of course he so violates 
the standards of behavior laid down by his caste that it 
spews him forth temporarily or permanently. He is pro­
vided in this way with a permanent body of associations which 
controls almost all his behavior and contacts. His caste 
canalizes his choice in marriage, acts as his trade union, 
his friendly or benefit society, his slate club and his 
orphanage; it takes the place for him of health insurance 
and if need be provides for his funeral. It frequently 
determines his occupation. (1963: 111).
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In practice subcaste or jati Is the effective group. Mandelbaum writes
that?
A child learns quite early to discriminate between his own 
kind and those of other jatis who have different degrees of 
pollution and with whom his interplay must be more guarded.
He absorbs the self image of his jati in countless ways.
A boy of a Rajput jati learns about the martial style and 
regal tradition of his group by the bearing of his elders, 
by their contemptuous references to those of other jatis by 
the tales, proverbs, and bellada he heard frequently. Even 
the lowest jatis have explanatory tales of how they fell 
from a higher state through no great fault of their own.
Further:
a
Yet even in a loosely organized jati there is^joint^ response 
in certain situation. The people of a jati do not march al­
ways as a close social company, hewing to a set direction, 
fulfilling given directions, and mechanically correcting 
deviations. There are often considerable differences within 
a jatl in wealth and power, in goals and ideals. In certain 
matters, modes of worship for example, there can be quite 
considerable deviation. But in other affairs, particularly 
in those which have to do with permanent pollution, jati 
members impose sharp limits on deviation. Pollution affects 
the external relations of all in a jati,and when they feel that 
they are collectively confronting others, they tend to act as 
a unified social group (Ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968: 38-9).
Quarrels within a jati may draw-on for months, sometimes years, until both 
parties are weary or kinship or ceremonial obligations draw them together 
again (Gough, 1955:44).
An important link among kinsmen is the "relation pollution". "When a 
birth or death occurs in ego’s kin group he is subject to relational 
pollution. He is defiled for a stipulated period of time varying with 
his genealogical distance from the deceased or new born. Defilement is 
believed to spread through the kin group, which is conceived in the words
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of Mitakshra, as "connected by particles of the same body11. Relational 
pollution is incurred neither through ego’s actions nor through the actions 
of others upon him; he is simply the recipient of defilement by virtue 
of his biological phenomena”. "Ego’s relational defilement is inversely 
proportionate to his caste rank; that is the higher the rank the less 
the defilement in case of a birth or death. Brahmans are usually said 
to be polluted for ten days, Kshatriyas for twelve days, Vaishyas for 
fifteen, and Sudraa for thirty". (Ed. Singer and Coh, 1968: 116).
Importance of ritual caste obligations has been noted by Milton Singer.
He made a study of a number of successful industrial leaders in Madras.
He found that while there were striking changes within three generations 
in residential, occupational, educational and social mobility, as well 
as in patterns of ritual observances, these changes have not transformed 
the traditional joint family structure into isolated nuclear families.
He writes:
Until quite recently a prevailing sociological theory 
asserted that the joint and extended family structure 
was everywhere and inevitably transformed into nuclear 
family structure under the influence of urbanization 
and industrialization.
Further:
The home is culturally defined as the domain of one’s 
family, one’s caste, one’s religious community; and the 
norms appropriate to these groups are in operation there.
The office and factory, on the other hand, are defined as 
a domain which includes non-relatives, other castes and 
relations communities, and foreigners.
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Ee concludes;
Compartmentalization Is an adaptive process which, permits 
the incorporation of innovative patterns of thought and 
behavior associated with modern industry without too direct 
a collision with traditional modes of thought and behavior.
So long as the rest of the family is maintaining the 
traditional observances, the industrial leader, and his 
employees as well, feel free to depart from the traditional 
patterns in the office, in the factory, on trips abroad, 
and elsewhere outside of the home. (Ed. Singer and Cohn,
1968; 438-9), (443-46).
I give views of Hutton, Nicholas, Orenstein and Singer regarding links
which unit members of a subcaste to support my contention that social
mobility on the part of an individual is extremely difficult in a caste
society. It requires action in groups. Such actions usually involve
changes in occupation of the group concerned and possibly the emergence
of a new caste. For example if a section of Carpenter subcaste takes to
agriculture as their primary occupation the new group may be distinguished
from the Carpentring-carpenters as Agriculturist-carpenters CP- 90).
Kaibarttas of Bengal offers another example. Occupationally they were
fisherman and were known as Jaliya Kaibartta (Kaibarttas who work in
water), a section of the subcaste abandoned fishing and become
agriculturists. This resulted in the fission of the subcaste and the
founding of a new subcaste, the Haliya Kaibarttas (Kaibarttas who work
with plough), (Hutton, 1963:51-2).
The conclusions which I draw from what has been stated above are that the 
low positions which the various castes occupy in the economic hierarchy 
in Ramkheri are very largely due to the fact that they did not or perhaps 
could not act as a group to change their occupation and hence change
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their positions in the ritual and economic hierarchies. I quote
Srinivas in this connection.
Burton Stein has argued that the modern phenomenon of 
competition among castes for enhanced status within a 
narrow, localized ranking system is inappropriate for 
understanding medieval mobility. Social mobility in 
medieval India involved spatial mobility, and the units 
of mobility were individual families; the need as well 
as the facilities for "corporate mobility" did not exist. 
...Burton Stein has certainly enhanced our knowledge of 
Indian society, but in his analysis of mobility processes 
in medieval South India he has ignored the need which has 
always existed in the caste system to translate familial 
mobility to caste mobility. Otherwise mobility does not 
obtain public recognition. Whom will the sons and 
daughters of the mobile family marry? Marriage within 
the old caste group, the most natural solution, would be 
the negation of such mobility. (Ed. Singer and Cohn,
1968: 191, 196).
Bailey writes:
It is a peculiarity of the caste-system in the social 
structure of a village, as distinct from its formulation 
in Manu or its manipulation by kingly families, that 
mobility in the system of ritual ranking attaches not 
to individuals but to groups. Unless this pecuSarity of 
caste is given full wright, it is impossible to see why 
the conflicts resulting from the new economy have continued 
to be fought out in the idioms of caste and between caste 
groups, and why the situation has not produced class-groupings 
along the lines of economic differentiation and across the 
borders of different castes. (1964: 270).
Two questions still remain to be answered. Are the positions which the 
castes occupy in the economic hierarchy achieved or ascribed and what is 
the role of religion in the economic hierarchy?
Briefly stated one might hold that the positions are neither entirely 
achieved nor entirely ascribed. They appear to be achieved in so far
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as they- depend upon the organized efforts of the caste groups. They are 
ascribed in so far as without such efforts on the part of the caste 
groups the positions are ranked in the purity - pollution continuum.
The role of religion in the economic hierarchy is evident in the limit­
ations which, it places on the social mobility of the individual.
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CASTE AND THE 
ECONOMIC FRONTIER
BY
F. G. Ba i l e y
Manch e s t e r Un i v e r s i t y Pr e s s/ 1964
BJLSIPABA
Biaipara is situated in the center of the Kondmals, a Subdivision of 
Phulbank District in Western Orissa. This region has been relatively 
isolated because of its terrain and.its unhealthy climate. It was opened 
to trade and administration by the East India Company in 1803.
Bisipara is a multi-caste village and is predominantly inhabited by Oriyas 
Its population in 1953 was 685. The caste composition is given below:
TABLE 14
Percentage of
Caste Populat:
Boad Outcaste 21.7
Warrior 19.3
Kond Potter 16.5
Boad Distiller 6.7
Ganjam Outcaste 6.0
Weaver 4.6
Kond 3.8
Herdsman 3.4
Kond Herdsman 2.7
Sweeper 2.6
Ganjam Distiller 2.0
Fisherman 1.4
Boad Brahman 1.0
Barber 1.0
Washerman 1.0
Ganjam Brahman 1.0
Basker-maker 1.0
Templeman 1.0
Oriya* 0.8
Writer 0.2
* Oriya is also a caste name 65
Bisipara is a nucleated type of settlement. It consists of a number of 
streets. These streets are named after the majority of the caste living 
in each.. The Track street is an exception because it has an aggregate 
of houses inhabited by many castes. This part of the village is a 
recent addition.
POLITICAL HIERARCHY
0
Kondmals is the home of K^nds, a Kui speaking animistic people who 
practiced human sacrifice a little over a century ago. It is an inhospitable 
forested land of hills and hollows with tracts of fertile land here and 
there. Oriyas, from across the Mahanadi river established themselves 
in the area by force and intrigue long before the British rule in India.
They occupied wider valleys and best lands and lived in fortified 
villages in the centre of their realms which had fluctuating boundaries 
and shifting loyalties. They were Hindus, spoke Oriya language, were 
superior in the arts of war and government and remained distinct from 
the Konds.
Bisipara was colonized by the Oriyas in those days. They were made up of 
castes of unequal ritual purity. The high castes comprised the Brahmans, 
Warriors and Herdsman. The low castes consisted of Barber, Distiller 
and Washerman. Below them came the Outcastes.
As was the case with other Oriya dominated villages, political power and 
leadership rested with the Warriors. Excepting for the single family of 
Brahmans, the Warriors were also superior; they were the wealthy class 
and the dominant group in the village. The political relations of any other 
person to a Warrior depended on his position in a caste hierarchy. Caste, 
in other words, had a political function also. Caste was congruent with 
the political system.
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In 1855 the. Kondmals was brought under the British Administration* It 
was, divided into 50. muthas and over each was placed a headman (sirdar
TOuthadar) .However, the political primacy of the Oriyas was not greatly 
altered, though now they were representative of an effective outside force. 
Their political primacy remained practically unaffected partly because the 
newly appointed headmen were none other than the old Oriya Hill Chiefs, 
and partly because most of the servants of the East India Company were 
Oriyas.
Similarly the political primacy of the Oriya Warrior caste remained uncha- 
llanged on the village level for another half a century or so. The head­
man was invariably a Warrior, who was given this position by virtue of his 
being the head of his caste-group. He enjoyed considerable amount of 
authority and influence. He exercised jural and fiscal functions and acted 
as an arbiter in land and marital disputes. Bailey writes:
Over the years the mutha headmen built up a formidable 
list of perquistes attaching to their position. This 
varied from mutha to mutha but it would almost always  ^
include such items as the following; a contribution of 
paddy from the harvest; a gift on the occasion of a 
wedding or a funeral feast (often a gift as substantial 
as an ox or a cow); contributions to funerals and weddings 
in the headman^ family; free entertainment when the 
headman was touring the Kond villages; and so forth 
(P. 183).
Significant changes have taken place in the political hierarchy in Bisipara 
during the last fifty years. The Warriors have lost much ground to the 
hitherto subservant castes, such as the Boad Distillers, Ganjam Distillers 
and the Boad Outcaste. Por example, the Boad Distillers are now accepted
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as members of equal rank by the Warriors and no questions are raised re­
garding their earlier polluting occupation. They take sides with the 
Warrior factions and have a much greater say in the management of the 
village than before. That they are able to combine more effectively for 
political action was evident from their dispute ostensibly with a Kond 
farm^servant but in a sense with the authorities during the year,: 1954.
The circumstances were that a garden plot in the Boad Distiller street
became the property of a Kond farm-servent not through sale but through
manipulation. Thereupon he insisted building a house of his own in that 
plot. This provoked the united opposition of the Boad Distiller caste, 
to quote:
They have chosen to regard it as an infringement of 
their caste rights, if a man of lower caste were to live
not at the end of their street, but in their midst, and
to live not in a house built for him as a servant with
the permission of his Boad Distiller master, but in a
house built by himself in his own right as a landholder
(P. 196).
The Gangam Distillers were not one of the original castes which settled
in Bisipara. Judging from the facts that they came to the village at a
time when the Warriors were supreme in the village and that the Ganjam 
Distillers had a polluting occupation in those years, it appears that 
they have risen considerably in the political hierarchy. Their present 
political rank is indicated by their relations with the village council.
The village council requires that heads of all clean castes attend its 
meetings regularly and that fines be imposed upon defaulters. There are 
five households of Ganjam Distillers in Bisipara and contrary to the 
rules of the village council only one of them attends the council meetings.
69
The council cannot or does not choose to fine the absentees. Further,
though the Ganjam Distillers invariably cooperate with the village
council in its decisions such as raising of funds and village ceremonies,
they do not seem to give much weight to the village council as a
political body. Bailey writes:
But they have not tried to participate in the political 
management of the village: They do not seek a following
or try to obtain leadership within the village. Nor 
hhve they made a direct assult upon the political system 
of the village. But they do ignore its judicial aspect 
and it is on its juridical powers that the strength of 
the council is ultimately founded (P. 209).
The story of the Boad Outcaste is different as well as inconclusive.
As Untouchables they do not sit in the village countil. Until recently 
they were politically and economically subservant, physically segregated 
and labored under numerous ritual disqualifications. Overt manifesta­
tions of their attempts to rise in the political hierarchy appeared 
when they demanded entry into the village temple in 1948. The rest of 
the village rejected their demand and the matter was reported to the 
police. The Boad Outcaste failed to achieve their objectives and de­
cided to build a temple of their own. The village retaliated by banning 
their traditional rights to beg and to make music at ceremonials. These 
ill feelings grew to a climax in an incident in the vicinity of the 
village. One evening an elderly Boad Outcaste and a youngman of the 
Warrior caste came face to face on a narrow strip between the irrigated 
paddy fields. What actually transpired is hotly disputed, but the 
episode ended with the youngman falling headlong into the deep mud.
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The clean castes were furious and once again the Boad Outcastes sought 
the help of the police. Ultimately no action was taken against any 
party, But it became clear that the hitherto subservant Boad Outcastes 
were no longer so.
The significance of the changes in the inter caste political relations 
described here is twofold. First, two castes head the political hier­
archy these days, viz., the Warrior and Boad Distillers. Second, as the 
cases of Ganjam Distillers and Boad Outcastes show that political re­
lations of some castes may extend beyond the village indicating thereby 
that they are moving out of the village political arena.
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B
The highest position , of the Warriors in the political hierarchy in
fhe Kondmals as well as in Bisipara before, the coming of Administration
was primarily due to their number, organization and their traditional
calling. Bailey writes:
The Warriors control over the land was sanctioned finally 
by their monopoly of physical force, a product partly of 
their numbers and partly of their traditional calling
; (P. 266).
Further;
The warriors possessed the ultimate sanction of physical 
force, untrammelled by the presence of Government (P. 267).
After the coming of the Administration the Warriors continued to be high
in the political hierarchy mainly through influence rather than power.
A major source of their influence was the position of headman, who was
always of the Warrior caste. Being the only effective link between the
village and the Government he could be a useful friend or a formidable
enemy. It was upon his recommendations that appointments to the positions
°f paik (miliatiamen) and watchman for the village by the Government
were made. These positions carry grants of land.
The explanation of the present political hierarchy is more complex. The 
location of Bisipara itself is one factor. It lies along the line of 
communication and in the center of Kondmals. It was probably on these 
accounts that it was a seat of Administration for many years. This 
brought it into direct contact with the outside world and made it a 
trader’s frontier. Not only did merchants from neighbouring areas 
settle in the village but also the local population took to trading.
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The Boad Distillers invested their spectacular profits from the drink 
trade in the purchase of land, again perhaps because of the location of 
the village. There was nothing else in which to make an investment, and 
also because land was a symbol of prestige. This explains why today
there are two castes at the head of the political hierarchy. Bailey
writes:
In other words the significance of the trader’s frontier 
as an instrument of social change in Bisipara lay not in 
the volume of goods which is brought to the community,
but in the fact that its wealth did not always accrue to those
who controlled the agricultural economy, and who had the 
power in the traditional political structure of the village 
CP. 239).
The case of the Boad Distillers indicates that wealth is a second factor 
in the political hierarchy in Bisipara. However, the role of wealth appears 
to be qualified in two ways viz., the extent to which a caste is an in­
tegral part of the village economy and secondly, whether or not its 
occupation is polluting or it is on the wrong side of the pollution. For 
example, the Ganjam Distillers do not play any significant role as leaders 
in the village in spite of their wealth. This is mainly because, unlike 
the Boad Distillers they are a part of the wider economy rather than 
Bisipara only.
The importance of a caste's role in the village economic life as a factor 
in the political hierarchy is also evident from a comparison between the 
successful boycott of the Boad Outcaste in Bisipara with the unsuccessful 
boycott of the Pan, their counterparts in neighbouring Baderi. In Bisipara 
the village council transferred the traditional rights of the Bead Outcaste
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to beg and make music at ceremonies to Ganjam Outcastes and Sweepers, and 
the Boad Outcaste had to accept the council's decision. On the contrary 
similar measures on the part of the village council were ineffective 
against the Pans, in spite of the fact that one of the councilors was 
slapped by a Pan Untouchable right in the midst of a formal meeting (1966 
128-37).
That wealth alone does not entitle a caste to have a high position in the 
political hierarchy unless it abandons its polluting occupation is ex­
amplified by the Boad Distiller caste. They stopped making liquor, 
Sanskritized their way of life and took to agriculture as their principal 
occupation. In this process they had to disassociate themselves from 
these members of their subcaste who were not living in Bisipara and who 
did not Sanskritize their ways. This was because 'it is a peculiarity 
of the caste-system in the social structure of a village, as distinct 
from its formulation in Manu or its manipulation by kingly families, that 
mobility in the system of ritual ranking attaches not to individuals but 
to groups' (P. 270). Bailey describes the process of their social 
mobility in the following words:
Approximation to the behaviour of an ideal Brahman is, how*- 
ever, only the first step in improving one's ritual status.
For the new status must be asserted, made public, and rein­
forced by separating oneself from others with whom one 
formerly was associated, usually on the grounds that they 
are not observing the new restrictions. This is the familiar 
process of the emergence of sub-castes and the split becomes 
evert in the refusal of the aspiring group to dine or to marry 
with the rest. Such divisions do in fact exist in the Boad 
Distiller caste. These in Bisipara call themselves the 
"great Distillers" (BorO Sundi) and neither inter-marry nor 
inter-dine with the other two sub-castes (P. 189).
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Again, wealth may not be able to overcame the line of pollution. This 
assertion finds support from a comparison between the Boad Outcaste and 
the Kond Potters. The former are in the untouchable category and the later 
are not. Their economic positions do not differ greatly, and in actuality 
the Boad Outcaste are comparatively more educated and have a greater number 
of Government employees, such as schoolmasters, etc. Yet the Boad Out­
caste have not been able to find a higher position in the political 
hierarchy of the village, while the Kond Potters do not appear to have any 
problems.
Localization is another factor in the political hierarchy. Bailey writes:
One of these features is localization. This precluded in­
dividual mobility. The rich man remain tied to his fellows 5 
by kinship and excluded from higher groups by their knowledge 
of his origin. If a man is determined to improve his position
apart from the rest of his fellows, then his only course is
to separate himself from the local community, either literally 
by going away, or structurally by abandoning Hinduism (P. 271).
In Bisipara the Boad Outcaste have been "thrust into the wider policy" and
have not been able to rise in the political hierarchy in the village on
account of localization.
Two questions still remain to be answered in this section. These are: a.) 
how far are the positions in the political hierarchy in Bisipara ascribed 
and how far afeeythey achieved?; b.) what is the role of religion in the 
political hierarchy?
The answers are given below:
75
It is clear that upward.political mobility baa taken place in Bisipara 
during the last hundred years and that the role;of effort on the part of 
the castes concerned has been a very important factor. Yet the political 
hierarchy today is also ascribed in so far as;
The forces of change are thus canalized, and given certain 
conditions, the structure of caste groups is unimpaired, 
although the ranking of units within this structure may be 
modified in accordance with their changed economic rank ...
Ritual rank continued to be validated by diffefiantial 
control over productive resources (P. 271).
Fur ther:
A similar illustration of the fact that differential ability 
to profit from the new economy was not solely dependent on 
the capacity of individuals is provided by the Warrior caste- 
group. Their leaders have profited from the Administrations 
preference for the traditional rulers. Likewise the 
Scheduled Castes and the Adibasis enjoy the protection of 
discriminating legislation in the competition for salaried 
posts CP. 237).
As regards the role of religion in the political hierarchy, the evidence
from Bisipara indicates that it is significant. In the first place, as
has been shown above, mobility has taken place within the idiom of Hindu
varna. In the second place:
Augumented political effectiveness leads to efforts to im­
prove ritual status and in certain circumstances this goal 
can be achieved. This is simply a variation of the common- 
sense sociological principle that the newly-rich adjust their 
patterns of behavior to existing wealthy classes. The 
situation here is complicated by the fact that the ideal 
behavior is that enjoined by Hinduism, and not simply the 
pattern followed by a wealthy class (P. 191).
It is necessary to take note of comments by Silverberg on this question here. 
He writes;
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Several discussants, have mentioned that cpnflicting values 
cQinplicate the caste system at present, yet I think that 
to understand what.is going on today, we must note that there 
is coming to he a much, greater uniformity in the values 
relevant to stratification. Uniformity is a concomitant 
of spreading modern networks of mass communication, and an 
effect of having stronger governments of in control of 
communications. A voter or a schoolboy or an ambitious group 
of low-caste industrial workers is no longer offered a wide 
variety of varna models for conduct. Instead, a common 
package of civic virtues is held up for emulation by all.
In this now, uniform selection of values ~ evident in textbooks 
speeches, and advertising - there is the asceticism and high 
thinking (but not the exclusiveness and ritualism) of the 
Brahman, the ambition and steadfastness (but not the violent, 
domineering qualities) of the Kshatriya* the thrift and purity 
(but not the selfishness or religious obsessiveness) of the 
Vaishya, the spirit of service (but not the ignorance and 
passitivity) of the Sudra villager. The new value system, 
deeply influenced by western civilization may retain some of 
what Edward Harper and Cora Dubios identify as its "basic values" 
but the system is narrower. Priests must become teachers, 
landloards must become vegetarians, shopkeepers must become 
community leaders, peasants must become scholars. Competition 
is intensified for achievement in relation to fewer, more 
homegeneous norms, and achievement is opened to all individuals, 
not only to members of appropriately specialized castes 
(1968: 119).
The following assertions in the above passage are of particular relevance 
to the present discussion, a.) A: uniform set of values is emerging for all 
Hindus irrespective of their caste, b.) Achievement is also open to all 
irrespective of caste. The first assertion is another way of saying that 
all castes are what Srinivas has called Sanskritizing their ways. This 
assertion does not conterdict the point being emphasized here because 
Sanskritization involves "adopting higher standards of ritual purity in 
terms of the religious practices and taboos defined by Hindu religion 
(ed. Silverberg, 1968: 33).
77
The assertion concerning individual achievement does not take many-
relevant facts into account. Individuals may achieve higher political
or economic positions but their links with the members of their subcaste
are of such a nature that it is not possible for these individuals to
sever them without unacceptable ritual consequences for a Hindu. He
must carry at least some members of his subcaste along with him. It is
on this account that in spite of factions, the Warriors in Bisipara
collectively perform common funerary rites though on a modified scale.
Bailey describes the role of ritual links between an individual and his
subcaste as follows:
In seeking to improve his position in the ritual system of 
rank in his own community, the rich man cannot throw off his 
poorer caste-fellows; he must carry them along with him.
There are clear reasons for this. The new economy has done 
nothing to break down caste endogamy. Therefore a man must 
find a wife from among his own group. He depends on the rest 
of his caste for help in the rites of marriage and death and 
at numerous other crisis in the course of his life. With 
such ties as this, the most that the wealthy within a caste 
group can do to lighten their upward passage by jettisoning 
poorer caste-fellows is to form a sub-caste. This sub-caste 
must consist of at least two unrelated families in the first 
instance, otherwise marriage will be impossible. Since the 
members of a caste-group often drive from one ancestor, social 
conditions are not always favorable for sub-caste development, 
even when economic conditions are appropriate. Fission might 
be made difficult by existing ties of kinship, which would 
conflict with the new sub-caste ties: the claim to a new
status might even mean physical movement out of the caste 
street. It is probably such factors as these that have pre­
vented sub-castes emerging among the Boad Outcastes, and have 
caused the rich and poor among them to be associated in efforts 
to improve status. The same ties, and the same knowledge that 
mobility adheres to groups and not individuals, instills a 
sense of solidarity in the caste-group and causes the poorer 
to support their own "middle classes" in the struggle against 
higher castes (P. 270).
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Economic Hifrarchy
The economic hierarchy in Bisipara has undergone considerable changes 
during the last hundred years. Before the coming of the Administration 
in 1855, the population in the village comprised of the Warriors, Boad 
Brahman, Barber, Washerman, Herdsman, Boad Distiller and Boad Outcaste.
The Warriors were owner and cultivators of all the land in the village.
The Boad Outcaste worked as farm labourers. The Brahman, Barber,
Washerman, Herdsman and Distiller each had specialist tasks in the economic 
and ritual organization of the village. Bisipara was then a relatively 
self sufficient agricultural community with the warriors at the head of 
the economic hierarchy and other castes as their dependents.
The hierarchy is different these days. Table 15 shows the distribution 
of village land between castes in 1953. The Warriors are no longer the 
sole landowners. They own only 28 percent of land as against 33 percent 
owned by their earlier dependents and 39 percent owned by new comers.
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Table 15
Share of total income Average annual in- Percentage
from landowned taken in come per head in of village
Caste pledge or share cropped units of paddy population
Warrior 28.2 21.7 19.3
BoaH Distiller 10,0 21.5 6.7
Ganjam Distillers 12.5 96.0 ■2.0
Boad Braham 1.7 28.0 1.0
Ganjam Brahman 0.8 13.0 1.0
Herdsman 1.25 6.0 3.4
Barber nil nil 1.0
Washerman 0.13 1.6 1.0
Weaver 1.0 3.4 4.6
Templeman 1.0 13.0 1.0
Fisherman 0.75 7.5 1.4
Oriya 1.0 18.7 0.8
Sweeper 0.6 3.3 2.6
Basketmaker 0.5 7.6 1.0
Boad Outcaste 20.5 13.0 21.7
Ganjam Outcaste 3.0 6.8 6.0
Kond 0.75 3.0 3.8
Kond Herdsman 0.25 1.7 2.7
Kond-potter 12.2 11.0 16.5
Writer nil nil 0.2
8(1
Bisipara is also known as traders; village. It has a number of salaried 
Government officials. It is necessary to take note of various types of 
economic activities here.
The most notable traders in the village are the Ganjam Distillers. They 
run shops and are regarded as one of the wealthiest caste in the village. 
Further individuals from almost every caste engage themselves in small 
trading. Some trade in paddy, processed rice or turmeric. Some work as 
itinerant small traders and as marketman. Two Ganjam Outcaste ply carts and 
a number of Boad Outcaste are engaged in cattle trade. A Kond Potter and 
a Boad Distiller own oil presses. Weavers and many Boad Outcaste weave 
cloth and cotton shawls for sale.
Village officials also belong to different castes. Both the headman, two 
schoolmasters and the postman are Warriors. Two messengers are Kond 
Potters. Five schoolmasters, one policeman, two messengers, three watch­
men are Boad Outcaste.
There are 23 households of village servants. These comprise 5 Brahman,
2 Barber, 1 Washerman, 9 Herdsmen, 2 Templemen, 4 Sweeper households.
Of these, only 12, namely, 3 Brahman, 2 Barber, 1 Washermen, 3 Herdsmen,
1 Templeman and 2' Sweeper households are employed by the village, pay­
ment being made to them by the tithe system (jajmani).
In addition to these there are 7 miliatiamen (paik). Five of them are 
Kond Potters, 1 is a Herdsman, and 1 a Boad Outcaste. Their position
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carries with it a small grant of land.
The economic hierarchy in Bisipara appears to be as follows:
Warriors
Ganjjiam Distillers 
Boad Distillers 
Boad Outcaste 
Kond Potters
The remaining castes are equal in the hierarchy mainly because all of 
them more or less are on subsistance level. However, it can be argued 
that those who work as village servants on tithe payments are lower than 
those who either work on cash basis or make a living through trading.
The evidence of what appears to be a helpless position of these village 
servants is found in the cases of the Brahman, Barber and the Washerman. 
Brahman A was boycotted some years ago and so far he has not been able 
to find an alternative position nor has he been reinstated in spite of his 
repeated appeals. The Barber threatened to strike yet continued to work. 
The Washerman has been fined by the villagers a number of times for some 
real or imaginary pretexts. He paid the fines and continued to work.
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BThe coming of the Administration was an event of major importance in the 
history of Bisipara. It brought the village into a wider economic system 
and enforced laws which had far reaching consequences. One such legis­
lative measure was the recognition of an individual's right to own or sell 
landed property irrespective of his caste and his traditional occupation. 
By itself this legislation does not appear to be of much significance, but 
it was probably one of the most important factors which combined with 
other circumstances brought great changes in the economic^hierarchy of 
the village. For example, in former times the sons of a deceased Warrior 
had no other choice but to continue living in joint family without 
participating in their father’s estate. The new legislation made it 
possible for dissatisfied heirs to participate in their father’s estate. 
Bailey writes:
Why, then, has partition become normal and the joint 
family the exception? While the family are agriculturists 
pure and simple, family economics can be efficiently managed 
by one man. Whatever the rivalries and tensions between 
brothers their economic interest is divided to the same 
end - making the estate produce as much as possible. But 
when one brother gets an income from trade and another is 
a policeman and a third is a carter and the fourth and 
fifth remain on the land; and when the trader and the 
policeman and the carter refuse to put their earnings into 
the common pool, as they are permitted to do in certain 
conditions; and when they demand a share of the estate 
so that they may sell it and use the money to finance 
other undertakings - than all the brothers are glad to 
partition and go their own way. The joint family cannot 
survive divergent interest and disparate incomes among 
its members (P. 92).
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A result of the partitioning of the estates was that land came into the 
market. In earlier times expenses incurred on the occasions of marriages 
and death were borne by the joint family. Now such expenses become the 
responsibility of the individual. It was important for him to invite 
all the agnates on these occasions and in many cases he had to sell his 
estate to meet these expenses. Fifty-seven cases of sale of estates 
were reported in Bisipara, thirty of these were sold in order to meet 
such expenses (P. 58). In words of Bailey, "The most important single 
cause bringing estates down to this danger-level is the system of in­
heritance - partition of the estate between all sons at the death of 
the holder^- (P.48).
The economic consequences of smallhholdings in the prepartitioned Panjab 
in British India have been examined by Darling. He shows that small hold­
ings led to widespread indebtedness and that one of the principal causes 
was the customary heavy expenditures at ceremonials. His survey also 
reveals what could be the influence of religious beliefs on economic 
behavior. For example, he mentions that in the south-west and northern 
districts, which are predominantly Muslim populated, the cost of a 
marriage ceremony would range from Rs. 250 to Rs. 450, while further 
south in Hissar, on the edge of Bikaner, the Bagri Hindu Jat rarely spends 
less than Rs. 2,000. This conclusion is also supported by his compari­
son between the extent of indebtedness in the Muslim populated 
Rawalpindi District with that in predominantly Hindu populated Hoshiarpur 
district. Both Districts have similar climate, and same rainfall. Land 
holdings in both the Districts are small and "there are the same 
necessity and enterprise urging men into the army and out into the world 
beyond. But the two differ in regards to the extent of indebtedness.
The average debt in Rawalpindi is only Rs. 171 and total debt is no more 
than nine times the land revenue and that 24 percent have no debt at all. 
Compare this with Hoshiarpur District where only 11 percent are free 
from debt" (1947: 54^76).
84,
Land cannot be sold if there are no buyers. Here again the circumstances 
were initiated by the Administration. The hitherto unsettled region was 
brought under the control of the Government of India and the resultant 
peaceful conditions opened up the country to new settlers. In the mean­
time prohibition was enforced in the south and the sellers of drink 
migrated in large numbers across the boarder from Ganjam into the 
Kondmals. It was during that period that the Ganjam Distillers and Boad 
Distillers settled in Bisipara. Shortly after this the Government also 
made it illegal for the Konds to distill their own liquor. Until then 
the Konds who comprise more than half of the population of Kondmals, had 
made their own liquor from the flowers of mohua tree which abounds in 
that area. The Government was successfully able to put a stop to the 
production of liquor in the home-stills but the craze for the drink re­
mained unabated and the Konds were compelled to patronize licensed out- 
stills which were run by men of Distiller castes. The Bisipara Distillers 
made spectacular profits from the sale of liquor and invested the wind­
fall profits in land. This explains why today Ganjam Distillers’ income 
per head in units of paddy is 96 and that of Boad Distillers is 21.5 as 
contrasted to 21.7 of the Warriors,
Why did anyone other than the Distillers, not start manufacture or sale 
of liquor? Particularly why did the Warriors choose to sell their 
estates rather than take to a lucreative trade? In Bailey’s opinion 
the reasons were that the Distiller castes alone had the monopoly 
arising out of caste-beliefs and Government support. He writes:
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A second aspect of the principle that men as profit- 
makers are not equal is the result of the combined effects 
of the caste system and Administrative action. The examples 
are obvious. The Distiller caste-group alone are qualified 
to trade in drink. The drink-trade was made extraordinarily 
profitable by the Government’s ban on home-stills. The 
Government was interested in Excise Revenue, and it is 
possible that local officials were subjected to a "Distiller 
lobby" but the profits which accrued to the Distillers over 
a period of forty years were not primarily the result of 
their business acumen or entrepreneureneurial exertions 
(P. 237).
Furtheri
Sellers of drink are necessarily low in the caste ritual 
hierarchy, since alcoholic drink is polluting. The higher 
castes are not allowed to touch it. I assume, therefore, 
that before 1855 and during the period from 1970 to 1910, 
when the drink-trade was flourishing the Boad Distiller 
caste occupied a lowly position in the caste hierarchy - 
among the low (nichfi) Hindus, but above the line of being 
themselves polluting (P. 188).
The rise on the part of Boad Outcaste in the economic hierarchy had 
different causes. An English Middle school and an Upper Primary school 
were started in Bisipara. It seems that the Boad Outcaste took advantage 
of the opportunities and many of them qualified themselves for jobs in 
the Government. In the meantime a legislation favouring the Harijans 
which included the outcastes came into force. According to this 
legislation a proportion of all minor Governmental posts such as school 
masters, policeman, messenger in the Revenue, Forest and Agricultural 
department was reserved for them. In 1955 there were eleven minor village 
salaried officials from Boad Outcaste in a total of eighteen such 
officials in Bisipara. They are investing their income in the purchase 
of land and new land is going to Boad Outcastes. With 21.7 percent of
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the consuming population, they get 20.5 percent of the income. This 
income in units of paddy per head from land is 13 (P. 220).
Next to the Boad Outcaste in the economic hierarchy are the Kond Potters. 
They are ritually clean caste but are low in the economic hierarchy.
Only two of them are employed as salaried officials. Twenty-three 
households have small farms; 9 have no land and live on small trade.
Bailey attributes their position in economic hierarchy due to a lack 
of hard work and initiative in them. He compares the Kond Potters with 
the Boad Outcaste and points oht that the former were slow to take 
advantage of the opportunities made available by the Administration than 
were the latter.
New economic opportunities and increase in population explain very 
largely why the economic position of these castes who work on tithe 
payments is unstable and risky. The Boad Outcaste were boycotted with 
great flourish by the clean castes. Their traditional privileges as 
music makers and licensed beggers were withdrawn and given tbethe Genjam 
Outcastes and Sweepers. This measure failed to damp their "revolutionary" 
spirit and enhanced ill feelings between them and other castes.
Were it not for the fact that the Boad Outcastes had become a part of 
wider economic and political arena, their traditional subservience would 
have continued. The effect of increasing population is exemplified in 
the case of the Barber. If there is no Barber in the village a whole 
row of barbers is waititig to serve in a nearby town.
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The effects of a wider economic field upon the economic hierarchy in
Bisipara are striking. Striking also is the disassociation between
the traditional and the present occupation of a caste. Bailey writes:
Not every person works at his traditional occupation.
The Distillers do not touch liquor. The Kond Potters 
do not know how to make pots. The Fishermen do not 
fish. The Warriors are cultivators. Even where there 
is scope for practising an '^ hereditary occupation, not 
all members of the appropriate caste engage in the 
work (P. 96).
He believes that major factors in the adoption of a craft are aptitude,
skill and capital. He says:
On the other hand, a man can pick up carpentry, doctoring 
or divining, because to some extent every man is his own 
carpenter, doctor and diviner. If he turns out to have 
an aptitude for one of these crafts, then his talent can 
grow and he can begin to work for others. Caste has no 
direct or indirect influence on entry into these trades 
(P. 110).
This raises the question; does this mean that in a wider economic field 
rational economic motivation is the only major factor in the choice of 
occupations and therefore Hinduism is not significant in the economic 
structure of Bisipara today? The answer is in the negative. The 
significance of the Hindu religion is the economic hierarchy is evident 
in the following ways:
a.) An ucho,Hindu name a ("high caste Hindu"), would not take to a 
calling which involved pollution, however lucreative the calling might 
happen to be. The case of the Warriors examplifies this.
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b.) If a nicho, Hindumae low caste Hindu becomes wealthy it approxi­
mates the Brahman. It means that the frame of reference is the varna 
scheme.
c.) Rising in the ritual hierarchy is a group prpcess. It is on these 
accounts that the Ganjam Distillers and Boad Distillers are approximating 
the Brahmanic ways. Recently the Boad Outcaste, who are becoming 
wealthier, are also doing the same. Bailey explains;
The Boad Distillers in the last forty years, have made 
active, conscious, and on the whole successful efforts 
to raise their ritual status and their political status 
within the village. Indeed, the caste as a whole in the 
Kondmals has tried to better itself according to the 
Hindu rules.
According to the Hindu rules (which is a translation of 
a phrase frequently on the lips of informants), there is 
only one way of improving oneself, and that is to 
approximate one's behavior to a stereotype of the behavior 
of a Brahmin, in particular with regard to what is eaten.
This the Boad Distillers have done. They no longer deal 
in drink, being forbidden by the law to do so, nor unlike 
some of the Other castes, do they keep illicit stills for 
their own use. What is more, their caste-council has 
laid down rules forbidding members to touch alcoholic 
drink. These rules, promulgated and reiterated every 
three or four years at the meetings of the caste-councils, 
have also put a ban on eating flesh in any form - that is, 
on eggs, meat, and fish (PP. 188-9).
Barber characterizes the disassociation between castes and their
traditional occupations reported from other parts of India as "a new
picture of social mobility in the traditional Hindu caste system". He
emphasizes the roles of wealth, education, government service and political
affiliations, etc., in the emerging new picture. He writes:
89
The newer view of the Hindu caste system and of its 
processes of social mobility involves the explicit 
statement of a whole series of interrelated points 
which are at variance with the older description.
Perhaps the key point in the series is this one, that 
the individual and his associated kin group in Indian 
society are ranked not along one but along several 
different social and cultural dimensions (ed.
Silverberg, 1968: 18-9).
For the purposes of the present discussion the key point is the Individual 
is an integral part of his associated kin group in what Barber calls 
"the new picture of social mobility". It will be agreed that links be­
tween the individual and his associated kin group are none other than 
ritual obligations.
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Barkeley a n d  Los Angeles, 1965
Sripuram
Sripuram is situated on the north bank of the Kaveri river about eight 
miles from Tanjore, South India. It is a nucleated settlement, contain­
ing 349 households. The total population is 1,400. It is divided into 
three more or less well-defined physical segments, the Agraharam, the 
Kudiana Streets, and the Cheri. The Agraharam is exclusively inhabited 
by the Brahmans. The Kudiana Streets are non-Brahman quarters. A 
fairly large number of castes live here and therefore the population 
is heterogeneous. The Cheri is Adi-Dravida segment. It is separate 
and distinct from the other segments evidently because the inhabitants 
are untouchables.
The caste composition of Sripuram is as follows:
TABLE 16
Caste Households Persons
Brahman
Kannada-speaking Madhva 1 4
Telegu-speaking Smartha 
Konaseemsdravida 7 19
Velnadu 4 18
Mulahandu 3 10
Tamil-speaking Smartha 
Brihacharnam
Mazhanattu Brihacharanam 9 42
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Kandramanichya Brihacharanam
Vadama: Chozhadesha 
Astaschashram
Tamil-speaking Shri Vaishnava 
Vadagalai
Temple Priests
Bhattachar (Thengalai) 
IKuriikkAl
Non-Brahman 
(cultivating Castes)
The Kalla Group:
Kalla
Ambalakkara
Muttiria
Ahamudiya
The Vellala Group:
Vellalas Proper 
Chozhia Vellala 
Karaikkattu Vellala 
Kodikkal Vellala 
Gaunda or Konga Vellala 
Nayanar 
Mudaliyar
Other Cultivating Castes 
Padaychi 
Muppanar 
Odaiyar 
Naicker
Artisan Castes
Tattan (Goldsmith)
Tachchan (Carpenter)
Kusavan (Potter)
Servicing Castes
Pandaram (Temple Priest) 
Melakkaran (Temple Servant) 
Ambattan (Barber)
Vannan (Washerman)
Other
Konan (Herdsman)
Nadar (Toddy Tapper)
Non-Tamil Castes
Maratha 1 9
Reddiyar 1 2
Nayudu 1 11
Adi-Dravidas
Palla 82 332
Thotti 1 8
Chakkiliya 1 3
344 1.372
Non-Hindu population has not been included.
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Po l i t i c a l H ierarchy
It is difficult to understand changes in the political hierarchy in 
Sripuram without a reference to political developments in Tamilnad, a 
region in which Sripuram is situated. The Brahmans were considered to 
be the only legitimate political leaders till the early twentieth century.. 
They had monopolized western education, as a result of which many of 
them entered the Indian Civil Service and other professions. Added to 
their high ritual status and their power emanating from ownership of 
land throughout the region the new positions of authority enhanced 
their political status still higher.
The first signs of change in the 19th century in the political hierarchy 
appeared in the form of a newspaper, the Justice, a vehicle of non- 
Brahmans’ demands in 1917. At about the same time the Non-Brahmans 
founded the Justice Party thereby herelding a struggle between Brahmans 
and others. The leaders of the Justice party managed to have 
discriminatory measures favouring the Non-Brahmans built into the 
administration. Posts in the government as well as seats in the 
institutions of higher learning came to be reserved for Non-Brahmans.
A Self-Respect movement was started by the Non-Brahmans in the 
thirties. It denounced the Brahmans for "their bigotry and duplicity" 
and urged that marriages be performed without the services of Brahman 
priests. "A general attitude of hostility toward Brahman came to be 
built on the social plane, and feelings ran high against them" (P. 211).
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The waverof anti-Brahman feeling which swept through the region found 
its echo in Sripuram, Before Independence the Brahmans had enjoyed a 
great measure of power in the village. The panchayat president was 
always a Brahman. The panchayat room was located in the Agraharam, and 
initiative in all important matters was in the hands of Brahmans. The 
Non-Brahmans were only second class citizens. The Adi-Dravidas were 
practically of no political consequences and were totally subservient to 
the rest of the village. No Adi-Dravida could enter the Agraharam ex­
cept on business and that also only in the backyard. In case a Brahman 
decided to show his displeasure with an Adi-Dravida he would send for 
him through his Non-Brahman tenant, get the culprit ties to a tree and 
beaten. This was practiced even for minor offences.
The Post-Independent period has witnessed a rapid decline in the political 
primacy of the Brahmans. On January 26, 1950, the day when India became 
a republic, a man from the Kalla caste gathered together a large group 
of Non-Brahmans and Adi-Dravidas and marched through the Agraharam up 
to the gates of the Vishnu temple. This was something unheard of in 
Sripuram. For Adi-Dravidas to march through the Agrahram was not only 
ritually polluting but also brought social humiliation on the Brahmans. 
However, the Brahmans did not protest apparently having realized that 
the balance of power was no longer in their favour.
These days Kallas, a Non-Brahman caste, heads the political hierarchy 
both in the region as well as in Sripuram. This was made evident when 
the three political parties, the Congress, the D.M.K., and the P.S.P.
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nominated candidates from the Kalla caste for the Thiruvaiyar assembly. 
Even the retiring member as well as his predecessor were Kallas. It 
is generally acknowledged that any canidate to be successful from this 
constituency (in which Sripuram is situated) had to be a Kalla. The 
influence of the Kallas was also evident in their dispute with the 
Adi-Dravidas in a neighbouring village. The dispute arose when the 
Kallas attempted to take away forcibly the alleged Adi-Dravida murderer 
from the courtroom in order to deliver justice to him on their own 
terms. The Minister of the State had to intervene before the matter was 
settled.
The influence and power of the Kallas within Sripuram is manifested in 
many ways. The president of the Panchayat is a Kalla. There are 14 
members of the village panchayat, elected from the three segments of 
Sripuram, but in practice the village is run by the president, his 
brother-in-law, and some of his close associates, who are not members 
of the Panchayat. The president has a reputation of being a strongman 
and it is hard for anyone to cross his path. During the General Elections 
there was an altercation between him and another Non-Brahman youth from 
the village who was canvassing for a rival candidate. The president took
off his slipper and beat the young man with it in public, in the
presence of the polling officer. No action was taken against him.
The response of the Brahmans to the rise of a Non-Brahman caste in the
political hierarchy has been an attitude of aloofness and detachment.
Soon after the constitution of a new panchayat, some influenctial
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Non-Brahman leaders went to one of the prominant Brahmans in the 
Agraharam and appealed to him to take over the affairs of the Panchayat. 
In spite of their repeated assurance of complete cooperation on their 
part, he declined the offer and continued to keep himself aloof from the 
panchayat.
It seems that even the Brahmans have come to recognize the growing in­
fluence of the president. A few years ago a prominant Brahman landowner 
in a neighbouring village was having trouble with one of his tenants.
The tenant refused to vacate a plot of land which the landlord wanted 
to cultivate under his own management. The help of the president was 
sought by the landlord, the tenant took flight and quit the plot.
The Adi-Dravida are still subservient to the higher castes. Though 
formally all members of the village panchayat have equal rights, the Adi- 
Dravida members are made to sit separately if, indeed they are invited 
to attend its meetings.
However, they enjoy a considerable measure of independence within the 
boundaries of their Cheri. They have a panchayat, sevai sangam con­
sisting of 11 members. This panchayat adjucates disputes in Cheri and 
imposes fines for various kinds of breaches of customs. It raises funds 
by subscription. Beteille remarks:
A closer study of the village shows that there are within 
it at least three spheres of power. These spheres broadly 
correspond to the three main subdivisions of the village, 
namely, the Agraharam, the Non-Brahman streets and the 
Cheri. Each subdivision has, to a certain extent, its own 
community life, with its own leaders and men of influence.
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Needless to say, these spheres tend to overlap in many 
areas and the leaders of one community may have influence 
over Others. But by and large the three aspheres tend to 
maintain a measure of autonomy (P. 165).
However, the Non-Brahmans tend to be higher than the Brahmans in the 
wider political area:
Independence in 1947 and the first General Elections in 
independent India in 1951-52, saw the Non-Brahmans forge 
further ahead in their control of the Congress and of 
politics in Tamilnad as a whole...By the fifties the Non- 
Brahmans were in a commanding position in the Congress 
party the State Legislature and the Cabinet. They have 
more or less effectively maintained their control till 
now (P. 214).
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The principal factors in the political primacy of the Brahmans were 
their ownership of land, high ritual status, monopoly of scholar-- 
ship and association with the rulers. They were the first to take 
advantage of the schools and colleges started by the British. Western 
education not only brought social prestige on its own right, but also 
opened the way to new economic opportunities. The new urban jobs - 
clerical, executive, and professional - became a virtual monopoly of 
the Brahmans. This brought them close to the new rulers of India.
Traditionalism, reverence for authority, low self-concept and lack of 
organization, were responsible for the subservient position of the Non- 
Brahmans. Beteille calls it a habit of thinking and relates an incident 
which supports his contention. A Brahman mirasdar* wanted to buy a 
tree from an Adi-Dravida. As the tree was lying in the Cheri the 
Brahman expressed his desire to go and inspect it before striking a deal. 
The Adi-Gravidas begged him not to go there and brough the tree to the 
Agraharam. This habit of thinking is also reflected in the everyday 
behavior of the Adi-Dravidas, He steps aside when he sees a Brahman 
passing that way.
*Mirasdar literally means one who possesses inherited property. (Miras, 
Arabic meaning inherited property; dar, Persian, one who possesses).
The Brahmans were referred to as Mirasdars because they have inherited 
land granted to their ancestors by the Chola and the Nayaka Kings over 
a thousand years ago (P. 13).
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Causes of changes in the politicdl.hibrarchy during the last forty years 
lie in the Agraharam, the wider political arena, and in the Non-Brahman 
Street as well as in the Cheri. Let me begin with the Agraharam.
The Agraharam: There is no leadership in the Agraharam and it is
doubtful if the Brahmans are accustomed to a strong leadership. Beteille
writes:
It is necessary to highlight the exclusive nature 
of Shri-Vaishnava religion because it has important 
structural implications. It had in the past built 
a wall between them and the Smarthas and, to some 
extent, all other Brahmans. Not long ago there 
used to be bitter conflict between Smarthas and Shri 
Vaishnavas, not only in the village, but in the 
region as a whole (P. 68).
Fur ther:
Until fairly recently several Smarthas refused to 
participate in the activities of the Vishnu temple as a 
retaliation for like behaviour on the part of Shri Vaishnavas 
with regard to the Shiva temple. One prominent member of 
the Smartha community, who died recently, is said to have 
spent his leisure hours in lengthly tirades against the 
Shri Vaishnavas. Since he was learned in three languages - 
Tamil, Sanskrit, and English - he could more than hold 
his own against the Shri Vaishnava elders in asserting 
that Shankaracharya was superior to Ramanuja, and Shiva 
to Vishnu (P. 70).
Again:
Orthodox Shri Vaishnavas, particularly of the older gen­
eration, still do not sit along with Smarthas on such 
occasions (marriages etc.) nor do they accept cooked food 
of any kind, or even water, from the hands of Smartha 
Brahmans. Such people are known usually as vaidic 
(orthodox) in contrast to the ordinary people who are 
called laukic (lay or secular), The vaidic Shri 
Vaishnava performs all the ritual duties of the Brahman 
strictly according to tridition; their daily life is a
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continuous round, of rituals ...the distinction between 
vaidic and laukic does not however correspond to 
distinctions specific to the caste system, because in 
the same family one brother may be vaidic, while the 
other is laukic..Generally vaidic Iyenger do not eat in 
public or with laukic people, even though the latter may 
be of their own caste. They do not normally eat food 
cooked by anyone but their own close relatives, and if 
one has undergone the important baranyasam rite, he 
usually refuses food cooked by anyone but himself or his 
wife (P. 58-9).
It seems that in spite of ritual exclusiveness the Agraharam has been 
having a man of influence now and then. For example, fifteen years ago 
a Brahman mirasdar commanded respect for all the Brahmans. He was in
the direct line of descent of one of the ancient families of the 
village. He and his ancestors had contributed both money and land to 
the Vishnu temple at Melur, and had taken action in many collective 
undertakings in the village. His example indicates that "in order 
to be fully accepted as a leader in an Agraharam one has to combine 
landownership with other qualities such as, learning and scholarship - 
both traditional and modern - and membership in an ancient and well 
established family or kin group" (P. 169).
Agraharam as a political force is being weakened through a gradual 
shifting of its population to the city. Four out of five big mirasdars 
do not live in Sripuram.
Territorial dispersal is particularly marked among the 
Brahmans. Among them networks of kinship and affinity 
not only cut across the boundary of the village, but 
also of the district and the state. Western education 
and the availability of professional and white-collar 
jobs in towns and cities throughout the country have 
been the principal factors behind the territorial mobility 
of the Brahmans (P. 222).
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In Tamilnad the rise of the Non-Brahman in the political hierarchy was 
due to "a new sense of identity and a new ideology in the Self-Respect 
movement". The movement created for the first time a feeling among 
Non-Brahmans that they were equal to the Brahmans, if not superior"
(P. 214).
It is the anti-Brahman movement rather than class 
conflict between the landowners and the landless 
that has dominated political life in this area over 
the last forty years (P. 212).
The rise of the Non-Brahmans in general and the Kallas in particular 
in the political hierarchy in Sripuram is due not only to the wide­
spread anti-Brahman feelings in the region but also to factors such as 
numerical strength, organization and leadership. The Kallas are 
numerally the largest in the region, are very well organized and have 
an aggressive and effective leadership. Their leader, the president 
of the village panchayat comes from a family of toddy-tappers. This 
trade brought him into contact with the Adi-Dravidas who made his father's 
principal customers. He makes use of the associations from time as is 
clear from the support he received from them when he ejected an 
obstinate tenant of a mirasdar. The toddy trade also brought him in 
contact with the law enforcing authorities and he has learned how to 
handle them. He does not hesitate to use violence and to produce 
false evidence should the need arise. He has earned a name for 
leadership arid members of Legislative assembly arid bosses of political 
parties seek his help during elections. He is seen moving with them in
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a jeep and these links enable him to distribute patronage and to main-' 
tain his influence. Beteille remarks:
Power is, in more ways than one, contagious. Those 
who move with the powerful are regarded by others as 
being themselves powerful CP* 158).
Judging from the example of Kalla, it might be generalized that unless 
there is organization and leadership, numbers alone do not necessarily 
enhance the position of a caste in the political hierarchy. The 
Vellalas are numberically larger in Sripuram than the Kallas and are 
in no way ritually inferior to them, yet the Kallas are politically 
higher evidently because the Vellalas are not organized and do not have 
an effective leadership (Table 16).
As regards the Adi-Dravidas their subservience has been explained as 
follows:
The Adi-Dravidas are unable to participate fully in 
the affairs of the panchayat for a different reason.
While the Barhmans have largely chosen to withdraw 
from participation, the Adi-Dravidas by and large 
find themselves excluded because of their low economic, 
social and tirual position. When they do attend meetings 
of the panchayat they are required to sit separately.
Often they are informed about a meeting only after it had 
been held, and their thumb impressions are later secured 
on the relevant documents (P. 153).
It was noted in previous section that Sripuram has three almost autonomous 
spheres, the Agraham, the non-Brahman street and Cheri. The explanation 
of these what might be called non-hierarchial political relations, lies 
partly in the unwillingness on the part of the Brahmans to make agri­
culture as their principal occupation and partly to legislative
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measures such as the adult franchise and discriminatory laws granting 
special rights to the schedule castes. To quote Beteille:
Power blocs in Spripuram are not only informal in 
nature, but their composition also tends to be fluid.
There has been a good deal of change in the distribu­
tion of power and such change is, in fact, an important
feature of the system today. Changes in the distribution 
of power and the composition of power blocs are reflections 
of shifts in the bases of power. Some of the old bases of 
power, such as birth and ritual status, are being partly 
supplanted by new ones, such as numerical support, part 
membership, And contact with officials (P. 144).
The consequences of these developments are that unlike the power based
on landed wealth, power based on other factors tends to be shifting and
highly suseptable to outside influences.
Let me now turn to the question "how far are the positions in the ' 
political hierarchy ascribed and how far are they achieved"?
Evidence from Sripuram indicates that the positions of the Brahmans and 
the Adi-Dravidas are ascribed to a large extent. As mirasdars the 
Brahmans could have built up much greater influence among the Adi- 
Dravidas. They failed to do this because their ritual status did not 
permit them to have a more informal contact with the ritually unclean. 
Similarly, the Adi-Dravida have been debarred from any significant 
role in the political life of the village because of their ritual 
disabilities;
Positions in the political hierarchy are achieved through effective 
leadership and organization. However, the achievement factor is
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limited by ritual considerations.
As to the role of religion in the political hierarchy the evidence 
from this village indicates that it is significant in the following 
ways:
a.) Positions of influence and power may go only to those
who are high in the ritual hierarchy,
b.) The model of Sanskritization is the Brahman.
c.) Sanskritization has to be a group phenomenon.
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ECONOMIC HIERARCHY
Sripuram is a typical Indian village and like other Indian villages its 
economic hierarchy has undergone many changes during the last fifty 
years. The population was made up of five principal economic categories, 
the mirasdar landowners, the Non-Brahman cultivating castes, artisan 
castes, servicing castes and the Adi-Dravida Untouchables.
The entire cultivable land of the village belonged to the Brahman 
mirasdars and to a single family of Maratha. Six families owned more 
than fifty acres including one which owned more than one hundred acres. 
Other families owned less than fifty acres each.
The mirasdars did not cultivate the fields themselves and considered 
it improper to work with plough. The cultivation was carried on by 
Non-Brahmans. The most important cultivating castes were the Vellala, 
and the Kella groups. (Table 16).
The artisan castes comprised Goldsmith, Carpenters, and Potter. The 
village had no Blacksmith, Weavers and Basket-makers. The servicing 
castes comprised of Priests, Temple-servants, Barber and Washerman. 
Unlike the popular belief that only Brahmans are priest or all 
Brahmans are priests, the case in Sripuram was not so. Only two 
Brahmans served as priests and that only for the Agraharam. The priest 
included in the servicing caste was not a Brahman. He was a Pandram, 
an off-shoot of the Vellalas, and served only the Non-Brahmans. The 
Temple-servants, the Melakkaran supplied pipes and drums to the temples. 
The Barber and Washerman received annual payments in kind in addition to
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small grants of land. Other artisans and village servants were paid in 
kind for piece work.
The Adi-Dravidae worked as farm labourers. No Adi-Dravida owned land, 
nor was any a tenant.
This hierarchy which corresponded to the ritual ranking has changed since 
then. Most of its land has gone from the Maratha family. The Brahman 
mirasdars have lost nearly one quarter of their ancestral property. 
Ownership has dispersed even within the Agraharam. Unlike the earlier 
practice,title of land does not rest with the head of the family. Wives 
and daughters also hold titles of ownership and estates have been 
fragmented. That is why though the biggest landholder owns only twenty 
acres of land in the eyes of law, in actuality he is an effective owner 
of a larger area. Ownership of land has also dispersed beyond the 
boundaries of the Agraharam. Half of the landowners are Iviing outside 
the village. Four out of five biggest mirasdars do not live in Sripuram. 
Landownership is no longer restricted to the Brahmans. Many individuals 
from the Vellala, the Kalla and Padayachi castes as well as notably from 
the Cheri have acquired some land in recent years. Though there are 
only three Adi-Dravida landowners, their average holding being only one 
acre, the very fact that they are buying land marks a change in the 
traditional economic hierarchy.
Changes have also taken place in the composition of those categories who 
worked as tenants and those who worked as farm labourers fifty years ago.
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Many Non-Brahmans have. Become, rent era and no longer cultivate the land 
themselves and sublet it to the Adi-Dravida. This enables the Non- 
Brahmans to suppliement their income from sources other than agricul­
ture and gives the Adi-Dravidas a greater measure of economic security.
In addition to the changes in the pattern of ownership of land and 
tenancy there have been many other changes in the earlier economic re­
lations. In the first place the landowners are no longer able to act 
as patrons and economically superiors over their tenants and servicing 
castes. Their fragmented holdings have resulted in lower incomes. At 
the same time the cost of living is higher than before. Consequently, 
their economic relations with the servicing castes are becoming con­
tractual. To quote Beteille;
Today not only has the proportion of landowners resident 
in the village gone down, but fragmentation has greatly 
reduced the size of individual or family holdings. Together 
with this, the cost of living has gone up, since landowners 
have very often to support one or more children studying out­
side. This makes it very difficult for the mirasdar to meet 
his traditional obligations to tenants and to artisans and 
servicing groups. Formerly at festivals such as Deepavali 
and Pongal, as well as on other occasions landowners were 
expected to give liberally to a host of dependents. Today 
most of them cannot easily afford to do this. As their 
ability to distribute patronage becomed weakened, their 
power and influence over tenants and dependents also tend to 
wane (P. 201).
Further, Sripuram is increasingly being linked with the wider economy.
The artisans and village servants have their clientage outside the village 
also, and the traditional payments made to them by the farmers in 
Sripuram are only a part of their total incomes. Again, a fairly large
number of indivhuais mostly from the Agraharam are working as clerks,
teachera, etc., outside the village. The Agraharam receives over 
Rs. 3,50.Q every' mouth in the form of money orders from them.
‘ 1
To sum up; The Brahmans are still the highest in the present economic
i  '
hierarchy, the Non-Brahmans are se'cpnd and the Adi-Dravida third. The 
difference between the economic hierarchy of today and of yesterday is 
that the gulf between the segments is much less than it was before and 
mobility from one to the other is taking place.
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BThe principal factor in the earlier economic hierarchy was the high 
ritual rank of the Brahmans. Rulers and princes had granted them lands 
partly because they could maintain control over the population more 
effectively with their help and partly because they thought it an act 
of merit. Sastri writes:
Faith is the unique merit of the gift of land (bhu-dana) 
was very common and frequently acted on by those who could 
afford it. Thus it came about that new colonies of pious 
and learned Brahmans were settled in the different parts 
of the country and gained control of local affairs through 
sa-bha and its executive (1955: 492-3) .
Another factor in the earlier hierarchy was the attitudes of the Non- 
Brahmans and the Untouchables toward the Brahmans. It was considered 
improper on the part of the low caste not to acknowledge the superior 
rank of a Brahman in one way or another. This contention is supported 
by a report from Russell who mentions that many orthodex low caste men 
in Central India would drinlc that water in which the toe of a Brahman 
had been dipped. (1916: 382).
Changes in the traditional hierarchy came about on account of certain 
practices and values of the mirasdars. In the first place they were 
given to inordinate expenditure, conspicuous consumption, betting and 
gambling. It was on these accounts that the Maratha family once 
wealthy is no longer so. Secondly, the mirasdars were not willing to 
take to manual work of any kind. Their hostility toward handling of
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plough, led them to seek Western education in the cities which alone 
could qualify them for white collar jobs. Once employed in the city 
they became absentee lahdloards. Later many of them sold their lands 
away,
A factor of major importance which brought changes in the economic 
hierarchy has been the governmental legislation. The adult franchise 
recognized the equality of all citizens in the eyes of law irrespective 
of their caste and origin.
Discriminatory measures favouring the Untouchables granted a certain 
percentage of seats in educational institutions and government offices. 
These measures contributed largely toward an enhancement of the self 
concept as well as the economic positions of the Non-Brahman castes.
Three legislative measures, one which fixed the maximum limit of an 
individual's holding at 30 acres, the second which fixed the maximum 
area of owner cultivated plot at 6 2/3 acres, The third which gave greater 
security to tenants, has a more direct impact on the economic hierarchy 
within the village. The land was fragmented and the distinction between 
effective ownership and title became widespread. Outsiders notably sons- 
in-law, mappillai became landowners in Sripuram. Land changed hands 
more rapidly than ever before. The mirasars sold 200 acres immediately 
after the act which laid down maximum limits on holdings was passed in 
1961. Undoubtedly it was mainly because of legislative measures that 
many Non-Brahmans and even the Adi-Dravidas became landowners.
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Let .me. now turn to the. question, how far are the various positions in 
the economic hierarchy ascribed and how far are they achieved? Beteille 
wr ites:
Today it is possible to achieve a variety of economic and 
political positions in spite of one’s birth in a particular 
caste, although the latter is still very important in setting 
limits within which choice in the former is possible CP* 45).
It is on this account that the Brahmans have chosen not to take to plough
in spite of the fact that owner cultivation brings more money than letting
the land to others. To quote Beteille again:
Property by itself does not create social honour, although 
it is generally a precondition to it. Thus, when a Vellala 
requires land, he does not automatically move up in the scale 
of social honour; for this he is required, in addition, to San- . ■ 
skritize his style of life (P. 190).
This is because low ritual status and wealth are incompatible in the 
villagers eyes. Positions in the economic hierarchy are rationally 
motivated as well as achieved in the cases of Kallas, and three
families of Adi-Dravidas. They have improved their economic position 
through purchase of land in the village.
As regards the question what is the role of religion in the economic 
hierarchy, the answer is the same as in the cases of the villages discussed 
earlier. Beteille remarks that Kallas transform themselves into 
Maravas, and Ahamudiyas into Vellalas.
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Tet there are significant differences between social 
mobility in the caste system and social mobility in 
the class system. In the later it is the individual 
who moves up or down, whereas in the former entire 
communities change their position. 0?* 190).
It has to be "the entire community" because of the ritual links which 
bind it together. It is important here to note the comments of 
Srinivas on changes in the ceremonial practices in different parts of 
India. He writes that there is an increasing tendency to reduce the 
number of ceremonies on the occasions of marriage etc., but funeral 
rites and the annual shraddha continues to be performed as before.
And further:
Not only caste but also kinship is bound up with pollu­
tion ideas. Thus, births,as well as deaths results in 
pollution for specific periods for cmembers of the kin­
ship group, death pollution being more rigorous than 
birth pollution 0-966: 125, 120).
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RAMPUR
Rampur is situated at a distance of 15 miles from Delhi, in North India. 
It has a population of 1095 consisting mainly of Jats, a people of 
Indo-Scythian origin. It is one of the many Jat villages in this area. 
The Jats numbered 8,377,819 in the villages around Delhi in 1931.
Rampur is a nucleated settlement. The Jats live in the center of the 
village and the other castes live in the outskirts. Each caste has 
its own block.
The total cultivable land in the village is 784 acres and cultivation 
is carried on with Persian wells and canals. Annual rainfall ranges 
from 22 to 30 inches.
The caste composition of the village is as follows in Table 17.
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Table 17
Caste Families
Jat 78
Chamar Leatherworker 20
Brahman 15
Bhangi Sweeper 10
Kumhar Potter 7
Jhinver Water-Carrier 5
Dhobi Washerman 4
Khati Carpenter 4
Nai Barber 3
Chipi Calico-Printer
or Tailor 2
Lohar Blacksmith 1
Baniya Merchant 1
150 CL095 persons)
POLITICAL HIERARCHY
The Jats are higher than other castes in the political hierarchy in 
Rampur. This is manifested in two ways. In the first place the headmen 
are all Jats. In the second place the statutory panchayat is clearly 
Jat dominated. Says Lewis, "when there are conflicts between the Jats 
and the lower castes the latter are not in a good position to defend1’, 
their interest" (P. 27). However, the fact that the panchayat has 
become a forum for the airing of more or less trivial disputes between 
individuals (P. 27) rather than an effective judicial body, shows that 
a more detailed analysis of intra and inter-caste relations is necessary 
for a clearer understanding of the political hierarchy in the village.
The Jat lineages and clans are grouped within Rampur into units locally 
known as panas. The village is divided almost equally into two panas, 
Pana Dhan Singh and Pana Harditt. Pana Dhan Singh consists of lineages 
of Dabas and Kharab clans. Pana Harditt consists of lineages of Dabas 
and Deswal clans. The Dabas are said to be the descendants of one 
Dabas who settled in the village in the twelfth century. The Deswals 
and the Kharabs who were effines of the Dabas came to the village some­
times later. These days the two panas are of approximately equal 
strength. Pana Dhan Singh has forty families and Pana Harditt has 
thirty-eight. Each pana has an equal amount of land and is represented 
by a separate headman.
There are three factions in each pana. Pana Dhan Singh contains factions 
A, F, and D and Pana Harditt contains factions B, C, and E. In each
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pana two of the factions are hostile to each other and one is neutral.
The hostile factions within each pana combine with one of the groups in 
the opposite pana so that each hostile faction is hostile to two groups 
(one in each pana) and friendly to a third.
The ages of these factions range from 12 to 100 years but all of them 
are off-shoots of larger factions which emerged nearly 150 years ago.
It is reported that about twenty years before the mutiny in 1857 a 
quarrel arose between the Dabas clan and their sisterTs sons, the 
Kharabs over the possession of some land in Rampur. The latter were 
successful in maintaining their hold on the disputed property and the 
quarrel did notremain limited to the village only. There were many 
violent cases, the most violent being when a Dabas girl was abducted 
by a Kharab young man as a result of which fifteen persons were wounded 
and one killed. Since then there have been many subdivisions and 
realignments of the factions. An important shift in faction membership 
took place during the early years of the present century when the Harditt 
lineage lost headmanship to the Jaimel lineage. It seems that though 
there is no evidence of active hostilities among the Jat factions 
these days, yet the factional rivalries contribute very largely 
towards making the statutory panchayat an ineffective body.
The higher position of the Jats as a whole in the political hierarchy 
in the village is also manifested in their disputes with the Sweepers 
and the Leatherworkers. It was customary on the part of the' Sweepers 
to raise chickens and pigs in order to suppliment their meager income.
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The Jats objected to this practice on the grounds that the chicken 
spoiled the dung cakes and the pigs damage the crops. The Sweepers 
complied. However, the case of the Leatherworkers has been less 
favourable for the Jats. In 1926 they refused to pay their customary 
house tax to the Jats. The matter was taken to the court. The Jats 
won the case and the Leatherworkers were forced to pay the tax. In 
1938 the problem again came to a head because the Leatherworkers had 
failed to pay the house tax for the previous ten years. The matter did 
not reach the court because the Jats agreed not to insist on the payment 
of arrears in return for regular payments in the future. The Leather­
workers continued to pay tax till 1947 but have not done so since then. 
Meanwhile the relations between the Leatherworkers and the Jats have 
been worsening steadily. In 1933 following the advice of the Arya 
Smaj (Hindu reform movement), the Leatherworkers stopped begar (forced 
free labour) for the Jats. They also brought a criminal case against 
the Jats. The Jats were also made to pay fines if they bury their own 
dead cattle instead of giving them over to the Leatherworkers as stipulated 
in the shart wa.jib-ul-urz (list of customs and conditions affecting 
management of village). The estrangement between the two castes appears 
to have increased markedly in the post Independence period, though the 
Jats have the final say in the village.
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BAll the village land, including the house sites is 
owned by the Jats, the other castes are thus living 
there more or less at the sufference of the Jats. It 
was this crucial relationship to the land, with the 
attendant power of eviction, which made it possible 
for the Jats to exact begar service from the Camars 
(Leatherworkers) in the past and still enables them 
to dominate the other caste groups (PP. 79-80).
Another factor in the political primacy of the Jats is that most of 
them are owner cultivators and unlike the landowning Brahmans in Sripuram 
live in the village and take active interest in the village life. Further 
the Jats are the most numerous (648 in a total population of 1095) as 
well as a well organized caste in the village. In spite of many factions 
they have a powerful caste panchayat. The panchayat has both judicial 
and regulatory functions. It sanctions the celebration of kaj 
(funerary rite) as well as permission to distribute sweets on the occasion 
of the birth of a son. The panchayat may refuse to accord its sanction.
In such an eventuality no one will atend the kaj nor will anyone accept 
the sweets.
Finally, the fact that the Jats are a clean caste has legitimized their 
political primacy. Were the Jats on the wrong side of the pollution 
barrier, other clean castes in the village would probably not have accepted 
their political superiority. Evidence supporting this contention 
consists of some events which took place in 1933. It is reported that 
in response to the call of Arya Smaj to do away with untouchability, 
many Jats drank water at the hands of the Leatherworkers. Later on 
however, these Jats were boycotted by the local Brahmans in spite 
of the fact that these Brahmans worked as tenants of the Jats (P. 73).
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The low position of the Sweepers in the political hierarchy as mani­
fested by their abandonment of the practice of raising poultry and 
pigs is evidently due to their economic dependence upon the Jats.
Lewis writes:
All the Bhangis (Sweepers) are heavily in debt and 
owe money to the Jats. In the past they used to borrow 
from their jajmans, either interest free or at very 
low rate, but now they must pay from 12 to 18 perocent
a year. Moreover it is not easy to get loans. If a
Bhangi approaches one of the Jats for this purpose, he
may be told sarcastically to seek help from the Congress
Party or from one of the politicians the Bhangi 
voted for on election day (33. 71).
What may be described as a defiant position of the Leatherworkers is
due to many factors. Probably they are the best organized and politi­
cally conscious low caste in the village. As far back as 1926, they 
decided collectively not to pay house tax and carried the matter to the 
court. Their frequent recourse to the authorities for intervention 
indicates that they are unwilling to accept the political primacy of the 
Jats. Another factor which explains their behaviour is their gradual 
disassociation from the village economy. During the World War II many 
of them obtained jobs in the nearby ordinance factories. Even after the 
end of the War and the consequent unemployment, they did not return to 
their traditional occupation in the village. These days in a total of 
twenty families, only two work as shoemakers. In all probability even
these families do not restrict marketing of their product to Rampur alone
Numerical strength of the Leatherworkers is another factor which has 
contributed to their defiance of the Jats. They rank third in the villag 
(Table 17) in regard to population. This enables them to act more inde­
pendently than other low castes. -*-22
How far are the positions which the Jats and others occupy in the 
political hierarchy achieved? How far are the positions ascribed?
In the case of Jats their position is achieved in so far as they took 
possession of Rampur and the adjoining villages and were able to main­
tain their hold. The positions of lower castes is ascribed in so far 
as they cannot attain a higher position so long as they are on the 
wrong side of the pollution line.
What is the role of religion in political hierarchy? It is necessary 
to examine the role of kinship in political relations for an answer to 
this question. Let me begin with an examination of the relations be­
tween kinship and factions. Table 18 shows the clan composition of the 
six Jat factions in the village.
Table 18
Jat Faction Clan Composition
A Dabas + Kharabs
B Dabas + Deswal
C Dab as
D Dab as + Kharabs
E Dab as + Dhaya
Kharabs
It is clear from the above Table that in factions C and F, faction and 
clan are synonymous, arid in the remaining four factions, no faction
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contains more than lineages of two clans. Lewis comments on the close
relations between factions and clans as follows:
The role of kinship in the composition of factions is 
extremely important. In questioning informants about 
the membership of their particular faction they tend to 
equate their faction with their kinship group, even when 
they are aware that the two may not entirely coincide.
This is particularly true when kin belong to separate but 
friendly factions. There is a strong reticence, however, 
to volunteer the information that close kin belong to 
hostile factions. But when the question is put directly 
it will be admitted. There is not a single case of brothers 
belonging to separate factions, only one case of first 
and second cousins, and only four cases (out of fourteen) 
of third cousins (P. 118-9).
The role of kinship in political relations is also evident in the manner 
in which the Jats have organized themselves. The Jat caste council in 
Rampur is structurally a part of caugama (four villages) caste council 
which in turn is a part of bisagama (twenty villages) caste council.
It seems that the political and kinship units overlap in the case of the 
Jat caste. The bisagama is also an exogamous unit. Some villages in 
this unit, are dada (grandfather) villages, and some are dadi (grand­
mother) villages. Some villages are recognized politically more impor­
tant than others. For example there are caudher (leader) villages and 
others as vizir (minister) villages, Lewis remarks on this phenomenon as 
follows:
A typology of peasant societies must also include as a 
variable the role of kinship, that is, the extent to which 
the society is organized on a kinship basis. Where the 
kinship basis is pervasive, as in Rampur, we can say that 
the society is more primitive or tribal (P. 376).
My contention is that the kinship roles emanate from Hindu religion and
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it is in this sense that religion is a factor in the political hier­
archy. An example of such kinship roles is provided by ceremonials. 
This is the reason why the composition of the Jat factions coincide 
with clan and maximal lineages. There is not a single case of brothers 
belonging to different factions.
Another example of the expression of the Hindu religion in kinship
relations is found in the rules governing maft&age.
The search for a bridegroom is complicated by involved 
rules relating to caste, locality, and clan. The main 
features of these rules, except with regard to caste, 
is the requirement of exogamy. Caste rules demand that 
all members marry within the caste. A Jat must marry a 
Jat, a Brahman a Brahman, and so on. These endogamous 
rules are adhered to without exception in Rampur. There 
are no cases of intercaste marriage. Close inter-marriage 
within the caste is also prevented by the exogamous rules 
for village and clan (P. 160).
In his comparison of Rampur with Tepoztlan, Mexico, Lewis writes:
In Rampur the question of whom one can marry is much more 
complicated. Marriage is controlled by a combination of 
factors, namely, caste endogamy, village exogamy, limited 
territorial exogamy, and clan exogamy. . , Our study of 
Rampur showed that the 266 married women living in the 
village came from about two hundred separate villages at 
distances of up to 40 miles (PP. 319-20).
ECONOMIC HIERARCHY
Rampur is a village of owner cultivators. Generally speaking the 
holdings are small, the biggest being 52.1 acres. The rest are much 
smaller. Table 19 shows the range of holdings in the village.
Table 19
Size of
Holding Number of
(acres) Families
Less than 1 3
1 - 4  22
4 -10 29
10 -20 17
20 -40 6
over 40 1
78
The entire cultivable land is owned by the Jats, and no Jat family is
landless. In a total of seventy-eight families, only twelve do not
cultivate their land themselves. Forty-two of the remaining sixty- 
six families find it necessary to suppliment their income from outside 
sources. Twelve Jats are employed as teachers, fifteen are employed 
in the police and in the army, fifteen work as subordinate civil 
servants in Delhi and five receive pensions.
Five Brahman families work as tenants of the Jats. The rest of the
families follow a variety of occupations. Five work as teachers, seven
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are factory workers, one is a tailor and one makes his living by 
selling silk. There is no temple in the village and no Brahman works 
as temple priest.
Like the Brahmans the Leatherworkers do not follow the traditional calling 
of their caste. Four work outside the village, three have taken to 
weaving, four are garden contractors, one is a village watchman, the 
rest excepting two raise cattle or work as day labourers. Only two 
families still make shoes but do not handle hides. They have no 
jajmani relations in the village.
There have been no great changes in the traditional occupation of the 
Potters. In a total of seven families two work outside the village, but 
the remaining five continue to make pots and work on .jajmani basis. 
However, their jajmani payments have been substantially slashed in recent 
years and they have to suppliment their income from other sources. Four 
work as weavers and one grows vegetables. Similarly the five Water- 
carriers find it necessary to have additional sources of income, apart 
from what they receive from their jajmans. All of them have taken to 
vegetable gardening.
There are four families of Carpenters. Carpenters are working as teachers 
and the remaining two still work as carpenters and maintain the customary 
jajmani relations. As the jajmani payments are insufficient for a 
living, they have some other sources of income such as working as mason 
and selling milk.
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The traditional calling of the Chipi is calico-printing but the two 
families in Rampur have taken to tailoring. They work on cash basis 
for the Jats and Brahmans and on reciprocal basis for servicing castes.
In the case of Barber, only on of the three families in Rampur still 
follows his traditional calling and to maintain jajmani relations.
The other two no longer work as barbers. One is a school teacher and the 
other is a truck driver.
There are four families of Washermen. Only two still pursue their 
traditional occupation and work on jajmani basis. One is working in 
a factory near Delhi and the other works as an agricultural labourer.
The only family of the Baniya, the merchant, continues to follow his 
traditional calling. He sells grains and other commodities, but at 
the same time maintains a type of j ajmani relations with Brahmans and 
servicing castes. Similarly the single family of Blacksmith and six 
families of the Sweeper caste have not abandoned their ancestral 
occupation and continue to work on jajmani basis. Four Sweepers have 
found work outside the village.
A description of the economic structure is incomplete without noting 
the outside income of the different castes as well as the extent of 
their indebtedness. Table 20 shows the outside income.
The extent of indebtedness in the village is quite significant. The 
Blacksmith, the Carpenter, the Potter, the Sweeper castes are under 
heavy debt. It is notable, however, that generally speaking those
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families which are working on jjijmani basis are in debt.
Table 20
Caste
Jat
Brahman
Leather-
worlcer
Sweeper
Potter
Water-
carrier
Carpenter
Washerman
Barber
Calico-
printer
Blacksmith
Merchant
Total Number 
of Families
78
15
20
10
7
5
4
4
3
2
1
1
Number of 
Families with 
Outside Income
42
10
5
4
2
0
2
1
2
0
0
1
Total
Average Monthly Outside
Income per Family Income
145 6077
142 1421
53 265
72 289
45 90
0 0
250 498
80 80
115 230
0 0
0 0
100 100
Total 150 69 Rs. 9050
The economic hierarchy in Rampur may be viewed from two angles, intercaste 
and intracaste. In the intercaste economic hierarchy the Jats and Brahmans 
are higher than the servicing castes, the Sweeper being the lowest. Though 
differences in wealth exist within each caste including the Jats, the 
intracaste economic hierarchy within servicing castes is relevant for the 
purposes of the present discussion. Those families in the servicing 
castes who do not work withing the jajmani system are higher than those who do.
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BIn this section I ask why do the Jats and the Brahmans have direct access 
to the economic resources (i.e. intercaste economic hierarchy) and why 
are those servicing caste families who are not working within the 
j ajmani system economically higher than those who are (intracaste 
economic hierarchy).
The principal source of production in Rampur is land. The traditional 
occupation of the Jats is agriculture. One of the reasons why the Jats 
have direct access to resources therefore is their traditional occu­
pation. However, agriculture as a traditional occupation alone does 
not explain the position of the Jats. A second major factor is their 
caste organization. It is on account of the support of their caste 
as a whole in the region that they have been able to maintain control 
in Rampur. The caugama and bisagama Jat panchayats are the organ 
through which collective caste activities are carried on.
The reasons why the Brahmans are second to the Jats and higher than 
other castes in the economic hierarchy are firstly, that five of them 
are working as occupancy tenants of the Jats and as such have direct 
access to resources* and secondly, that the income of the rest of the 
families from outside sources is highest in the village excepting 
that of the Jats. But the position of the Brahmans in the economic 
hierarchy cannot be attributed to their traditional calling. In 
actuality it is not considered proper for a Brahman to touch the 
plough. Therefore rational motivation appears to be the important
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factor in the second position of the Brahmans in the economic hier­
archy. The case of the Brahman who has become a tailor and that of
the other who is selling silk supports this contention.
The reasons for the lower positions of those working within the jajmani 
system than those who are working outside the village lie in the 
increased use of cash economy, rising prices of agricultural products, 
employment opportunities outside the village, increase in population 
and subdivisions of holding into smaller plots. For example in 1910 there
were 38 holdings in the village. In 1953 there are 78. In 1910 no
holding measured less than 6.25 acres. In 1953 the smallest holding 
measures .5 acres and there are 36 holdings within the range of ,5 
and 6.25 acres. This explains why it is becoming increasingly difficult 
for the landowners to meet their j ajmani obligations and to insist 
upon slashing down these payments. They also find it economical to 
sell their farm products and to employ paid labor instead of main­
taining the traditional j ajmani relations. At the same time wages 
paid to workers in the factories and other places outside the village 
have tended to keep up with the rising cost of living. It is in 
this manner that the economic gap between those who work within the 
jajmani system and those who work outside the village is becoming 
wider and wider.
Are the positions in the economic hierarchy achieved or ascribed and 
secondly, what is the role of religion in the economic hierarchy are 
the two questions which have to be answered here.
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The positions of the castes are ascribed in the intercaste economic 
hierarchy. There is a summations of roles namely, the higher castes 
are wealthier than the lower ones. That the positions are achieved is 
cleared from what I have characterized as the intracaste economic 
hierarchy. Many families of lower castes are becoming wealthier than 
upper caste families notably those whose landholdings are uneconomic. 
Yet, as in the cases of other Indian villages examined in this thesis, 
the caste identity in ritual and ceremonials is as strong as ever. 
There is no evidence of the acceptance of those individuals who do not 
follow their traditional occupations into caste other than their own. 
Lewis describes, the persistance of the identification of an individual 
with his caste in the following passage.
Meanwhile, despite the weakening of the jajmani 
system and the inroads of a money economy in Rampur, 
the social aspects of the caste system have changed 
very little. The rules of endogamy are not ques­
tioned. In spite of the influence of the Arya Smaj, 
the traditional caste rules governing interdining and 
taking of water still prevail. The Jats will not 
share their hookas with Camars (Leatherworkers) or 
sit on the same string cot with them. When community 
project speakers address the people of Rampur it 
would be democratic assemblages, the Camars remain 
on the outskirts of the crowd. Patterns of hierarchy 
and social distance persist, and the psychology of 
caste still permeates interpersonal relationships.
In some ways caste identifications have even strengthened 
in Rampur. Among the Jats the emphasis on caste 
loyalty may represent a defensive reaction to the 
weakening of the jajmani system, while among the 
Camars it signifies a united stand against the higher- 
caste landowners (P. 83).
My assertion is that the identification of an individual with his 
caste is founded upon beliefs in the Hindu religion.
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WLAKPUR 
NORTH WEST PAKISTAN
MALAKPUR
Malakpur is situated in Tahsil (subdistrict) Talagang, District Camp- 
bellpur in the province of Panjab, West Pakistan. The District lies 
on the eastern bank of the Indus and stretches from Attock to the border 
of Mainwali in the south. It has extremes of climate and is a land of 
plains and plateaux. Annual rainfall ranges from 14 to 24 inches and 
irrigation is carried on through wells and seasonal streams.
Historically, the area has been the home of Awans. It was referred to 
as Mahal-Awanan (the Awan District) in Abul Fazalfs revenue records 
in the sixteenth century. The Awans were numberically largest in the 
District. (Dist. Gazt. 1907: 64,70). In the Subdistrict of Tala­
gang alone they comprised 83 percent of the population (Baden-Powell, 
1896: 271). Probably they have been also the largest landowners 
in the past, because in spite of their reported dispossessions by the 
Sikhs?and the British they owned 36 percent of land in the District in 
1901.
Tradition tells that Malakpur was founded by one Viru, an Awan,'*' by 
2
Kaom . He had five sone. One of them continued to live in Malakpur
The origin of Awan is uncertain. The Awans themselves contend that the 
word Awan is a derivative of the Arabic word mua-wan,meaning one who 
assists. The mua-wan, they hold are those who in an answer to the call 
of the Caliph of Bagdad, volunteered to assist Sultan Muhmud of Ghazni 
in his campaigns in India in the early eleventh century. Thus, they claim 
a foreign origin. However, the word Viru probably a corruption of the 
Sanskrit Bir indicates that the Awans, at least those of Malakpur are of 
local origin.
The word lcoam literally means a tribe or a nation. In common usage it 
is used in two different senses depending upon the context. The Awans 
are referred to as a kaem by non-Awans. The Awans themselves refer to 
their subdivisions or lineages also as kaom e.g., Hafzal kaom.
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but the others made their own settlements not far away from Malakpur.
With the passage of time these' settlements grew is size and numbers 
and today forms a cluster of five villages collectively called Viruwal.
The majority of the Awans living in Malakpur today, are said to be the 
descendants of Bathal and Baroji, two grandsons of Veru. Their different 
lineages are also referred to as kaoms. Thus the kapnis, of the descen­
dants of Bathal are Bathral, Niaz Ali Khail, Nur Mohammadal. Hajal,
Khani Khail, Bakhshal, Mir Mohammadal, Khurshedi, Mural and Fateh Sheri 
and thejcoams of the descendants of Baroje are Bajrals, Jhamal, Jafral 
Hafzal and Sher Bazie. The Gartal, Achral, Jhalcral and Sadqual koams, 
also Awans came to the village from other places sometimes during the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century. Excepting a common koam name 
Awan, no kinship links seems to have existed between these groups and 
the earlier Awans of Malakpur.
Until the beginning of the British rule in the Panjab the entire popula­
tion of Malakpur lived in the original settlement. Since then hamlets, 
called dholces of various sizes have sprung up in the outskirts of the 
village. The pattern of the emergence of the dhokes has been the same. 
After the partitioning of land among the heirs of a deceased person, one 
or more of the heirs might decide to move out from the ancestral home, 
and lay the foundation of a dhoke. As a rule the dhoke is referred to 
after the name of its founder* But sometimes the dhoke is named
after any peculiarity of the terrain in which it is located, e.g. Dhoke 
Baila, called so because it is situated in baila, (land where river
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overflows) . However, all dhokes are not a result of partitioning of 
ancestral property. The Gartal, Sadqual, Achral and Jhalcral were given 
lands by the local Awans and were permitted to make their own dholces.
These days there are thirteen large and some smaller dhokes in Malak­
pur. The population of the larger dhokes as well as that of the
original settlement is given below:
TABLE 21
Dhoke Koam Persons
Baila (Achral) 143
Jhanda (Nur Mohammadal) 130
Hafzal (Hafzal) 320
Sadqual (Sadqual 316
Imral Clmral) 76
Jhamal (Jhamal) 103
Sherfa (Khani Khail) 178
Fetch Sheri (Fateh Sheri) 84
Sadqual (2nd) (Sadqual) 73
Jhamal (Jhamal) 233
Hakim Wali (Meher Mohammadal + Nural) 225
Bakshal (Bakshal) 105
Hajal (Gartal) 320
2306
The population of the original settlement is 878 persons bringing the 
total population to 3183. Compared to population of the village given 
in 1961 Census of Pakistan the figure given here is less by about 300.
This is mainly because a number of tiny dhokes are not included in my 
figure. The kaom composition of Malakpur is given below.
TABLE 22
Koam Persons
Awan 2778
Sayyad 21
Lohar - Blacksmith 51
Mochi - Cobbler cum Shoemaker 60
Teli” Oil-presser 23
Dhabba ~ Calico-printer
cum weaver 52
Nai - Barber 54
Kubhar - Potter 13
Milar - Vegetable grower
cum Persian well operator 61
Musalli - Farm labourer 49
According to the records of the pat-wari (village accountant) the total 
cultivable land is 9606 acres. There are 86 Persian wells and one 
Jhalar (bucket and wheel for lifting water from a stream) but they irrigate 
only a fraction of the land and therefore much of the cultivation depends 
upon rainfall.
There are five mosques in the main settlement in addition to a mosque 
in every large dhoke.
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POLITICAL HIERARCHY
Until about twenty years ago the Awans were higher in the political 
hierarchy in Malakpur. The manifestations of this hierarchy can be 
traced to the Mughal times.
The Mughals interfered very little with the ancient customs in the 
village. They incorporated the village into the administration as a 
unit for revenue and police purposes (Tinker, 1954: 19). It was cust­
omary on the part of the amil (revenue officer) to hold the hereditary 
chief of a clan or a local landowner responsible for the collection of 
revenue. The individual share of the cultivators was decided by the 
chief or the landowners of the village (Baden-Powell, 1896: 425).
The British made a distinction between agriculturist and non-agriculturist 
sections of population and ranked the former higher than the latterlin 
the villages. The Awans being agriculturists were ranked higher than 
the lcammis in Malakpur. It was on this account that no kammi was 
appointed as a lumberdar or nominated to the District Board or any other 
local body.
Within the village an indicator of the political hierarchy was the number
of villagers who came to the "men's house" usually maintained by big
landowners. It was there that the huka (hubble bubble) was served at
any time and men gossiped, played cards or lounged on the cots. It was
there also that the landowner listened to his tenants, discussed affairs
of the day and met in a parea* (informal village council) to decide their
*The parea has no connection with the government and its composition de­
pends upon the particular case to be put before it. Usually a few re­
spectable landowners and kammis take part in it.
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disputes. It was there also that a traveler could find food and spend 
a night. As Awans were the only big landowners, they alone could main­
tain men's houses. There were five lumberdars in Malakpur, a Bathral, 
a Barjral, a Jhamal, a Jafral and a Khurshedi. They maintained men's 
houses and it is reported that each attracted almost an equal number of 
villagers. Thus all were equally influential. Besides, none of them 
hesitated to go to another's men's house, thereby indicating friend­
liness .
The political hierarchy had changed considerably by 1969. It is 
necessary to narrate events which contributed to the change for an 
understanding of the political relations among the different kaoms in 
Malakpur these days.
1951 was an important year in the political history of Malakpur. Elections 
for the Provincial Legislative Assembly were held for the first time 
in that year on the adult franchise basis. Before this there had pre­
vailed the rule of limited franchise, according to which only literate 
and landowning people could vote. Malakpur was considered an important 
source of votes because of its large population and therefore the two 
contestants for a single seat for the constituency in which Malakpur was 
situated, pame personally to the village to enlist support. One of them 
was an influential Awan landowner from a neighbouring village and the 
other was a Sayyed pir (religious leader) from a different village. The 
Awan who had the Muslim League Party ticket dwelt upon the achievements 
of his party, namely, the creation of Pakistan and the conference of the 
right of the inheritance of property as enjoyed by Islam, while the pir
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who was an. independent candidate, promised to work for an Islamic order
in the country- Significantly the pir was successful, in spite of a
very high majority of voters being Awans. As was known later the votes 
of the Awans in Malak*Fur were also divided between the two candidates. 
The approximate alignment is given below,
TABLE 2&
Voted for the Pir Candidate Voted for the Awan Candidate
Hafzal Half of Sadquals
Bajral Half of IChurshedis
Jhamal Indeterminate number
from other Kaoms
Bathral
Half or Khurshedis
Half of Sadquals
Indeterminate number 
of other kaoms
The elections seemed to have divided the village into two fairly well 
defined factions. Factionalism was by no means an unusual phenomenon 
for Malakpur. It went as far back as men could remember. The elections 
were unusual because actors from outside the village had become im­
portant in local conflicts and the traditional mechanisms which 
restrained the conflicts going too far were weakened. Village disputes 
were no longer a village affair but sometimes became a matter of prestige 
for outsiders. It was increasingly becoming an arena where politicians 
from outside the village struggled for influence. It was with their
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support that many Awans brought suits agsinst each other. An incident 
which illustrates "trial of strength" between factions took place when 
the officer - in - charge of the local police*1 station was handed an order 
of immediate transfer. No reason for the immediate transfer was mention­
ed in the order, but the officer knew that it was a result of his refusal 
to comply with the "request" of a member of the Provincial Assembly to 
release a person who was in the police custody at that time.
However, the traditional mechanisms which restrained conflicts going too 
far did not disappear altogether and continued to be operative. This 
is evident from the following two incidents which took place in the late 
fifties.
Incident I.
Two groups of men, eight in one and six in the other, armed with ballams 
(long sticks with steel points) were seen a few feet away from the body 
of a man laid on a string cot. The body was covered with a white sheet. 
There were spots of blood on the ground and many of the men were wounded 
and bleeding. It was clear that a pitched battle had taken place, as 
a result of which one man had lost his life. A few minutes before I 
arrived at the spot, the fight had been brought to a halt by an elderly 
person. Presumably he was called there in all haste. He was riding a 
horse and he addressed the group from the horse’s back. Briefly stated, 
he said, "I warned this man not to change the boundary line of his field 
without consulting A. He is dead now and will not be able to shift the 
boundary line again. R. N. has met me and we have decided to end the
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matter. No one will be punished and we shall bear the expenses of the 
police inquiry. Let us say duai-khair (prayer for peace)". Saying 
this he raised his hands in prayer and so did the groups, thereby 
symbolizing an end of the dispute.
Incident 2.
It was customary on the part of the kammis to request for a house site 
from the Awans. The ownership of the site remained unchanged even 
though the kammis^  lived there for many years. One of the reasons why 
the kammis could not own the house site was the Panjab Alienation of 
Land Act which debarred non-agriculturists to own land. Soon after 
Indpendenceethis act was repealed and distinction between the agricul­
turists and non-agriculturists became a matter of the past. By the 
late fifties many kammis had acquired sufficient wealth through 
trading and had started buying land for themselves. As it happened, 
the Bathral and the Bajral lumberdars had a common plot which they had 
inherited. It was necessary to divide the common plot before any sale 
could be made. However, no agreement had been possible on the division. 
The matter came to a head when one night, the Bathral lumberdar ploughed 
and fenced that part of the disputed plot which he thought was his 
share. Next morning the Bajral lumberdar was furious and sent a man with 
a drum all over the village and the dhokes to announce "Come on friends
of _________ ; if you do not come today, your friendship with him will
come to an end". It was a difficult situation for many villagers be­
cause until then the Bathrals and the Bajrals had belonged to the same
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factions (Table 23). However, within a short while two armed groups 
were confronting each other. The situation was saved by the elders 
of different kaoms on the plea that a fight such as that would ruin the 
village. The two lumberdars agreed to place the matter before a third 
party and a clash was averted.
There were some major changes in the constitution of Pakistan in the 
year 1959. A system called the Basic Democracies was introduced, 
in which, among other provisions, every 1,000 to 1,200 adults elected 
one representative for the Union Council, A Union Council contained 
10 to 12 members and all Union Councils in the country collectively 
functioned as a college for the election of the president of Pakistan. 
Malakpur elected three Union Councillors, but the 1959 elections were 
not hotly contested, perhaps because no one seemed to know what it was 
all about.
Elections for the Union Council were held again in 1965. These were 
fought out in Malakpur much more seriously than those in 1959, There 
There were five contestants for three seats, a Jhamal, a Hafzal, a 
Bakshal, a Bajral and a Khurshedi. The Bajral and Bakshal were defeated. 
Voters were divided more or less on the following lines.
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TABLE 24
Jhamal Cahidate HafzalCandidate Khurshedi Candidate
Majority of Bathrals Majority of Bajrals Majority of Sadquals
Majority of Hafzals 4 Hafzals Minority of Gertals
Minority of Jhamals Majority of Gertals Minority of Jafrals
Half of Khurshedis Indeterminate number Half of Khurshedis 
of other kaoms
Indeterminate number 
of other kaoms
Indeterminate number 
of other kaoms
Soon after the elections a number of supporters of a successful candidate^ 
A, went near the house of B, a defeated candidate and celebrated the 
success of A by singing and dancing. B felt greatly humiliated and de­
cided not to take the matter lying down. A few days later BTs men 
forcibly rounded up some cattle belonging to A and when they were being 
driven to a cattle shed, N.K. a tenant of A managed to free them from their 
captors. B's men again attempted to capture the cattle the next day, but 
once again N. K. foiled their attempts. A few days later N. K. was 
attacked by B’s men on his way to the fields. However, not only did he 
manage to escape unhurt but also inflicted some injuries to one of his 
attackers. One dark night N. K. and his brother who had gone to a 
neighbouring village were way-laid on their way back home. N.K's brother 
was fatally wounded and died a few days later. The matter went to the 
court but the alleged attackers were given the benefit of doubt and were 
acquitted. It is reported that N. K. did an unexpected thing when the 
news of their acquittal reached him. He congratulated the murderer of
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his, brother and said to them "I am glad you are back home and it is 
good that no one else usurped my right to avenge the death of my 
brother." Nearly two years passed without any move from N. K. and the 
matter was almost forgotten. One night when marriage celebrations were 
in progress in B's house, a hail of bullets killed four persons on the 
spot and wounded many others. N. K. was never seen in the village again.
By 1969 the traditional mechanisms which restrained conflicts appeared 
to be far less functional than before. The visiting pattern in the men’s 
houses and number of disputes being handled by the police indicated that 
the Awans were divided into two distinct and hostile factions and that 
the kammis, many of whom had acquired wealth since Independence had risen 
in the political hierarchy. The two factions as manifested by the 
visiting pattern were as follows:
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TABLE 25
Bathral Faction Bajral Faction
Majority of Jhamals Majority of Sadqual
Majority of Jafral Majority of Meher Mohammadal
Majority of Haf zal Minority of Jafral
Majority of Khurshedi Minority of Khurshedi
Majority of Niaz Ali Khail Minority of Ichral
Majority of Gertal Minority of Imral
Minority of Imral Minority of Bakshal
Minority of Ichral Minority of Niaz Ali Khail
Minority of Meher Mohammadal Minority of Gertal
Half of Nur Mohammadal Half of Nur Mohammadal
In 1969 the members of the Bathral faction had lodged five cases against 
the members of the Bajral faction, while four cases had been lodged against 
them by the latter. A copy of the police report made by a Bajral is 
given below.
Police Report under Section 307 Pakistan Penal Code (attempted murder).
I learned in the morning that my maternal uncle’s son had 
died last night in Dhoke...I left for the Dhoke and was
accompanied by B.K. son of S. K. On our way we met F. K. son
of G. K. and A. K. son of M. K. who were also going to the 
same place. As we approached the Dhoke we were suddenly con­
fronted with K. G. son of B. G. (kaom Bathral) and F. N. son
of A. N. (Kaom Hafzal). They were armed with guns and 
pointing the guns at us. K. G. said "die like men" and fired. 
A bullet grazed my right shoulder and another my thumb. I 
fell on the ground but in the meantime some men came running 
from the Dhoke. Upon seeing them K. G. and F. N. fled.
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The reason for this attempted murder is that I was 
engaged to K, G.'s sister, but he was opposed to this
marriage. He had warned me earlier that if I insisted upon
the marriage the consequences would be disastrous for me.
Reported by L. K., son of P. K. (Roam Bajral).
A copy of a police report made by a Bathral is given below.
Police Report under section 307 Pakistan Penal Code (attempted murder).
Last evening my brother S. K. and I were working in our 
field. Suddenly H. K., son of D. K. (kaom Bajral), N. K.
and G. M. K., sons of M. A. K. (kaom IChurshedi) and U. H. K.,
sons of S. H. K. (kaom Hafzal) and A. K., son of G. K.
(kaom Bajral) appeared from the small grove which is 
situated to the north of our well. H. K. was carrying a 
gun. Pointing the gun at me he shouted "Today we shall see 
who stands in the witness box against me" and fired. But 
in the meantime my brother and I managed to hide in our 
cattle shed. The sound of firing attracted men from the 
nearby Dhoke...and the attackers managed to escape.
The reason of this attempted murder is that I was a witness 
in a case registered against H. K. and I had not agreed to 
give evidence according to H. K.’s wishes.
Reported by F. K. son of M. K. (kaom Bathral).
To sum up: The Awans were higher in the political hierarchy before 1951.
Since then there was no clear hierarchy. There is an unresolved struggle 
for supremacy between two Awan factions, while some kammis have risen 
in the hierarchy.
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BPower over resources, government legislation and a relative self- 
sufficiency were the three major factors in the political hierarchy in 
Malakpur before 1951.
The Awans being landowners had power over resources, as a result of 
which they had power over men as well. Nadel characterizes the association 
between economic and political roles as involute or combinative relation­
ship (1964: 68). Bailey comments on the association between power over
resources and power over men as follows.
In the case of politics and economics both concerned
power over resources in men and materials, and I cannot
conceive of a system of cooperation where there was not also 
in the last resort summation of roles (Archiv. Europ. Social 
IV. 1963: 120).
The association between power over men and power over resources is more 
marked when a community is relatively isolated. In the case of Mala­
kpur, when it became a part of a larger political arena and less isolat­
ed than before the elections in 1951, though the Awans did continue to 
own land, their roles became less involute, and they lost some of their 
earlier political power.
The third factor, the government legislation namely the Panjab Alienation 
of Land Act (1901) appears to have been partly responsible for the low 
position of the kammis in the political hierarchy. It is difficult to 
say with any certainty what would have been their position in the absence 
of these legislative disabilities. Judging from the fact, however, that 
many kammis have risen in the hierarchy after the abolition of the Act,
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their low position during the British times might be attributed to 
government legislation.
The explanation of the political relations in Malakpur after 1951 is 
more complex. For instance, we must know why were there intra-kaom 
factions rather than inter-kaom confrontations like the inter-caste 
relations in many Indian villages? What is the composition of the 
factions and why factions are fluid, i.e., why did the factional 
alignments change a number of times during the last twenty years (Tables 
23, 24, 25)?
There were intra-kaom factions rather than inter-kaom confrontations, 
firstly because intra-kaom disputs are a matter of tradition. Most of 
the disputes originate in one or more of the following ways.
a.) Many farmers encroach upon their neighbour's field by slowly moving 
the boundry line. It takes sometime before the neighbour discovers the 
encroachment. Usually he reacts by setting the boundary "in order" 
according to his own thinking. This inevitably leads to serious fights.
b.) Unattended cattle may cause damage to crops. This is particularly 
serious when the crops are ready for harvesting. The issue is fought out 
between the owner of the field and that of the cattle on the spot.
c.) It is not unusual for parents to betrothe their children before 
puberty. Sometimes a boy who has received education develops an outlook 
different from that of his elders. He may refuse to have a "rustic" wife,
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thereby causing a serious blow to the honour of her parents. Sometimes 
however, the refusal may come from the girlTs side. This happens when 
the boy does not measure up to the expectations of her parents.
d.) Suspicions, often ill founded, regarding illict liaison, arouse 
intense emotions and may lead to serious fighting, even murders.
e.) A large percentage of pillagers is illitrate. They need counseling 
and guidance particularly in legal problems. Many educated and ambitious 
Awans become patrons of such individuals and build up a following. A 
following of this kind is useful for the patron in his own conflicts.
Another factor in the intra-kaom factionalism is a latent, sometimes 
manifest rivalry within a kinship group. It is referred to as sharika 
and is fairly widely prevelant throughout the Panjab. It is a rivalry 
between agnates and affines but more sharp among cousins. In a sharika 
an individual attempts not to "look small" in the eyes of his kin group 
in any way. At the same time he hesitates to further the cause of his 
rivals lest they might outstrip him. It is an attitude which appears to 
be insignificant yet has an important role in the emergence and persistence 
of factions.
A third and a new factor in the intra-kaom factionalism was the weakening 
of the traditional mechanisms of arbitration. It was customary on the 
part of the elders to intervene in disputes and to restrain them from going 
too far. The situation has been well described by Gluckman.
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Conflicts are a part of social life and custom appears 
to exacerbate these conflicts: but in doing so custom 
also restrains the conflicts from destroying the wider 
social order.
fur ther:
Again, I am not suggesting that divided loyalties and 
interests will always prevent a dispute arising, or 
prevent social dislocation and change. Loyalties and 
interests are not thus beautifully balanced. What I 
am saying is that these conflicting loyalties and 
divisions of allegiance tend to inhibit the development 
of open quarrelling, and that the greater is likely to 
be the cohesion in a wider range of relationships - 
provided that there is a general need for peace, and 
recognition of a moral order in which this peace can 
flourish (1955: 2, 25).
Factionalism took a new turn when "recognition of a moral order in which 
this peace can flourish11 was undermined by the elections to the Union 
Councils in 1965. The elections to the provincial Assembly 1951 had 
brought in powerful outsiders in the village arena but they were few and 
far away and active on a few occasions only. The Union Council elections 
were different because those who had hitherto restrained conflicts from 
going too far themselves became engaged in a struggle for supramacy. It 
was like "men of the earth" (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), themselves locked 
in a combat.
Why was there not an inter-kaom confrontation like the inter-caste re­
lations in some Indian villages?
There was no inter-kaom confrontation in Malakpur because of a number 
of reasons, the principal ones being the following.
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a.) The Awans feel confident that they are the masters of the
village. They command influence not only within the village but
also beyond it and it is very difficult for a kammi to seriously challenge 
their authority. The power of the landlords such as that of the Awans 
has been described by Wiser in the passage given below.
The leaders of our village are so sure of their power 
that they make no effort to display it. The casual 
visitor finds little to distinguish them from other 
f a r m e r s (1951; 18-9)
b.) Numerical preponderance of the Awans is another important 
factor which has contributed to a submissive attitude on the part of 
the kammis. The kammis constitute only about eleven percent of the 
total population and if taken separately according to their respective 
occupations the percentage of each group is insignificant as compared 
to the Awan population.
c.) Individual social mobility as contrasted to social mobility
in groups in Indian villages ia a major factor. The reasons why there 
is no group social mobility include the following.
i.) There is no concept of "relational pollution". Death brings
no pollution to any agnate, nor is it necessary for any of the agnates 
to perform funerary rites (namaz janaza). Burial is a responsibility of 
the community in which the deceased was living at the time of his death, 
irrespective of his origin.
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ii.) The. concept of kaom is vague, The Awans, their segments and
sub-segments are all referred to as kaom. This is illustrated by the 
genealogy of the Hafzals (Table 26). This Table shows that the kaom 
concept tend to overlap in the cases of the Awans, the Hafzals, Main 
Mohammadals, Kasmals, and Kazi Khails.
The vagueness of the kaom "boundaries” is enhanced by two other factors. 
Unlike Indian subcastes the kaoms are neither strictly endagamous nor 
exclusive. Six marriages between Hafzals and Bajrals, nine between Bajrals 
and Khurshedis, four between Khurshedis and Hafzals, three between 
Bathrals and Khurshedis, five between Bathrals and Bajrals have taken 
place during the last thirty years. More significantly, an Awan 
lumberdarT s wife is a daughter of a poor Awan who had married a woman 
of Musalli kaom. A second Awan lumberdar is married to a Pathan woman 
from the neighbouring village.
Similarly unlike the Indian castes, there is no evidence of exclusiveness 
on the part of kaoms. The pattern of social interaction in Malakpur is 
not different from what has been described by Eglar.
A child learns the caste it belongs to from the time 
it begins to speak, and tells it when he gives his personal 
name. Very early, the child also learns that it can marry 
within its own caste. Yet the fact of belonging to 
different castes does not create social barriers among the 
people, all of whom are Muslims, Kammis and Zamindars sit 
together and may eat together, accept food from one another’s 
house, smoke a common huka,draw water from a common well 
and pray side by side.
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Again:
Landowners and craftsmen, zamindars and kammis, sit in the 
same group; a zamindar may sit or lie on a cot while a 
kaiftmi perches on its edge or squats on the ground or on 
the low wall of the compound surrounding the men's guest 
house.
Further:
On all important occasions in the houses of the kammis, 
the chowdhrani (wife of the lumberdar) honours them by
her presence. She gives the traditional money, the salami
to the bride or the bridegroom. When there is a death in 
the village or in one of the neighbouring villages, she
goes, heading a party of women, to offer condolences and
her presence will enhance the importance of the event 
(1960: 29, 56, 32).
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Table 26
THE HAFZALS
Generation Incombents
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Note that the Hafzal kaom consists of a number of smaller kaoms, the 
Main Mohammadals, Kasmals, Sed Khails, and Kazi Khails. A new kaom 
Sultan Khail is emerging with the foundation of Dhdke Sultan. More 
importantly these smaller kaoms which might be called maximal lineages 
are also collectively referred to as the Hafzals. Like the Marri 
Baluch it is difficult to lay down any precise formal criterion of 
grouping among the Awans. (Pehrson, 1966: 18).
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The vagueness of the kaom concept has been further enhanced by the 
absence of "kaom panchayat". This is because there are no separate 
rules governing the behaviour of kaoms like rules of caste behaviour in 
India.
A consequence of the vagueness of kaom "boundaries" has been that social 
mobility on the part of individuals from the kammi kaoms has not been 
viewed as a threat by the Awans, As has been shown later a number of 
kammi families have acquired wealth, notably the dhabbas. They abstain 
from visiting the men’s houses or leaders of the Awan factions are are 
even addressed as malakji, a title normally reserved for Awans. Comment­
ing on this phenomenon, a prominant Awan remarked "what can you do if 
people call them malakji, what difference does it make anyway? We 
know the reality".
The composition of the faction groups is another question to be con­
sidered. As has been shown in Table 26 fission in kaoms begin with a 
rift among brothers. For example the Kasmals began identifying them­
selves separately after Kasim had a rift with his brothers A and N. 
Similarly the descendants of Mian Mohammad, Mian Mohammadals identified 
themselves as a separate kaom after their ancestral property was 
partitioned between Main Mohammad and his brothers. In recent years 
Sultan Khan has built a new dhoke, Dhoke Sultan Khail, after a quarrel 
with his brothers during the Union Council elections in 1965. Though
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the fission among the Hafzals as described here represents processes in 
other kaoms, a more widespread form of rift is between counsins. This 
is unlike the composition of faction groups in Rampur where the Jat 
faction groups are made up of lineages and clans (Table 18).
Significantly the kammis in Malakpur remain cautiously neutral in the 
factional groupings. They have not moved out from the main settlement and 
do not live in any dhoke. This is probably because in the words of Bailey 
structually, "the system does not allow compitition between castes" 
(Archive Europ. Soc. IV, 1963: 107-24). Likewise according to Nicholas 
who basis his conclusions on data from 19 villages in the Indo-Pakistan 
subcontinant, "intercaste conflict can be the dominant mode of the 
political conflict in a village only where the subordinate caste is more 
numerous than the dominant caste" (ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968; 278).
Why did the factional alignments not remain constant? This appears to 
be because of the following reasons, (a) Most of the Awans are medium 
landowners (see Economic Hierarchy). This gives them a certain amount 
of political and economic independence and enables them to further their 
personal interests, by choosing groups which serve their ends. (b) There 
is a difference between de jure and de facto ownership of land. For 
example according to the records of the patwari, I. K. a Hafzal (Mian 
Mohammadals) owns one hundred acres but in actuality he has distributed 
the land among his four sons. The sons work as his tenants and will be 
recorded as owners of the fields in their possession at the time of his 
death. This has given I. K. a considerable measure of control over the
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political affiliations of his sons but they will follow their own ways 
after his death and may choose to join opposing factions.
The case of Sultan Khan is interesting. He contested the Union Council 
elections in 1965, what was stated to be against the wishes of the entire 
Hafzal kaom including I.K. Many observers believe that Sultan Khan 
could not act so ihdependently and attribute his behaviour to the 
"diplomacy" of I. K. who is said to have given his blessings in secret.
How far are the positions of the kaoms in the political hierarchy 
ascribed or achieved? The higher position of the Awans is ascribed in 
so far as all zamindar kaoms are regarded higher than their dependents.
The zamindars as a category are regarded higher because of their power 
over resources, ability to provide employment and protection to their 
kammis. Though the more land a zamindaroowns the greater is his prestige, 
yet the very fact of being a zamindar earns an individual a certain 
measure of respect.
This raises the questions, can a kammi achieve a position equal to or 
higher than that of a zamindar, and secondly, how significant is what 
Bailey has characterized as localization. The cases of the two dhabba 
families who have acquired some wealth in recent years indicate that 
kammis may achieve a higher position in the political hierarchy. Many 
poorer Awans treat them with deference and address them as malakj i. This 
is probably because the criterion of ranking in political hierarchy is 
changing from being a zamindar to ostensible riches and "right"
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connections outside the village. A striking example of the changing 
position of the kammis in the hierarchy comes from a neighbouring 
village. A prominant landowner and sometimes a high official, had 
unlawfully occupied some land abandoned by Hindu migrants in 1947. No 
questions were raised by anyone until 1969 when a refugee kammi re­
ported the matter to the Martial Law Administrator, as a result of which 
the land was confiscated by the Government.
The instances of the dhabba families also indicate that the role of 
localization in Malakpur as contrasted to that communities in India,
e.g. Bisipara is limited. Though at present many zamindars consider 
these two dhabba families as upstarts and regard them no better than 
before, it seems that with the passage of time the dhabbas will build­
up an improved position in the village.
What is the role of religion in the political hierarchy? I stated in 
the Introduction of this thesis that following Mill's "method of 
difference", I discovered the role of religion through a comparison be­
tween social hierarchies in India and those in Pakistan. After having 
surveyed five communities in India, I proceed with the task here and 
began with a comparison of political hierarchies. I make the comparison 
in three steps: first, I summarize evidence from the Indian communities
next, I consider evidence from Malakpur and note the differences between 
the evidence from the communities in the two countries; and finally I 
ask, does the sacred literature of the Islamic Faith explain these 
differences.
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1, Evidence from the Indian Communities
a.) Castes are classified into "clean" and "unclean". The 
"unclean" castes may not attain positions of political leadership be­
cause they are not accepted by the "clean" castes on account of their 
natal impurity.
b.) It is necessary for those "unclean" castes who attain power 
and wealth to drop their "unclean" caste affiliations such as caste 
occupation and name to be accepted as leaders. As a rule such caste 
Sankritize themselves in the varna scale with the Brahman as a model.
c.) Individual social mobility is absent. It is possible only 
in groups. This is because of "relational pollution" rules governing 
caste endogamy and recruitment to the caste.
d.) Vertical political cleavages are segmental in so far as that 
though political cleavages may divide a caste, agnatic obligations and 
ritual links continue to bind the caste together. Vertical political 
cleavages in the Indian communities are modified by kinship. Examples: 
Jat faction group in Rampur and the Bal and Anna Factions in Gaon.
2. Evidence from Malakpur
a.) Kaoms are classified into two categories, zamindars and kammis. 
The distinction is based upon power over resources and not upon any in­
herent qualities.
Kammis must legitimize a higher position in the political 
hierarchy by acquiring power over resources, by abandoning their kammi 
occupation and identification with kammi kaoms. There is nothing like
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the varna scale. Until the British, times a distinction was made be­
tween kaoms of foreign and those of local origin. The former were ranked 
higher than the latter on account of the formers association with the 
rulers. However, since Independence these distinctions are not emphasized 
and are becoming less meaningful. The Awans no longer emphasize their 
Semitic descent.
Again there is no Brahman model. All kaoms have identical religious 
duties and the m<are accident of birth in any kaom does not entitle an 
individual to any given position. In Malakpur there are three Sayyed 
families. They claim a descent from the Prophet of Islam, two nt command 
little respect because of their moral shortcomings. The third Sayyed is 
respected. This is probably because he is an imam (one who leads prayer 
congregation) and is known for his piety. He was elected a member of 
the Union Council in 1959.
c.) Vertical social mobility does not have to be collective . 
Individuals are not bound up with their descent groups through any form 
of "relational pollution" nor does recruitment to a kaom depend upon 
the origin of the mother. Though kaom endogamy is fairly widely 
practiced, it is not universal and is on the decline.
d.) Vertical political cleavages divide the kaoms into well de­
fined almost mutually exclusive sections. Brothers and more often 
cousins jointopposing faction groups, and the composition of these 
groups is determined more by personal interest rather than kinship 
obligations.
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3. Does the. sacred literature of the Islamic Faith explain 
these differences? The answer is in the affirmative. According to the 
Koran:
0 ye men, Surely we have created you all of a male 
and of a female and made you tribes and families 
that you may know each other; surely the noblest 
among you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most 
careful of his duties (49:13).
Everyman has been created in a state of purity - none 
is born sinful; it is by his own misdeeds that a man 
degrades himself (30; 95, 5).
Still again and those who strive hard for us, We shall 
certainly guide them in our ways, and Allah is surely 
with the doers of good (29:69).
In his last sermon the Prophet of Islam said:
No Arab has superiority over any non-Arab, and no non- 
Arab has any superiority over an Arab; no dark person 
has any superiority over a white person, and no white 
person has any superiority over a dark person. The 
criterion of honour in the sight of God is righteous­
ness and honest living (Aik: 1936).
a.) My contention is that the role of Islam in the political hier­
archy is as follows: It is relatively easier for those occupying lower
positions in the political hierarchy to attain a higher position be­
cause this can be achieved individually.
b .)Inter-kaom confrontation is less likely to take place because 
the dominant kaom does not feel threatened by upward social mobility of 
individuals from the subordinate kaoms here and there. This is unlike 
the communities in India where at best the vertical political cleavages 
are in a modified form giving rise to a greater likelyhood of intercaste 
confrontation.
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It is important to discuss here one of the major findings by Nicholas.
He writes;
Intercaste conflict is important in village politics 
only where the dominant caste makes up less than half of 
the total village population (ed. Singer and Cohn, 1968:
278).
It seems that this generalization is not fully applicable to communities 
in Pakistan. This assertion is based on my observations in a neighbouring 
village. The entire village is owned by two Awans A.N. and R. N. who 
have inherited it from a common grandfather. There has been little 
cooperation between the two cousins and many stories are told about their 
sharika.
An incident which took place during the World War II Illustrates the 
phenomenon under discussion. It is reported that a number of women of 
Musalli kaom complained to R. N. that their male members had been forcibly 
taken away by A.N. to the Recruiting Camp Office and requested him to 
"free them" if possible. Upon hearing this R. N. went to the scene 
and found the men lined up. "What the devil are you doing here"? he 
asked. "Sir, A. N. brought us here". "Come along" he ordered and they 
followed him back to the village. It is reported that R. N. settled 
the matter with the Recruiting Officer later on.
It is significant that there has been no evidence of intra-kaom cooperation 
and inter-kaom confrontation in this village even during the Union Council 
elections. The followers of the two cousins have continued to remain 
in separate groups in spite of their kaoms being common. A possible
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explanation of this phenomenon could be that the subordinate kaoms are 
dependent upon the two zamindars and are not in a position to follow 
an independent course of action. Yet the fact that an absence (or 
otherwise) of ritual bonds among descent groups determines at least in 
part, the direction of political cleavages must'be recognized.
16.4-
Economic Hierarchy 
The economic hierarchy in Malakpur has undergone many changes since the 
turn of the century when the village was much more self sufficient than 
it is today. The population was divided into those who had power over 
resources and those who were their dependents. The latter could be 
classified into three categories, namely, a.) those who received pay­
ments in kind from the zamindars at the time of harvest in exchange for 
specified services. This relationship was called seyp and was identical 
to what is known as jajmani or baluta in Indian communities, b) Those 
who were paid according to piece work. As cash economy was limited main­
ly to the cities, payments to these groups were also made in kind, c) 
Those who were given agricultural land in return for their services.
In Malakpur power over resources rested with the Awans, they being the 
only landowners. Among the category of dependents those who worked on 
seyp were the Lohar, the Nai, the Mochi, the Kubhar, the Machhi and the 
Musalli. The Teli, and the Dhabba, were paid according to piece work. 
The Imam and the Milar were given small pieces of agricultural', land. 
Excepting the Iman, these occupational groups were collectively called 
kammis (workers). Their obligations and payments which they were to 
receive for their services were matters of traditions and subject to 
changes by elders of the kaoms from time to time. The obligations and 
payments prevalent in those days are given below.
Lohar who also worked as a carpenter repaired and manufactured 
agricultural implements, doors, windows and beams for the houses, if
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provided with the necessary material. He also made a pair of painted 
cots on the occasion of a marriage in a client’s household.
The duties of the Nai consisted of cutting men’s hair and trimming their 
beards, running errands and cooking at major ceremonies as well as on 
the occasion of vangar (a form of mutual help in agricultural work or 
house-building. Participants work for a day or two on reciprocal basis 
and are provided with food by the individual for whom the work is under­
taken) . It was he who dressed the bridegroom, his wife dressed the bride. 
He also performed circumcision and minor surgery.
The Mochi made and repaired shoes and leather coating for the trident 
used for winnowing, and supplied two pairs of shoes per head every year 
for his cleint’s household.
The Kubhar supplied his cleints with earthen pots twice a year as well 
as earthen buckets for Persian wells.
The Machhi worked as farm labourers, his wife baked loaves of bread at 
the community tandur (oven).
The Dhabbas made and dyed course cloth and bed covers.
The Teli crushed oil seeds, carded cotton and prepared quilts.
The Milar specialized invegetable growing and cultivated well irrigated 
land.
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The Musalli worked as a farm labourer as well as a drummer. He also 
assisted the Nai in cooking and serving food on the ceremonial occasions.
The Iman) was somewhat different in so far as that he was a teacher and 
led the prayer congregation and therefore was treated with some respect.
The Lohar and the Mochi received equal payments, namely, four bundles 
of wheat or maize and l/20th of the dheri (heap of grain after winnowing) 
twice a year at harvest time, excepting that the former received extra 
grains for his wood work for houses and cots, and the latter received 
hides of cattle.
The Nai and the Kubhar were paid half the quantities of grain to the 
Lohar and the Mochi, excepting that the Nai received food and extra 
grain on ceremonials and the Kubhar for earthen buckets.
The Machhi and the Musalli were given grains enough for the year.
The Teli obtained two pounds of oil seeds from every twelve pounds he 
crushed. The Dhabba was supplied with cotton yarn by his clients for 
weaving cloth. He received grains for his labour. The quantity of the 
grain was agreed upon in advance between him and his clients.
There was no Washerman nor was there a Scavengar in the village.
In recent years many changes in the occupational strucuture and con­
sequently in the economic hierarchy have taken place. Though there is 
some confusion regarding landownership on account of the discrepancies
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between de facto and de jure ownership yet it is possible to rank kaoms 
in a general way according to the extent of landownership. For example., 
almost all the Khurshedis, the Jhamals, the Bathrals, and the Imrals own 
land but about fifteen percent are landless in the Bajral, the Hafzal, 
the Jafral, the Sadqual, the Hajal and Meher Mohammadal Kaoms. The pro­
portion of the landless families in the remaining kaoms is higher. The 
proportion of the landed and the landless as well as the range of land­
holdings in the Khurshedis and the Hafzals is given below. Significantly 
land has not passed into the hands of any outsider but has been purchased 
by wealthier Awans within the village.
Table 27
Size of 
Holdings 
(acres)
0
1 - 5  
6 - 1 0  
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 - 25 
26 - 30 
31 - 35 
36 - 40 
Over 40
Khurshedis 
Number of 
Families
1
10
3
6
1
Hafzals 
Number of 
Families
8
4 
12
3
1
5 
1 
5 
1
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Most of the landless Awans work as tenants and many small landholders 
have found employment outside the village. Thirty-five Awans are 
employed in the army and two are in the police service, one is a school 
teacher and four are clerks in the nearby town. An Awan has become a 
tailor and another has opened a shop. The latter is also an unpaid Imam,
Ghanges in the kammi group are also notable and are shown in Table 28.
Table 28
Occupational 
Groups and total 
Number of Families
Traditional
Occupation
Present
Occupation
Lohar
9
Nai
7
Mo chi 
11
Blacksmith
Carpenter
Barber
Cook
Tanner
Shoemaker
Traditional 
Occupation - 9
Traditional 
Occupation - 4
Traditional 
Occupation + 
Tenant - 3
Traditional 
Occupation - 7
Traditional 
Occupation + 
Tenant - '4
Kubhar
3 Potter
Traditional 
Occupation + 
Tenant - 3
Machhi
3
Musalli
12
Farm labour 
factotum
Farm Labour 
drummer
- general Traditional 
Occupation - 3
Traditional 
Occupation - 9
Weaving 3
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Teli
3
Dhabba
12
Milar
12
Oil-presser 
Co tton-carder
Weaver
calico-printer
Vegtable grower
Traditional 
Occupation - 2
Blacksmith - 1
Traditional 
Occupation - 5
Shopkeeper - 4
Iman + farming 
-  2
Hakim (Native 
doctor) - 1
Traditional 
Occupation - 5
Shopkeeper - 4
Army Service- 2
Shopkeeper + 
Iman - 1
A number of kammis have purchased plots and have built their own houses 
during the last decade. These are Milar 10, Dhabba 5, Lohar 4, Nai 2,
Mochi I. Further many kammis have migrated to other places such as newly 
colonized areas in Thai and Sind. Those who migrated during the last 
ten years were Mochi 7, Milar 5, Nai 5, Machhi 2, Dhabba 2, Teli 2.
To sum up: In the earlier economic hierarchy the Awans were higher and the 
kammis were lower. Various occupational groups within the kammi category 
did not differ markedly from one another because little differentiation 
in wealth was discernable. Subsistence seemed to be their main concern. 
Fortes would characterize Malakpur as a homogeneous society. He writes:
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A homogeneous society is ideally one in which any person 
in the sense given to this term by Radcliffe-Brown in his 
recent (1950) essay, can be substituted for any other 
person of the same category without bringing about changes 
in the social structure. This implies that any two persons 
of the same category have the same body of customary usages 
and beliefs (Am. Anth. Vol. 55, 1953: 36).
In the present economic hierarchy the extent of social substitutability 
is less than before. All Awans are not economically independent, nor 
are all kammis economically dependent.
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BThe first question to be considered here is why were the Awans higher 
and the kammis lower in the earlier economic hierarchy. The higher 
position of the Awans was apparently due to their numerical strength and 
their organized and successful attempts to maintain their hold on their 
lands since the sixteenth century and perhaps even earlier.
The extent to which tradition was a factor in the callings of the various 
kammi groups is a matter of conjecture because of the assertion of some 
kammis that they were no different from the Awans and had inherited their 
occupation from their ancestors who like themselves had no choice but to 
take to a kammi calling. This assertion is supported by the absence of 
any ritual constraint upon choice of callings.
Another explanation of the economic hierarchy was that it was due to the 
self sufficiency of the village. It was a structural necessity for 
Malakpur to contain both craftsmen and landowners. Thus* the descent 
factor in the position of the kammis is not very significant. Had the 
ancestors of the present kammis not accepted the subordinate positions 
which they did, their place would have been taken by some others in 
Malakpur.
The changes in the early economic hierarchy may be attributed to a number 
of factors, most important ones being subdivision of land into un­
economic holdings feuds and litigation and new economic opportunities 
in a field much wider than the village. In other words the landlessness
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of nearly one fifth of the Awans is due to the fact that they sold
their inherited shares on account of their being uneconomic, and
partly because many of them found employment outside the village. The
Awan do not appear to be different from the Warriors in Bisipara in
regard to subdivisions of holdings and the consequent selling of land.
However, the two.cases are not quite identical because unlike Bisipara
Warriors, the Awans did not sell their land in order to meet expenses on
ceremonials. The reasons for the sale of land by the Awans may be sought
elsewhere. Darling writes:
Further west, owing to the factions and feuds, from Attock 
to Muzaffargarh, litigation and debt appears to be closely 
allied. To people, says the Settlement Officer of Mianwali, 
"who are not only delighted to take advantage of the smallest 
chance of joining in an affray or trying their strength but 
are also desparetely fond of civil litigation, years of 
plenty offer an irresistable temptation to spend money in 
connection with cases in which the long run prove utterly 
ruinous (1947: 68).
Further, the holdings which Awans had sold would probably not have been
uneconomic were it not for the fact that a zamindar was expected to
meet all his seyp obligations and perhaps give a little more for added
prestige. Darling illustrates the behaviour pattern of a zamindar with
the example of a Baluch landowner on the western bank of the Indus.
This zamindar was left with nothing for himself after he had "settled"
with the kammis at the dheri. He remarked "Sain pat ralcha" (God saved
my honour), signifying that he was satisfied because he had met all his
obligations as a zamindar (1947: 100).
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The relatively higher position of the Icammja in the economic hierarchy 
is due to new economic opportunities. Until the Independence they had 
two formidable obstacles in their upward social mobility, the zamindars, 
and the Hindus shopkeepers. The former are still there and though the 
abolition of the Panjab Alienation of Land Act has entitled kammis to 
purchase agricultural property the zamindars have made the best of 
hale shufa ( legislation safeguarding the rights of a neighbour to buy 
land) and have prevented the land from passing into the hands of the 
kammis. However, the second obstacle is no longer there. The Hindu 
shopkeepers have left. As has been shown in the previous section, 
excepting two or three shops, all the shops in Malakpur are owned and 
operated by kammis.
Are the positions in the economic hierarchy achieved or ascribed? The 
positions in the economic hierarchy are achieved, and not ascribed. The 
landless Awans are lower in the economic hierarchy in spite of the fact 
that they belong to the zamindar category. Some .Dahhabas and Milars are 
higher in the hierarchy than the Awans in spite of the fact that they be­
long to the kammi category.
What is the role of religion in the economic hierarchy? Following the
procedure which was adopted in the section dealing with the political 
hierarchy I begin with a summary of what were found to be the principal
factors in the economic hierarchies in Indian communities. Next I make
a comparison between the Indian situation and that in Malakpur and ask 
how far might the differences be explained by a reference to the Islamic Faith.
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Evidence from the Indian communities
a) Occupations are ranked according to the extent of purity or 
pollution. The very basis of rank was vital (Orenstein). A 
man of ucho or a high caste may not take to impure calling how­
ever lucreative it may be (Bisipara).
b) Individual social mobility is absent. If an individual from un­
clean caste becomes wealthy he initiates the process of fission 
in the caste to which he belongs. This is because "there is a 
need which has always existed in the caste system namely to 
translate familial mobility to caste mobility". Whom will the 
sons and daughters of the mobile family marry? (Srinivas). The 
Boro Sundi in Bisipara are an example.
c) Heavy expenses on ceremonials are incurred to meet ritual obliga­
tions, sometimes resulting in the sale of land and a lower position
in the economic hierarchy (Bisipara).
Evidence from Malakpur
a) There are two ways of ranking kaoms. (i) Those who have power over
resources (zamindars) are ranked higher than those who have not 
(kammi)0 (ii) Provided that wealth is equal, those who claim a 
foreign descent (Pathan, Mughal and Sayyeds) are ranked higher than 
those who do not (Sheikh). All local converts to Islam irrespec­
tive of their origin and occupation are collectively called Sheikhs.
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Customarily if a kammi acquires wealth he abandons his kammi 
calling and is identified as a Sheikh. Mobility from one kaom 
to another also takes two forms. It may mean a change from 
kammi title to zamindar title e.g. from Lohar to Malak. The second 
form of mobility is the change of the title of a kammi lcaom to 
Sbhkh and even kaoms of foreign descent, a phenomenon resulting 
from acquisition of wealth. Ibbetson's observations are of 
interest here. He writes that there is a common saying, namely,
"last year I was a Julaha (weaver); this year I am a Shekh; 
next year if prices rise I shall be a Sayyed".(1916: 222) . Census 
figures from Campbellpur District also indicate that this saying 
is well founded. According to the census figures the Milars numbered 
36,565 in 1901 and only 10,516 in 1931, while the Awans numbered 
150,898 in 1901 and 204,295 in 1931 (Dist. Gazt, 1901 and 1933, Vol. 
XXII Pt. XXXIV-XXXVII).
In Malakpur itself two Awans have become shopkeepers and so have many 
kammis. This shows the predominance of rational motivation in the economic 
hierarchy.
b) Social mobility is not collective. Unlike castes in India endogamy 
is not an integral factor in social mobility. A person who be­
comes wealthy may find spouses for his children in groups of his 
own economic class. This process is facilitated by the relative 
ease by which kaom titles may be changed. Should an individual be­
come poor, he also finds spouses for his children in groups of his
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own class. This is oftentime on exchange basis.
These assertains are based on observations made in two different 
areas. (i) a fairly high percentage of officers in the army as 
well as in the civil services belong to kammi families. They marry 
in cities with educated girls without much considerations to the 
origin of either of the spuses. (ii) The settlers in Rahmatwala, 
a new settlement in Thai are refugees from India. Seven families 
are immigrants from Hoshiarpur, twelve from Jullendur and twenty- 
two from Amritsar. Those from Hoshiarpur, are Rajputs, those from 
Jullendur are Arains and those from Amritsar are Jats. Interest­
ingly, for the first twn years they went as far as Lahore (a 
distance of about two hundred miles) to find spouses in their own 
kinship group. However, in recent years they have started exchange 
marriages within the village as well as with the local population.
The reasons for abandoning endogamy is said to be a marked contrast 
in wealth between them and their more prosperous kinsmen. In 
Malakpur itself the cases of those kammi families who have migrated 
to other places also support the assertion that social mobility is 
an individual phenomenon. These families will find spouses for 
their children from the economic groups in their new homes.
c) Expenditure on ceremonials is not a cause of the sale of ancestral 
property.
My contention is that the differences between the Indian communities and
Malakpur are due to the fact that in the case of the former ritual
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constraints play a very significant part while in the case of the latter 
there are no ritual constraints.
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CONCLUSION
Conclusion
In the preceeding sections I examined the various communities more or 
less as independent social systems. In the present section I adopt a 
broader approach. Keeping in view their common formative factors, I 
revert to the question raised in the beginning of this thesis and ask 
if the definition of the concept caste can be based on structural criteria 
rather than on particular features of the Hindu philosophical scheme.
However, before I offer an answer to this question it is necessary to 
consider some well known attempts to find structural criteria for the 
definition of caste.
In his monograph, Caste Ranking and Community Structure in Five Regions 
in India and Pakistan, Marriott undertake& the systematic explanation 
of regional similarities and differences in elaboration of the "caste 
system of India and Pakistan" in terms of associated features of community 
structure. It is hypothesized and"provisionally proved that elaboration 
of caste ranking is shaped and determined" by the extent to which the 
following features of structure are present: Cl) numerous ethnic groups 
in the community; (2) members of these groups "interact with members of 
other groups in a clearly stratified order"; (3) their interactions as 
individuals must not deviate widely from the stratified order of inter­
action among their respective castes taken as wholes:; (4) members of the 
local hierarchy are isolated from hierarchies elsewhere which are inconsistent 
with it (1960: 4).
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It is generally agreed that Harriott's study falls short of its promise. 
It is weakened by the pervasive circularity of its main argument and 
by the ambiguity in definition of the variable under investigation.
Barth's analysis in his System of Social Stratification in Swat, North
Pakistan is more fruitful. He writes;
Pathans in Swat express the notion of compatibility 
and incompatibility of statuses in terms of a concept 
of shame (sharm). A man is "ashamed" to assume any 
position or perform any action which he feels is incompatible
with his caste status... In its revelance to caste, shame
expresses precisely the notion of hierarchical incompat­
ibility of statuses and roles, and applied equally to up-and- 
down-grading; for exampe, a carpenter refuses, from shame, 
to perform a polluting service like washing clothes for 
another, while feeling of shame similarly prevents him from 
trying to exercise authority over a caste superior such as a 
Pakhtun or a Saint who is in debt to him. The use of this 
shame concept by Pathans corresponds to the use of the 
pollution concept among Hindus. Shame directs the choices made 
by individuals in assuming new part statuses. The caste 
organization depends for its maintenance on the explicit 
recognition of this discriminating factor.
He goes on to say:
The principal of status summation seems to be the structural 
feature which most clearly characterizes caste as a system 
of social stratification (1962: 142-5).
Bailey also consideres the principle of summation of roles as one of the 
structural features which most clearly characterizes caste as a system of 
social stratification, the other two being birth ascription and cooperation. 
He writes:
Is it possible, then, to conceive that cooperative 
activity could exist without the summation of roles, or vice- 
versa? That is, could there be a system of groups, connected 
by mutual and complementary rights and duties, so that the 
people in group A had e.g. a high ritual status and a low 
political status vis-a-vis group B? Clearly this is possible 
so long as the fields in which authority is exercised are
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clearly separated from one another. (In the case of 
politics and economics both concern power over resources 
in men and materials, and I cannot conceive of a system of 
cooperation where there was not also in the last resort 
summation of roles).
But in the field of religion and politics, we cannot say 
that cooperation entails the summation of roles. There­
fore, as structural features defining caste, to birth- 
ascription and cooperation, we must add the summation of 
roles. Caste systems are always involute systems.
He believes that for a society to exhibit a caste system the groups must 
be exclusive, exhaustive, ranked, closed, relations between which are 
organized by summation of roles and which cooperate and do not compete, 
further that caste in this sense exist in small scale societies or enclaves 
of larger societies. As an isolated community loses its economic and 
political self-sufficiency and becomes a part of the larger society, it 
also loses the cooperation among its castes. Thus, the caste conflicts 
in the Indian communities are due to the fact that they are no longer 
interdependent as in a small village. They are now economic groups com­
peting for their interest rather than cooperating. This explains why 
says Bailey there are caste associations in India. (Archive. Europ. Jr. 
of Soc. IV. 1963: 120,1).
The value of the principle of summation of roles as a structural character­
istic of social stratification cannot be denied. Nadel writes:
More generally speaking, role overlaps can function as 
"linked incentives" so that, through their linkage, the 
normative behaviour implicit in one role is safeguarded 
by the value character of the other ...
The advantages of role summation lies in the strengthening 
of social integration and of social control. For the more 
roles an individual combines in his person, the more is he 
linked by relationships with persons in other roles and in 
divP8?£§ areas of social life...
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Why should there be a summation of roles at all? I do 
not quite know how to answer this since we simply cannot 
conceive of a society entirely without it. But this much 
can, I think safely be said. The summation of roles is an 
aspect of the general principle of "allocation" which we 
discussed before; it forms part of the basic "economy" of 
P societies, in the sense that it reflects the balance be- 
^ tween needs (to have such and such proficiencies, interests 
and aims represented in the population) and resources (the 
human beings available (1964: 71-72)...
My submission is that a comparison between social hierarchies in India 
and Pakistan shows that the structural definition of caste is incomplete. 
This is so because of the following reasons.
a.) Even before Malakpur lost its original self-sufficiency the groups
in it were not mutually exclusive in so far as all kaoms prayed 
side by side in a mosque and there was no ritual ranking as in
communities in India. Pollution as in the Hindu belief system has
never been manifested in Malakpur.
b.) The struc^jral definition of caste does not explain why the direct­
ions of political cleavages should be different from those in India.
c.) Finally the strucutal definition of caste takes no account of the 
collective social mobility in India as contrasted to individual 
social mobility in Pakistan.
May I therefore conclude that the social stratification in India is unique, 
both structurally and culturally and therefore the only form which may be 
justifiably called caste.
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